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  Abstract 
 
A Social and Labour Plan (‘SLP’) contains the comprehensive development programmes that 
a mining right holder must create and implement to benefit a mining affected community. An 
application for a mining right must be accompanied by an SLP. Additionally, SLPs must contain 
development programmes that address human resources and local economic development.  
This dissertation considers whether the SLP System perpetuates an enclave approach to 
development (‘enclave development’). Enclave development occurs where mining companies 
develop physical infrastructure, such as roads and electricity, to support their extraction of 
natural resources. The definition relied on in this dissertation goes a step further to include 
the implementation of social programs that only target specific areas surrounding mining 
operations.   Assuming that the SLP system indeed perpetuates enclave development, the 
dissertation also inquires whether this can be remedied with reference to the African Mining 
Vision (‘AMV’).  
The hypothesis that the SLP System perpetuates enclave development was initially borne out 
of the Marikana Commission of Inquiry, which revealed issues with a British mining company’s 
SLP compliance. Relying on an enclave development approach is particularly problematic in 
South Africa, as it neglects the development of labour-sending areas and other poor 
communities that happen to be far from mining operations. 
By considering the AMV, it becomes evident that elements of the AMV’s proposed strategy 
of Resource-based Industrialisation are being pursued in South African mineral law and 
policies. The issue then arises whether the AMV can provide insight. Is it the case that South 
Africa has not yet seen the benefits of pursuing a Resource-based Industrialisation (‘RBI’) 
strategy because government is yet to maximise its implementation? Alternatively, are the 
critiques levelled against the AMV’s RBI strategy valid, hence its inability to speak to the South 
African SLP System? The critiques levelled against an RBI strategy are that: (a) it perpetuates 
the colonial model of resource extraction (thus explaining why South Africans fail to see the 
positive impact of this industrialisation strategy) and (b) it fails to address the negative social 
and environmental costs of pursuing a minerals based industrialisation strategy.  
Were one to support the argument that South Africa should work towards the full 
implementation of an RBI strategy, then the AMV’s proposal of localising the benefits of 
mining are appealing. The AMV proposes that a government establishes clear fiscal linkages 
with mining operations, that there be a clear revenue distribution system and the 
establishment of a Sovereign Wealth Fund. 
The development of fiscal linkages and a clear revenue distribution system would enable 
government to re-invest and distribute the revenue to local government, so that labour-
sending areas and poor communities benefit from mining. The portion of the revenue from 
mining would be invested into a Sovereign Wealth Fund and the revenue would ensure future 
generations also benefit from mining.  
vi 
 
 
The above approach, to localising the benefits of mining as opposed to relying on SLPs, returns 
primary responsibility for ensuring social development to the South African government. 
Governments are inherently far better capable than mining companies at ensuring far-
reaching social development and promoting socio-economic development.  
This dissertation concludes by asserting that at a theoretical level, although the AMV does 
provide insight that could potentially curtail the perpetuation of enclave development by the 
SLP System, whether these insights are worth implementing, and whether they can be 
implemented by the South African government, in the light of the compelling critiques 
levelled against the AMV’s RBI strategy needs further research.  
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Chapter 1: South Africa’s current mining 
landscape  
1. Introduction 
The Marikana Massacre is described as ‘one of the worst human tragedies’ in South Africa 
post democracy.1 It happened in August 2012, when heavily armed police intervened in a 
dispute between mine workers from different trade unions, and their employer, Lonmin PLC 
(‘Lonmin’). Forty-four mine workers died that day near Lonmin’s Mine in Marikana, as a result 
of the lethal force used by the police to break up the occupation of striking mineworkers upon 
a hilltop. 2 On 12 September 2012, Former President of the Republic of South Africa, Jacob 
Zuma, issued a proclamation establishing a commission of inquiry.3 The commission was 
tasked4 with determining whether an act or omission by Lonmin was instrumental in creating 
an environment that led to the massacre.5  It was in this context that Lonmin’s Social and 
Labour and Plan (‘SLP’) came under scrutiny.6  
According to Lonmin’s SLP, the mine had committed to building 5500 houses for their 
employees by 2011.7 When the commission of inquiry began in September 2012, only three 
of the 5500 houses were built.8 This is despite Lonmin acknowledging9 that failure to comply 
with its housing obligations could result in the withdrawal of their mining licenses.10   
                                                     
1 The Times ‘Marikana Massacre exposes weaknesses’ 20 August 2012 at 14; Dianne Hawker and Gcwali Khanyile 
‘The bloody smell and ugly sight of Marikana’ Sunday Independent 19 August 2012 at 6; The Star ‘Let justice be 
done’ 24 August 2012 at 14; Citizen ‘Marikana exposes leadership failure’ 20 August 2012 at 12; Pretoria News 
‘Marikana Massacre highlights leadership crisis’ 20 August 2012 at 9; Star ‘Ministerial committee to assist victims’ 
20 August 2012 at 15. 
2 Preamble para (a) of the Establishment of a Commission of Enquiry into the tragic incident at or near the area 
commonly known as the Marikana Mine in Rustenburg, North West Province. Terms of Reference Gazette No. 
35680 of 12 September 2012. Hereafter ‘Terms of Reference Gazette No. 35680’; Greg Marinovich ‘The murder 
fields of Marikana: the cold murder fields of Marikana’ The Daily Maverick, 8 September 2012. 
3 Terms of Reference Gazette No. 35680 see note 2. 
4 Terms of Reference Gazette No. 35680 see note 2.  
5 Subparagraph 1.1.3 of the Terms of Reference in Gazette No. 35680 see note 2. 
6 Marikana Commission of Inquiry: Report on matters of public, national and international concern arising out of 
the tragic incidents at the Lonmin Mine in Marikana, in the North West Province (31 March 2015), Ch. 2. Available 
at http://www.sahrc.org.za/home/21/files/marikana-report-1.pdf accessed 11 February 2017. Hereafter 
‘Marikana Commission of Inquiry Report’. 
7  Ibid para 17; Lonmin Social and Labour Plan Analysis – Quantitative Assessment Annexure ‘A’ at 2 available at 
http://www.sahrc.org.za/home/21/files/Lonmin%20Social%20and%20Labour%20Plan%20Analysis%20Qualitati
ve%20and%20Quantitative%20Assessment_ANNEXURE%20A%5B1%5D.pdf accessed 4 May 2017. 
8 Marikana Commission of Inquiry Report see note 6 para 19. 
9 In its Sustainable Development Reports.  
10 Marikana Commission of Inquiry Report see note 6 para 28. Under point 3 of the Mining Charter, non-
compliance renders the mining company in breach of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 
of 2002 (‘MPRDA’) and subject to section 47 read with sections 98 and 99 of the MPRDA. 
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An application for a mining right must be accompanied by an SLP.11  An SLP contains the 
comprehensive development programmes that a mining right holder will create and 
implement to benefit a ‘mining affected community’.12 Additionally, SLPs must contain 
development programmes that address human resources and local economic development.13 
SLPs typically target the specific areas surrounding their mining operations (enclaves) to 
contribute to socio-economic development in those areas.14 This ‘enclave’ approach to socio-
economic development (for short: ‘enclave development’) can be critiqued because it 
attempts to concentrate the benefits of mining to only mining affected communities. From 
this critique, the hypothesis for this dissertation arises, namely that absolute compliance with 
the SLP System15 cannot result in large-scale and far-reaching socio-economic development of 
South African communities.16  
As such, the SLP System misses its central aims which are: (i) to promote employment and 
advance socio-economic development for all South Africans; and (ii) to ensure that mining 
right holders contribute to the socio-economic development of the areas where they 
operate.17 This inherent inability of the SLP System to distribute widely the benefits of mining 
translates to both labour-sending areas and poor communities that happen to be far from 
mineral reserves not experiencing socio-economic development. 
Non-compliance with the obligations of SLPs is not limited to Marikana and is widespread. At 
the end of March 2015, the Minister of Mineral Resources stated that a total of 240 mining 
right holders failed to comply with their SLPs.18 Various reasons have been identified for the 
gross lack of compliance by mining right holders.19 One reason is that the profit motive of 
mining companies means that SLP compliance is the bare minimum required to appease the 
                                                     
11 42(1)(a) of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Regulations GG No. 26275 of 23 April 2004. 
12 Department of Mineral Resources Revised Social and Labour Plan Guidelines (October, 2010) at 4. Available at 
http://www.Department of Mineral Resources.gov.za/guidelines-revised-social-and-labour-
plans/summary/119-how-to/221-guidelines-revised-social-and-labour-plans-.html accessed 4 May 2017. 
13 Regulation 46(b) and (c) of the MPRDA see note 11. 
14 Regulation 41(c) of the MPRDA see note 11. 
15 ‘SLP System’ refers to the MPRDA Regulations governing SLPs and the Mining Charter. 
16 S 24(b)(iii) of the Constitution of Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter the ‘Constitution’) read with section 
3(1) of the MPRDA states that the State is the custodian of mineral and petroleum resources for the benefit of 
all South Africans and their exploitation should promote socio-economic development. 
17 Regulation 41(a) and (c) of  the MPRDA see note 11 
18 National Council of Provinces Question for oral reply No. 178 Advance Notice No: CO582E. Date of Publication 
in Internal Question Paper: 19 October 2015. Internal Question Paper Number: 37 as cited in Centre for Applied 
Legal Studies (CALS) ‘The Social and Labour Plan Series. Phase 1: System Design Trends Analysis Report’ (March, 
2016) at 14 available at https://www.wits.ac.za/cals/our-programmes/environmental-justice/social-and-labour-
plans/ accessed 18 July 2018. Hereafter ‘CALS SLP Phase I Report’. 
19 Centre for Applied Legal Studies (CALS) ‘The Social and Labour Plan Series Phase II: Implementation Operation 
Analysis Report’ (March, 2017) at 45 to 48 available at https://www.wits.ac.za/cals/our-
programmes/environmental-justice/social-and-labour-plans/ accessed 18 July 2018. Hereafter ‘CALS SLP Phase 
II Report’. 
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regulator.20 Another reason is that SLPs are not prioritised as much as other legal obligations 
such as the Environmental Impact Assessment.21 Companies lack the skills necessary to plan 
and implement local economic development projects.22 This means that ‘development’ is 
understood as ‘building structures’.23  Additionally, the approach taken to implementing SLPs 
by mining rights holders has been described by the Department of Mineral Resources (‘DMR’) 
as elevating form over substance.24 Rather, the aim should be sustainable systemic change 
that can only occur where companies partner effectively with the relevant government 
departments to meet community needs.25  
The general non-compliance with SLPs is often exacerbated by legislation that is poorly drafted 
and unclear.26 Additionally, the perception is that various government departments and 
organs fail to coordinate and communicate effectively.27 An affidavit submitted to the 
Marikana Commission of Inquiry28 indicated that the inconsistencies29 of the legal framework 
underpinning the SLPs impacted the ability of key role-players to fulfil their roles.30 This meant 
that in certain instances government officials would offer mining right holders differing 
interpretations of the (ambiguous) legislation and this would, in turn, affect the 
implementation of the SLP by the mining company where there was an attempt to comply.31 
The DMR’s lack of capacity and resources32 means that it is unable to process the large 
amounts of SLPs that are submitted within the required time frames.33 Other issues faced by 
the DMR include the inability to monitor compliance with SLPs and enforce regulations34 and 
the inconsistency of their approach to the various mining companies.35 
                                                     
20 Ibid at 47. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid.  
23 Ibid.   
24 This was stated in a presentation to the National Assembly’s Portfolio Committee on Mineral Resources. 
Parliamentary Monitoring Group: Mineral Resources Committee Meeting ‘Social and Labour Plans: Centre for 
Applied Legal Studies briefing’ 30 November 2016 available at https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/23775/  
accessed 27 February 2017. 
25 CALS SLP Phase II Report see note 18 at 47. 
26 CALS SLP Phase II Report see note 18 at 48. 
27 CALS SLP Phase II Report see note 18 at 48. 
28 Managing Transformation Solution (Pty) Ltd: Affidavit to the Marikana Commission of Inquiry ‘The problems 
of the Social and Labour Plan (SLP) “System” within the Mining sector in South Africa’ Annexure E (August 2014) 
available at 
http://www.sahrc.org.za/home/21/files/Marikana%20Commission%20of%20Inquiry_SLP%20Affidavit_Final_20
140819%5B3%5D.pdf accessed 27 February 2017. Hereafter ‘MTS Affidavit’. 
29 The fact that there is uncertainty in the mining industry regarding how the provisions in the Codes of Good 
Practice should be managed allows a gap for inconsistencies. Additionally, the DMR does not always focus on the 
Codes; MTS Affidavit see note 28 at Annexure E.  
30 MTS Affidavit see note 28 at 51. 
31 Ibid at 76. 
32 Ibid at 74; CALS SLP Phase II Report see note 18 at 52.  
33 MTS Affidavit see note 28 at 77. 
34 CALS SLP Phase II Report see note 18 at 52. 
35 CALS SLP Phase II Report see note 18 at 52; MTS Affidavit see note 28 at 76. 
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Within the context of a flawed SLP System in South Africa, one can consider what African 
leaders have acknowledged.36 Namely, that the exploitation of natural resources should result 
in socio-economic development and that this can be achieved in four ways.37 First, the 
extractives industry should be linked to the other sectors of the economy.  Second, quality 
data on the extent of the natural resources is important.  Third,  African states need to improve 
their capacity to negotiate with mining companies on the exploitation regime, and finally, 
there needs to be an improvement on the ability to audit, monitor and regulate revenue from 
natural resources.38  
South African politicians, along with other African leaders, maintain that Africa’s mineral 
wealth is still able to act as a catalyst for wide-spread industrialisation that results in socio-
economic development.39 The African Mining Vision (‘AMV’) is the flagship of these efforts 
and has been adopted by all 54 African Union member countries.40 The AMV has been 
described as representing a paradigm shift from a focus on solely maximising resource rents 
to a multifaceted approach that aims to achieve structural transformation by means of 
Resource-based Industrialisation (‘RBI’).41  
South Africa’s extractives industry has, on the one hand been hailed as ‘truly diversified’.42 On 
the other hand, the DMR has lamented the lack of compliance with SLPs and where mining 
right holders do attempt to comply, it elevates form over substance.43 These two 
contradictory points highlight a disjuncture in South Africa’s mining industry. The disjuncture 
is found in the fact that the extractives industry is considered diversified, despite its regulatory 
framework, the SLP System, that is meant to result in diversification and socio-economic 
development,  not being implemented.   
                                                     
36 Economic Commission for Africa ‘Minerals Cluster Policy Study in Africa: Pilot Studies of South Africa and 
Mozambique’ (2004) at 22. Hereafter ‘ECA: Minerals Cluster Policy Study’. 
37 Ibid.  More of the features highlighted by African leaders are discussed in Chapter Three. 
38  African Mining Vision 2009, Addis Ababa at 15 to 30. These features highlighted by African leaders are 
discussed more in depth in Chapter Three. 
39 This is evident in the sub-heading of the African Mining Vision which appears in the introduction as 
‘Transparent, equitable and optimal exploitation of mineral resources to underpin broad-based sustainable 
growth and socio-economic development’ see African Mining Vision 2009, Addis Ababa at v. 
40 ‘About the AMV’ available at http://www.africaminingvision.org/about.html accessed 19 April 2019; ‘African 
Mining Vision’ available at https://knowledge.uneca.org/ASM/AMV accessed 19 April 2019.  
41 Yao Graham ‘Escaping the Winner’s Curse – The African Mining Vision (AMV) and some challenges of the 
international trade and investment regime’ (2013) workshop on International Law, Natural Resources and 
Sustainable Development, 11-13 September 2013, Third World Network Africa, Accra. Available at 
https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/research/clusters/international/devconf/participants/papers/graham_-
_escaping_the_winners_curse.pdf  
42 ECA: Minerals Cluster Policy Study see note 36 at 22. 
43 This was stated in a presentation to the National Assembly’s Portfolio Committee on Mineral Resources. 
Parliamentary Monitoring Group: Mineral Resources Committee Meeting ‘Social and Labour Plans: Centre for 
Applied Legal Studies briefing’ 30 November 2016 available at https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/23775/  
accessed 27 February 2017. 
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This disjuncture is further compounded by the fact that the levels of inequality in South Africa 
have been consistently rising.44 Although the extractives industry cannot be held solely 
responsible for the accumulation of wealth on the one end of the spectrum, the rise in 
inequality can be interpreted as the wealth of the country already benefitting the wealthy.45 
This inequality is a trend that is reflected in resource rich countries.46 The above begs the 
question whether, contrary to the trend highlighted in other resource rich countries, South 
Africa’s laws and policies can achieve the objective of ensuring South Africa’s mineral wealth 
benefits all.      
2. Research Aims and Question 
From the broad problem above, we can extract the narrower research question that will be 
the focus of this dissertation: how can the AMV influence the content of the SLP System as 
found in the MPRDA, its regulations governing SLPs and the Mining Charter? 
The research question is based on two hypotheses.  First, that South Africa’s SLP System is 
failing in its attempt to achieve the objective of socio-economic development. The   second 
hypothesis is that South Africa is not pursuing an RBI strategy and thus the research question 
enquires into whether the African Mining Vision is able to influence the content of the SLP 
System to remedy these flaws. 
Although recent empirical research has been conducted on the effectiveness of the SLP 
System in meeting its objectives,47 the effectiveness (or rather: ineffectiveness) of the SLP 
System has not been analysed through the lens of socio-economic theories. This dissertation 
aims to consider South Africa’s mining policy and law using a theoretical framework that arises 
from considering socio-economic theories. This is important, because under the Constitution 
the exploitation of natural resources is meant to benefit all South Africans and result in socio-
economic development. Thus the lens of socio-economic theories is needed to inform our 
analysis of the enclave approach to development and the AMV as an alternative. 
 
                                                     
44 For a broad overview of the data on South Africa’s increasing inequality see Murray Leibbrandt, Arden Finn 
and Ingrid Wood ‘Describing and decomposing post-apartheid income inequality in South Africa’ (2012) 29 
Development Southern Africa at 19; Murray Leibbrandt et al ‘Trends in South African Income Distribution and 
Poverty since the Fall of Apartheid’ OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers (2010) at 45 
available at http://dx.doi.org./10.1787/5kmms0t7p1ms-en; Nicoli Nattrass and Jeremy Seekings ‘“Two Nations”? 
Race and Economic inequality in South Africa Today’ (2001) Daedalus 45 at 45. 
45 See broadly Murray Leibbrandt, Arden Finn and Ingrid Wood ‘Describing and decomposing post-apartheid 
income inequality in South Africa’ (2012) 29 Development Southern Africa 19.  
46 See Chapter Two section 3.1 for more on how to ensure an RBI strategy does not perpetuate inequality in a 
society and for a broad overview see G Wright ‘Resource-based Growth Then and Now’ in the World Bank Project 
Patterns of Integration in the Global Economy (2001); M Roemer ‘Resource-based Industrialisation in the 
developing countries: a survey’ (1979) 6 Journal of Development Economics 163 at 165.  
47 CALS SLP Phase I Report see note 17; CALS SLP Phase II Report see note 18. 
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3. Dissertation structure  
Four substantive chapters make up the exposition of the argument in of this dissertation.  
Chapter Two asks:  What does it mean to promote ‘socio-economic development’? The 
chapter is aimed at introducing and explaining the enclave approach to socio-economic 
development. First, is a discussion of the three theories that attempt to define development.48  
Then, this chapter considers the term socio-economic development and how different 
theories attempt to explain how socio-economic development occurs at the societal level and 
international level.  
At the societal level, industrialisation and RBI is first considered.49 These theoretical 
discussions will provide context for the discussion in Chapter Three on the policy of an RBI 
strategy as found in the AMV. At the international level, the dependency theory is discussed. 
At this point the phenomena of ‘sectoral disarticulation’, ‘enclave development’ and ‘linkages’ 
are defined50 as they relate to the way in which countries that are viewed by dependency 
theorists as part of the ‘periphery’ are underdeveloped.51 From this discussion, it becomes 
evident that natural resource exploitation has had a long history as part of this metropolis-
satellite exploitative relationship. In particular, South Africa’s economy has experienced 
sectoral disarticulation and enclave development because of this metropolis-satellite 
structure during colonialism and subsequently during apartheid.52 
Another theory that is discussed at the international level is globalisation theory.53 The point 
of the globalisation theory discussion is that despite the power imbalances highlighted by 
dependency theorists, there has been an increasing tendency by national economies to 
integrate and the treaty obligations of the WTO are thus important to consider.54 
Furthermore, this section on globalisation and the WTO highlights the impact on development 
that international trade has.55  
Chapter Three considers the African Mining Vision and other international legal and policy 
frameworks. The research question enquires into whether the AMV could offer some insights 
to inform the SLP System. To gather insights from the AMV, Chapter Three considers the 
AMV’s RBI strategy and the AMV Action Plan and Country Mining Vision which were 
implemented to operationalise the AMV.56   
                                                     
48 Chapter Two section 2. 
49 Chapter Two section 3.1. 
50 Chapter Two section 3.2.1.2. 
51 Chapter Two section 3.2.1.1. 
52 Chapter Two section 3.2.1.1. 
53 Chapter Two section 3.2.2. 
54 Chapter Two section 3.2.2. 
55 Chapter Two section 3.2.2. 
56 Chapter Three section 2. 
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This chapter also considers the critiques of the AMV framework and constraints to 
implementing the AMV’s RBI strategy. The three constrains are: (a) a lack of institutional 
capacity in most African countries; (b) trade agreements that have already been entered into 
which will curtail the implementation of the AMV; and (c) corruption and revenue 
mismanagement often associated with African politicians. The two critiques raised against the 
AMV are that: (a) it fails to adequately address the negative implications of a Resource-based 
Industrialisation strategy on women, children and rural communities; and (b) it perpetuates 
the colonial model of natural resource extraction.   
This chapter leaves open the issue of why South Africa’s mineral laws and policies that are 
seemingly aligned to an RBI strategy seem ineffective in promoting socio-economic 
development and this final point is further interrogated in Chapter Four. 
Chapter Four is aimed at considering whether the SLP System is flawed in that it fails to 
promote socio-economic development but instead perpetuates the enclave approach to 
development, and if so, how. This is the first hypothesis of the research question. The chapter 
begins with a discussion of the constitutional link between the right to ecologically sustainable 
development, the use of natural resources and the promotion of socio-economic 
development.57  The chapter then considers how the MPRDA promotes industrialisation, 
beneficiation, and linkages and the Mining Charter which was enacted to operationalise the 
MPRDA and this discussion points to the fact that elements (if not all) of the AMV’s RBI 
strategy are  being pursued in South Africa and this conclusion disproves the second 
hypothesis of the research question.58 The issue that comes to the fore is then: if the RBI 
strategy is, in some way, being pursued in South Africa alongside a flawed SLP System, what 
insights could the AMV possibly provide?59 
Historically, the pattern of natural resource extraction in South Africa has been based on the 
country’s position as a ‘satellite country’ and subsequently, apartheid perpetuated the 
sectoral disarticulation of the mining industry from other industries.  This history necessitates 
a closer examination of the value of continuing to pursue an RBI strategy, in the hopes that it 
works in spite of the criticism levelled against such a strategy.  
Chapter Five considers how the SLP System perpetuates enclave development with reference 
to the results of the 200960 and 201561 Mining Charter Impact Assessment Reports conducted 
by the DMR. The two reports highlight a tendency of the elements of the Mining Charter to 
be implemented by mining companies in a way that curtails their reach and negatively impacts 
                                                     
57 Chapter Four section 2 
58 Chapter Four section 2.1 
59 Chapter Four section 2.2 
60 DMR ‘Mining Charter Impact Assessment Report’ (Oct, 2009) available at 
https://evaluations.dpme.gov.za/evaluations/60 accessed 18 July 2018. Hereafter ‘DMR 2009 Impact Report’. 
61 DMR ‘Assessment of the Broad Based Socio-Economic Empowerment Charter for the South African Mining 
Industry (Mining Charter)’ (May, 2015) available at 
http://www.dmr.gov.za/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=7wIfrMbHgVc%3d&portalid=0 accessed 2 September 2018. 
Hereafter ‘DMR 2015 Impact Report’. 
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the ability of these elements to effect change. What follows is that some of the responsibility 
that falls on mining companies should be shifted to governments whereas some are rightly in 
the domain of companies.             
Chapter Five summarises the main findings from each chapter. This is followed by 
recommendations of what can be taken from the AMV to inform the SLP System and Terms 
of Reference that can be relied on when attempting to think of a way forward. 
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Chapter 2: What it means to promote 
‘socio-economic development’ 
 
1. Introduction 
The Constitution recognises that the exploitation of natural resources should be sustainable 
and promote economic and social development,1 but leaves the concept of ‘socio-economic 
development’ undefined. There is no common understanding of what it means to ‘develop’ or 
any one way that socio-economic development can occur.2  
Thus, at the national level, the legislature and executive must define and give content to the 
term according to the values of the Constitution. To this end, the National Development Plan 
2030 was adopted by the South African government.3 It views the improvement of South 
Africa’s economic infrastructure as a precondition for socio-economic development.4 
At an international level, the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Right to 
Development in 1986 which constitutes one of the many ways of understanding what it means 
‘to develop’.5 The UN Declaration on the Right to Development views development as a 
‘comprehensive economic, social, cultural and political process, which aims at the constant 
improvement of the well-being of the entire population’.6  Furthermore, the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights considers the right to development as central to the enjoyment 
of political and civil rights,7 as such, Article 20 enshrines the right that all peoples have to 
                                                     
1 Section 24 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (‘the Constitution’) provides that ‘Everyone 
has the right – (a)  to an environment that is not harmful to their health and well-being; and (b) to have legislative 
and other measures that: 
(i) Prevent pollution and ecological degradation; 
(ii) Promote conservation; and  
(iii) Secure ecologically sustainable development and the use of natural resources while promoting 
justifiable economic and social development.’ Hereafter ‘s 24 of the Constitution’. 
2 For more on the vagueness of the term ‘development’ see Gilbert Rist ‘Development as buzzword’ (2007) 17 
Development in Practice 485 hereafter ‘Rist “Development as Buzzword” (2007)’; Ha-Joon Chang and Ilene Grabel 
'Reclaiming Development from the Washington Consensus' (2004) 27 Journal of Post-Keynesian Economics 273 
at 274. 
3 The Presidency: National Planning Commission ‘National Development Plan 2030’ (15 August 2012) at 160. 
Available at https://www.gov.za/issues/national-development-plan-2030 accessed 30 October 2018.  
4 Ibid at 160. 
5 Declaration on the Right to Development, 1986 UN General Assembly A/Res/41/128.  
6 Annex to Declaration on the Right to Development, 1986 UN General Assembly A/Res/41/128.  
7 Preamble of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev.5,21 I.L.M 58 
(adopted 27 June 1981). Hereafter ‘ACHPR’.  
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‘pursue their economic and social development according to the policy they have freely 
chosen’.8  
This chapter is aimed at understanding the enclave approach to socio-economic development 
and the problems this approach causes, as evident in the SLP System. This will be done by 
describing the different frameworks that aim to promote socio-economic development. This 
is then followed by showing how these frameworks inform decisions and actions that promote 
certain outcomes over others. Theories provide various frameworks for understanding 
institutions.9 Socio-economic development, like any other institution, is complex.10  
This chapter provides a theoretical background for the analysis in Chapter Three and Four of 
the various legislative and policy frameworks that exist to promote socio-economic 
development, either directly or indirectly, using mineral resources. In Chapter Three it is more 
evident how the highlighted policies and legislation can be situated within the theoretical 
frameworks discussed in this chapter. Likewise, in Chapter Four, South African policies and 
legislation are situated within the frameworks discussed in this chapter. To situate the policies 
and legislation discussed in Chapter Four in a theoretical framework is useful because of the 
practical insight it provides into what informs certain decisions and outcomes. Furthermore, 
the discussion on the post-development school of thought is relevant in Chapter Five as it 
informs a tentative way forward.   
2. The term ‘development’ and its critique 
In President Truman’s inaugural address of 1949,11 he spoke of solving the problems of 
‘underdeveloped areas’.12 In his address he referred to these underdeveloped areas as the 
                                                     
8 Article 20(1) of the ACHPR states that: ‘All peoples shall have the right to existence. They shall have the 
unquestionable and inalienable right to self-determination. They shall freely determine their political status and 
shall pursue their economic and social development according to the policy they have freely chosen.’  
9 David Jaffee Levels of Socio-Economic Development Theory 2 ed (1998) 2 hereafter ‘Jaffee Development Theory 
(1998)’; John Brohman ‘Universalism, Eurocentrism, and Ideological Bias in Development Studies: From 
modernisation to neoliberalism’ (1995) 16 Third World Quarterly 121 at 121. Hereafter ‘Brohman Ideological 
Bias’ (1995). 
10 Jaffee Development Theory (1998) see note 9 at 2; For an overview of how to deal with the complexity of 
systems see Emory Roe Taking Complexity Seriously: Policy Analysis, Triangulation and Sustainable Development 
(1998). 
11 President Truman’s Inaugural address, delivered on 20 January 1949 at the Capitol available at 
https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/50yr_archive/inagural20jan1949.htm accessed 15 September 
2018. Hereafter ‘President Truman’s Inaugural address (1949)’.  
12 The fourth point in his address resulted in the creation of a Point IV programme that led to millions of dollars 
in scientific and technical assistance being given to ‘developing countries’ see President Truman’s Inaugural 
address (1949) see note 11.; ‘1949 Truman announces Point Four program’ available at 
https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/truman-announces-point-four-program accessed 15 September 
2018. For an account of how this point came to be added into President Truman’s Inaugural Address see Louis J 
Halle ‘On Teaching International Relations’ (1964) 40 The Virginia Quarterly Review 11-25 (reprint, no 
pagination). 
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‘Third World’.13 By the 1950s, the idea of ‘solving’ the problems of underdeveloped countries 
by scrapping ancient philosophies, traditional or cultural institutions14 and communities’ way-
of-life was widespread.15 The idea that this was the ‘full price’ to pay for development had 
also become widespread.16  
From President Truman’s announcement of a ‘bold new program…for the improvement and 
growth of underdeveloped areas’ we can trace the origins of the current discourse of 
development.17 To say development is a ‘discourse’ is to say that it uses language to create a 
framework or paradigm through which we understand our objective reality.18 Within this 
paradigm, there are unspoken rules and practices dictating ‘who can speak, from what points 
of view, with what authority’.19  This paradigm also dictates what constitutes a problem and 
how these problems should be analysed and solved.20 An example of the unspoken rules and 
practices emanating from the development discourse are evident in President Truman’s 
address wherein he states ‘…More than half the people of the world are living in conditions 
approaching misery. Their food is inadequate. They are victims of disease’.21 Implicit in this 
phrase (and in the whole address) is that the United States can identify and speak 
authoritatively on what the problem is (living conditions, the lack of food and diseases). It is 
also implicit that this problem is an issue that ‘they’ are facing – and so the United States is 
not the site for this ‘development’.    This paradigm makes it difficult to think of the ‘Third 
                                                     
13 President Truman’s Inaugural address (1949) see note 11; Arturo Escobar Encountering Development: The 
Making and Unmaking of the Third World (1995) 3 to 4. Hereafter ‘Escobar Encountering Development (1995)’. 
14 ‘Institutions’ in this context refer to the means people rely on to structure their political, social and economic 
interactions. These could be both formal means (e.g. legal or political) or informal (traditions, customs and 
language) see Douglass C. North ‘Institutions.’ (1991) 5 Journal of economic perspectives 97; Geoffrey M. Hodgson 
‘What are Institutions?’ (2006) 1 Journal of Economic Issues 1 at 2. 
15 United Nations, Department of Social and Economic Affairs as cited in Escobar Encountering Development 
(1995) see note 13 at 4. For more on how Eurocentrism has infiltrated development studies thus leading to the 
presupposition that Europe, and the West in general, is the standard of development which is inappropriate for 
addressing the issues of ‘Third World’ countries see Brohman Ideological Bias (1995) see note 9 at 127 to 130. 
16 United Nations, Department of Social and Economic Affairs as cited in Escobar Encountering Development 
(1995) see note 13 at 4. 
17 President Truman’s Inaugural address see note 11. 
18 Aram Ziai ‘The discourse of “development” and why the concept should be abandoned’ (2013) 23 Development 
in Practice 123 at 125 hereafter ‘Ziai “The discourse of development” (2013)’; Rist ‘Development as Buzzword’ 
(2007) see note 2 at 486; According to Michel Foucault ‘discourse’ is defined as ‘practices that systematically 
form the objects of which they speak’ in Michel Foucault Archaeology of Knowledge (2002) 54.  
19 Rist ‘Development as Buzzword’ (2007) see note 2 at 486; The discourse of development is also inter-
disciplinary and yet it retains its Eurocentrism see Rogelio Madrueño and Sergio Tezanos ‘The contemporary 
development discourse: Analysing the influence of development studies’ journals’ (2018) World Development 
334 at 334 to 335; Vusi Gumede ‘Social policy for inclusive development in Africa’ (2018) 39 Third World Quarterly 
122 at 130 hereafter ‘Gumede “Social policy” (2018)’. 
20 Arturo Escobar ‘The Making and Unmaking of the Third World’ in Majid Rahnema and Victoria Bawtree (eds) 
The Post-Development Reader (1997) 85 at 87 hereafter ‘Escobar “Making and Unmaking the Third World” 
(1997); Gumede “Social policy” (2018) see note 19 at 130. 
21 President Truman’s Inaugural address (1949) see note 11.  
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World’ using language that has not been prescribed by the discourse.22 Despite this paradigm 
limiting our understanding of objective reality, there is still value23 in retaining the use of the 
term ‘Third World’ and in this dissertation the term will be used to denote countries in Africa, 
Asia and Latin America who share a common history of colonialism, exploitation and 
underdevelopment.24 
The objective reality of the various countries of the world, according to President Truman’s 
address and the paradigm he created, is that some had attained varying levels of development 
while others were underdeveloped.25 The previous divide between the ‘coloniser’ and ‘the 
colonised’ was deemed obsolete,26 along with the ‘old imperialism-exploitation for foreign 
profit’ model.27 In the place of imperialism, would be ‘a program of development based on 
the concepts of democratic fair-dealing’.28 The problem, identified by this discourse, was 
poverty and ‘conditions approaching misery’ that half of the world’s population lived in.29 
According to this discourse, the United States and other countries in the West, could speak 
authoritatively on how these problems should be solved as they had the requisite knowledge, 
skill, industrial and scientific techniques.30 Additionally, according to this diagnosis of the 
problem provided by the discourse of development, ‘underdeveloped areas’ could be assisted 
using knowledge, skill, industrial and scientific techniques.31  The underlying presumption was 
that ‘underdeveloped areas’ were in their present conditions because they lacked knowledge, 
skill, industrial and scientific techniques.32  
Thus, the development discourse is the overarching paradigm that will inform my 
understanding of ‘economic and social development’ as stated in the Constitution.33 This is 
because the concept of ‘development’ as contained in the Constitution is from the 
development discourse. Whether the influence of the development discourse on our 
Constitutional drafters is good or bad is beyond the aim of this chapter. This chapter is aimed 
                                                     
22 An example of this language includes terms such as ‘overpopulation, poverty, famine, illiteracy and corruption’ 
see Escobar Encountering Development (1995) see note 13 at  12; Andrea Cornwall ‘Buzzwords and fuzzwords: 
deconstructing development discourse’ (2007) 17 Development in Practice 471 at 471 to 474. 
23 For more on how the use of ‘Third World’ can act as a means to promote solidarity and enable resistance see 
BS Chimni ‘Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto’ (2006) International Community Law 
Review 3-27. 
24 Ibid at 5; S Agbakwa ‘A Line in the sand: International (Dis)Order and the Impunity of Non-State Corporate 
Actors in the Developing World’ in Anghie, Chimni, Mickelson, Okafor (eds.) The Third World and International 
Order: Law, Politics and Globalization (2003) 2; S Gutto Human and Peoples’ Rights for the Oppressed: Critical 
Essays on Theory and Practice From Sociology of Law Perspectives (1993) 95. 
25 President Truman’s Inaugural address see note 11. 
26 Rist ‘Development as Buzzword’ (2007) see note 2 at 486. 
27 President Truman’s Inaugural address (1949) see note 11. 
28 Ibid.  
29 Ibid.  
30 Ibid; In this regard, the development discourse also views the West as the standard of whether or not 
development has occurred see Gumede “Social policy” (2018) see note 19 at 130-131. 
31 President Truman’s Inaugural address (1949) see note 11. 
32 Ibid.  
33 Section 24 of the Constitution.  
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more narrowly at understanding socio-economic development, in particular, the enclave 
approach to socio-economic development as it is perpetuated by the SLP System.  
Within the discourse of development, two approaches to defining the term ‘development’ 
emerged – a broad and a narrow approach. Both the narrow and broad definition of 
development share the premise that ‘development’ entails growth, progress or 
advancement.34 This premise is borrowed from biology.35 Consequently, inherent in both the 
narrow and broad definition is the assumption that life entails growing or advancing.36 For 
institutions,37 this means that progress is both necessary and inevitable. The post-
development view argues against both definitions of development and rejects the 
presuppositions inherent in both the narrow and broad definitions.38 Instead, post-
development theorists consider the negative impacts of development, such as the impact on 
the environment, as inherent and not an unintended consequence.39 
By the end of the discussion below, it is easier to situate the term ‘socio-economic 
development’ in the development discourse. The critiques levelled against the term 
‘development’ by Post development theorists, which appear below, are useful because they 
help delineate some of the issues inherent in the term ‘development’ and this critique informs 
the policy analysis in Chapter Three and Four.   
 Development narrowly defined 
According to the narrow view, ‘development’ amounts to an increase in the material wealth 
of a country i.e. to economic growth.40 The rationale is that a country’s economic growth will 
‘trickle down’ to its inhabitants, improving their lives.41 Theorists holding this view focus on 
                                                     
34 The Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘development’ as ‘relating to growth or becoming more advanced or 
elaborate.’  http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/51434?redirectedFrom=development#eid accessed 20 July 2017.  
35 The link between ‘development’ (and its usage in the social sciences) and the biological metaphor can be traced 
back to the influence of ancient Greek philosophy on the Western world see Gilbert Rist ‘Before thinking about 
What Next prerequisites for alternatives.’ (2006) Development Dialogue – What Next Forum 65 at 72-73 available 
at http://whatnext.org/resources/Publications/Volume-I/What-Next-Volume-I_art4.pdf accessed 20 July 2017. 
36 Ibid at 73; Rist ‘Development as Buzzword’ (2007) see note 2 at footnote 5. 
37 For a definition of ‘institutions’ see note 14. 
38 See Chapter Two section 2.3; Ziai ‘The discourse of development’ (2013) see note 18 at 126; Tomáš Profant 
‘The Pontis Foundation: Partly Disrupting the Development Discourse Through Partnership’ (2015) 42 Forum for 
Development Studies 265 at 269 hereafter ‘Tomáš Profant “Disrupting the Development Discourse” (2015)’. 
39 See Chapter Two section 2.3; Rist ‘Development as Buzzword’ (2007) see note 2 at 488. 
40 Ebunoluwa O. Oduwole ‘The Question of Development in Africa’ in Toyin Falola and Jessica Achberger (eds) 
The Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment in Africa (2013) 331-341 at 332 hereafter 
‘Oduwole “Development in Africa” (2013)’; Jan Marie Fritz ‘Socioeconomic developmental social work’ in Ursula 
Oswald Spring, Ada Aharoni & Ralph V. Summy et al. (eds) Peace Studies, Public Policy and Global Security – 
Volume VII (2010) 362 at 363 hereafter ‘Fritz “Socioeconomic development” (2010)’. 
41 This theory was prevalent in post-World War II and the earliest formulations of this theory was that once 
economic growth had been achieved, the benefits would trickle-down to benefit the poor through the 
subsequent taxing and redistribution through social welfare see United Nations World Economic Survey 1968 – 
Part One, Some issues on Development Policy in the Coming Decade (1969) 1; Phillipe Aghion and Patrick Bolton 
‘A Theory of Trickle-Down Growth and Development’ (1997) 64 The Review of Economic Studies 151 at 151; cf. H 
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the improvement of economic indices such as a country’s GDP,42 increase in technological 
advancement43 or artifacts.44  Consequently, the ultimate objective is the improvement of 
economic indices.45 Whether this improvement will result in an actual benefit for the 
inhabitants of that particular country, is ancillary.46  The weakness of the narrow view is that 
it does not centre considerations of how the material wealth of the country will be shared 
which is problematic because nothing is to say the benefits of the improved indices will ‘solve’ 
the problem of inequality.47  
 Development broadly defined  
Broader understandings of development emphasize what people are effectively able to do.48  
The broader view of development does not do away with the need to improve economic 
indices. Instead, its perspective is that this wealth is a means to an end.49 One main proponent 
of this view is Amartya Sen who considers development a ‘process of expanding the real 
freedoms that people enjoy’.50 According to this view, termed ‘the capabilities approach’, 
development should result in economic opportunities, the eradication of poverty, inequality 
and systematic social deprivation.51 Additionally, development cannot be limited to 
industrialisation, an increase in GDP, income or the accumulation of wealth.52 According to 
Sen, wealth is not useful in and of itself.53 Instead, it is useful because of the freedoms it 
enables one to achieve.54  
                                                     
W Arndt ‘The “Trickle-Down” Myth’ (1983) 32 Economic Development and Cultural Change 1-10 for a brief history 
of this theory and why he argues it is ineffective.  
42 W. Arthur Lewis The Theory of Economic Growth (1963) 14; Oduwole ‘Development in Africa’ (2013) see note 
40 at 332. 
43 L B Pearson The Crisis of Development (1970) 5; Oduwole ‘Development in Africa’ (2013) see note 40 at 332. 
44 Walt Whitman Rostow The Process of Economic Growth 2 ed (1962) 14; Oduwole ‘Development in Africa’ 
(2013) see note 40 341 at 332. 
45 P N Rosenstein-Rodan Problems of Industrialisation in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe (1943) 245; cf. Selim 
Jahan ‘Measuring living standard and poverty: Human development index as an alternate measure.’ (2002) 
University of Massachusetts Political Economy Research Institute at 1 hereafter ‘Jahan “Measuring living 
standard” (2002)’. 
46 Jahan ‘Measuring living standard’ (2002) see note 45 at 1. 
47 The Pearson Report, published by the UNDP, is unequivocal on the fact that economic growth does not 
automatically lead to a reduction of poverty see Pearson Report Partners in Development: Report of the 
Commission on International Development (1969); Aram Ziai ‘Justice, Not Development: Sen and the Hegemonic 
Framework For Ameliorating Global Inequality’ (2014) 7 Global Justice: Theory Practice Rhetoric 28 at 29 
hereafter ‘Ziai “Justice not Development” (2014)’.  
48 See United Nations Development Programme http://hdr.undp.org/en/humandev accessed 20 July 2017; 
Amartya Sen Development as Freedom (1999).  
49 Amartya Sen Development as Freedom (1999) 14. 
50 Ibid at 3. 
51 Ibid at 3. 
52 Ibid at 14. 
53 Ibid at 14. 
54 Ibid at 14. 
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Both Sen and the UN Development Programme (‘UNDP’) offer a broad definition of 
‘development’. Similar to Sen’s view that focuses on what people are able to do, the UNDP 
espouses the concept of ‘human development’ which they define as focusing on people and 
the opportunities that they have.55 ‘.56 According to the UNDP, the human development 
approach is about ‘expanding the richness of human life, rather than simply the richness of 
the economy’.57 The diagram below represents the dimensions of human development that 
the UNDP work to expand. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: United Nations Development Programme58 
 
By broadening the concept of ‘development’ Sen helped settle most of the previous debates 
regarding whether gender equality could aid economic growth.59 According to Sen, gender 
equality should be understood as one of the ‘constituent components of development’.60 This 
                                                     
55 United Nations Development Programme http://hdr.undp.org/en/humandev accessed 20 April 2019. 
56 United Nations Development Programme http://hdr.undp.org/en/humandev accessed 20 July 2017. 
57 United Nations Development Programme http://hdr.undp.org/en/humandev accessed 20 July 2017. For a 
discussion of how the UN’s measure of  Human Development is reductionist and consequently not broad enough 
see Gustav Ranis, Frances Stewart and Emma Samman  ‘Human Development: Beyond the Human Development 
Index’ (2006) 7 Journal of Human Development  323-358.  
58 UNDP ‘Dimensions of Human Development’ http://hdr.undp.org/en/humandev accessed 20 July 2017. 
59 Amartya Sen Development as Freedom (1999) 5; Ziai ‘Justice not Development’ (2014) see note 47 at 29. 
60 Amartya Sen Development as Freedom (1999) 5. 
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approach is evident in how gender equality and women’s empowerment is recognised as 
central to development61 by the broader view of development.  
 The Post development critique  
A third view, referred to as ‘post-development’,62 rejects the entire paradigm of 
development.63 Regardless of the vast differences between the narrow and broad view of 
development or between theories within each view, ultimately they are all based on the same 
three assumptions:64 one is normative, one practical and the other methodological.  
The normative assumption considers development as always good and desirable.65 Despite 
the numerous failures and shortcomings of development, efforts persist to reform and retain 
it.66 The second assumption is practical: development can be achieved.67 Both the normative 
and practical assumption form the basis and help perpetuate the creation of policies, projects, 
institutions and programs aimed at achieving development.68 The third assumption is 
methodological: countries can be compared because a universal standard exists.69  
                                                     
61 According to the UNDP gender equality and women empowerment are ‘a mainstream dimension of the 
development discourse’ see UNDP ‘Human Development Report 2016: Human Development for Everyone’ at 41 
available at http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2016_human_development_report.pdf accessed 18 January 
2018; for a general account of how the discourse surrounding women and development within the broad 
definition has evolved see Shahrashoub Razavi and Carol Miller ‘From WID to GAD: Conceptual Shifts in the 
Women and Development Discourse’ (1995) 1 United Nations Research Institute for Social Development available 
at  
http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/(httpAuxPages)/D9C3FCA78D3DB32E80256B67005B6AB5/$file/op
b1.pdf accessed 19 September 2018. 
62 The authors considered within the post-development movement include: Arturo Escobar, Aram Ziai, Gilbert 
Rist, Gustavo Esteva, Majid Rahnema, Sally Matthews and Victoria Bawtree. 
63 Ziai ‘The discourse of development’ (2013) see note 18 at 126. This view is espoused by ‘post-development’ 
theorists for more see Gustavo Esteva ‘Regenerating people's space.’ (1987) 12 Alternatives 125; Wolfgang Sachs 
(ed) The Development Dictionary. A Guide to Knowledge as Power (1992); Majid Rahnema and Victoria Bawtree 
(eds) The Post-Development Reader (1997); Escobar Encountering Development (1995) see note 13. 
64 Ziai ‘The discourse of development’ (2013) see note 18 at 126; Gumede “Social policy” (2018) see note 19 at 
130. 
65 Ziai ‘The discourse of development’ (2013) see note 18 at 127; Tomáš Profant ‘Disrupting the Development 
Discourse’ (2015) see note 38 at 269. 
66 An example of the reformation of development lies in the emergence of the term ‘sustainable development’. 
By adding ‘sustainable’ this is meant to incorporate a concern for the environment and ameliorate a short-coming 
of development see Rist ‘Development as Buzzword’ (2007) see note 2 at 487 and Sally Matthews ‘Post-
development theory and the question of alternatives: a view from Africa’ (2004) Third World Quarterly 373 at 
375-376 hereafter ‘Matthews “Post-development theory” (2004)’. 
67 Ziai ‘The discourse of development’ (2013) see note 18 at 127; Tomáš Profant ‘Disrupting the Development 
Discourse’ (2015) see note 38 at 268. 
68 Ziai ‘The discourse of development’ (2013) see note 18 at 127. 
69 Although the 1986 UN Declaration on the Right to Development is vague on the content of ‘development’, 
besides being unequivocal that self-determination is an element of development, according to the UNDP there 
are ‘three essential elements of human life…longevity [which refers to life expectancy], knowledge and [a] decent 
standard of living’ see UNDP Human Development Report 1997 (1997) 18; Ziai ‘The discourse of development’ 
(2013) see note 18 at 127; Brohman Ideological Bias (1995) see note 9  at 121 to 122. 
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The narrow view of development adopts the standard of GDP and the accumulation of wealth. 
Conversely, the broader view of development adopts a ‘universal’ standard of what a good 
life consists of.70 According to theorists such as Sen, and other proponents of the broader view 
of development, the good life is impossible without ‘basic education’, ‘free media’ and 
‘elections’.71  
Post-development theorists remove the above assumptions to reach a different 
understanding of ‘development’.72 Their understanding of development encompasses ‘the 
transformation and destruction’ of the environment and social relations to ‘increase the 
production of commodities (goods and services)’.73 The negative consequences of 
development, such as the destruction of the environment and the change in social relations 
or a society’s traditional way of life, are considered inherent to development, as opposed to 
being unintended.74 Whereas the broader view of development seeks to expand the narrow 
view of development, post-development rejects ‘development’ as a discourse and ideology 
completely.75 
Post-development theorists maintain that, in line with their critique of development, the 
legitimacy of any social change within a culture should be evaluated and chosen by the people 
of that culture.76 This means the people of a specific culture can choose Western-style 
development but do not have to.77 Accordingly, post-development theorists argue that the 
post-development theory does not reject positive social change approved and led by 
                                                     
70 Ziai ‘Justice not Development’ (2014) see note 47 at 32. 
71 Amartya Sen Development as Freedom (2000) 242; Ziai ‘Justice not Development’ (2014) see note 47 at 32. 
72 See Rist ‘Development as Buzzword’ (2007) see note 2; Matthews ‘Post-development theory’ (2004) see note 
66.  
73 This definition is proposed by Gilbert Rist as a ‘down-to-earth’ definition see Rist ‘Development as Buzzword’ 
(2007) see note 2 at 488; Development at the expense of people’s entitlements or human rights is recognised as 
another negative consequence of development see Irene I. Hadiprayitno, ‘Challenges Facing the Use of Human 
Rights to Address Negative Impacts of Development: The Case of Indonesia’ (2011) 4 Law and Development 
Review 247 at 249; for an overview of the tension between meeting development objectives and respecting 
human rights (and how this is resolved by the broad definition of development) see Hans-Otto Sano 
‘Development and human rights: the necessary, but partial integration of human rights and development’ (2000) 
22 Human Rights Quarterly 734-752. 
74 Rist ‘Development as Buzzword’ (2007) see note 2 at 488; Matthews ‘Post-development theory’ (2004) see 
note 66 at 374. 
75 Ziai ‘The discourse of development’ (2013) see note 18 at 126; Tomáš Profant ‘Disrupting the Development 
Discourse’ (2015) see note 38 at 268; Escobar ‘Making and Unmaking the Third World’ (1997) see note 20 at 87. 
76 Aram Ziai ‘The ambivalence of post-development: between reactionary populism and radical democracy’ 
(2004) Third World Quarterly 1045 at 1052 hereafter ‘Ziai “The ambivalence of post-development” (2004)’; Aram 
Ziai Zwischen Global Governance und Post-Development: Entwicklungspolitik aus Diskursanalytischer Perspektive 
(2006) at 48 as cited in Tomáš Profant ‘Disrupting the Development Discourse’ (2015) see note 38 at 269.   
77 Ziai ‘The ambivalence of post-development’ (2004) Ibid at 1052; According to Thandika Mkandawire the 
majority of the criticism of development is levelled against the paradigm as proposed by President Truman and 
not ‘development’ as conceived during the Bandung Conference that took place on 18 to 24 April 1955 in 
Bandung, Indonesia that views development as ‘“catching up”…emancipation and the “right to development”’ in 
Thandika Mkandawire ‘Running While Others Walk: Knowledge and the challenges of Africa’s development’ 
(2011) 36 Africa Development 1 at 7 hereafter ‘Mkandawire “Challenges of Africa’s development” (2011)’.  
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grassroots organisations, but it rejects the discourse of development that arose post-World 
War II.78 Ultimately, this means that the post-development movement79 neither disregards 
nor deems illegitimate the desire of those who suffer under the brunt of poverty to improve 
their living conditions.80 
From the above discussion, it is evident that the development discourse is the overarching 
framework within which the ‘problems’ of ‘Third World countries’ are solved.81 Within this 
framework are two approaches – the narrow82 and the broad definition of ‘development’.83 
Against (and outside) this overarching framework, the post-development critique arose to 
debunk a number of the assumptions inherent in the development discourse.84  
The post-development critique is useful when assessing whether some of the failures in 
attaining socio-economic development using the SLP System (the first hypothesis of the 
research question)85 are a result of the critiques levelled against the ‘solutions’ offered by the 
development discourse. Additionally, in Chapter Five they will inform the way forward in the 
light of the policy assessments in Chapters Three and Four. 
What follows is a discussion of a select number of theories that have circulated regarding how 
to achieve socio-economic development. These theories are useful because they each offer a 
framework for understanding ‘socio-economic development’.86 All the theories below operate 
firmly within the development discourse and have been selected because they, in some way, 
inform the legislation and policies that will be discussed in Chapters Three and Four. 
3. Theories of socio-economic development 
The term ‘socio-economic development’ combines both the narrow and broad definition of 
development as stated above. It encompasses both social development, defined as ‘the 
interplay of social structures, processes and relationships’87 to expand human freedoms88 
                                                     
78 Victoria Bawtree and Majid Rahnema (eds.) Post-development Reader (1997) 385; Matthews ‘Post-
development theory’ (2004) see note 66 at 376.  
79 Represented by the works of: Arturo Escobar, Aram Ziai, Gilbert Rist, Gustavo Esteva, Majid Rahnema, Sally 
Matthews and Victoria Bawtree. 
80 Matthews ‘Post-development theory’ (2004) see note 66 at 377; According to Thandika Mkandawire the desire 
to develop is not a Western imposition on African leaders instead it is ‘part of Africa’s responses to its own 
historical experiences and social needs’ in Mkandawire ‘Challenges of Africa’s development’ (2011) see note 77 
at 7. 
81 Chapter Two section 2. 
82 Chapter Two section 2.1. 
83 Chapter Two section 2.2. 
84 Chapter Two section 2.3. 
85 Chapter One section 2. 
86 Jaffee Development Theory (1998) see note 9 at 2. 
87 Fritz ‘Socioeconomic development’ (2010) see note 40 at 363;  
88 Amartya Sen Development as Freedom (1999) 3; Sakiko Fukuda-Parr ‘The Human Development Paradigm: 
Operationalizing Sen’s Ideas on Capabilities’ (2003) 9 Feminist Economics 301 at 303 hereafter ‘Fukuda-Parr “The 
Human Development Paradigm” (2003)’. 
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while also emphasising the importance of improving economic indices.89 It can thus be defined 
as the idea that economic development must positively contribute to people’s lives while 
social welfare programs should positively impact economic development.90 The analysis of 
socio-economic development can be broken-down into four levels: the individual, 
organisational, societal and international level.91 
At the first level are individual-level theories of development which place the greatest 
emphasis on the individual’s cultural attitudes and values as shaping the level of socio-
economic development of that society.92 The second-level consists of organisational-level 
theories of development which focus on how labour is organised within organisations as this 
impacts productivity and in turn a nation’s output.93 The societal-level theories of development 
focus on the role of countries as their policies, national characteristics, economic, social and 
political institutions are seen to shape their level of socio-economic development.94 At the 
final level are international-level theories of development which postulate that a country’s 
level of socio-economic development is linked to its role in the global system as opposed to 
solely their national policies or characteristics.95 
This chapter is limited to an analysis of societal-level and international-level theories of 
development. This is because both enclave development and linkages in the mining industry 
operate and are promoted predominantly at this level to effect socio-economic development.  
 Societal level theory of development: Industrialisation and Resource-based 
Industrialisation  
Industrialisation is a model that seeks to meet the national goals of a country by ensuring 
industrial structures are built that can achieve economic growth.96  Inherent in the model is a 
consideration of how to achieve economic growth and how its benefits can be distributed to 
                                                     
89 However, economic growth is viewed as a means to an end see Fukuda-Parr ‘The Human Development 
Paradigm’ (2003) Ibid at 305; W. Arthur Lewis The Theory of Economic Growth (1963) 14; Oduwole ‘Development 
in Africa’ (2013) see note 40 at 332. 
90 Fritz ‘Socioeconomic development’ (2010) see note 40 at 363; Fukuda-Parr ‘The Human Development 
Paradigm’ (2003) see note 88 at 305. 
91 Ideally, all levels of analyses should be integrated to gain an accurate account of the process of socio-economic 
development. For a more comprehensive account see Jaffee Development Theory (1998) see note 9.  
92 Jaffee Development Theory (1998) see note 9 at 17 and 199. 
93 Jaffee Development Theory (1998) see note 9 at 200. 
94 Jaffee Development Theory (1998) see note 9 at 83; John Mukum Mbaku Institutions and Development in Africa 
(2004) 3. 
95 Jaffee Development Theory (1998) see note 9 at 201; Gary Gereffi ‘Mexico’s Industrial Development: Climbing 
Ahead or Falling Behind in the World Economy’ in Eduardo Zepeda and Kevin J Middlebrook (eds) Confronting 
Development: Assessing Mexico’s Economic and Social Policy Challenges (2002) 195-240 at 195. 
96 M Roemer ‘Resource-Based industrialisation in the developing countries: a survey’ (1979) 6 Journal of 
Development Economics 163 at 166 hereafter ‘Roemer “Resource-Based Industrialisation” (1979)’; 
industrialisation, along with capital accumulation, development planning and foreign aid, were considered 
essential components in the development strategies of the 1950s see Escobar Encountering Development (1995) 
see note 13 at  74. 
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meet national goals such as the reduction of poverty and inequality.97 There are three phases 
that a country goes through to reach economic prosperity.98 These phases can be 
distinguished by their focal points, namely: initial industries, clusters and sustaining the 
progress and this is represented in the diagram below. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The focus of the three phases of economic prosperity. 
 
In the first phase, the industries associated to a country’s ‘factor endowments’ (such as natural 
resources, capital or labour) will spur economic growth.99 An example of this is how some East 
Asian countries have relied on cheap labour to spur the development of their countries.100  In 
the second phase, further investing into these industries results in the development of 
‘clusters’ around them, to support them.101 Clusters are industries associated to a main 
industry. They generally provide support services such as financial and transport services. The 
development of clusters assists in moving away from solely depending on an initial industry 
and results in economic diversification.102  
The Otigba Computer Hardware Village (‘OCH Village’) in Lagos, Nigeria is an example of how 
the development of clusters can help move away from a dependence on the initial industry. 
Initially, OCH Village consisted of businesses located on two streets in Lagos that focused 
mainly on computer and office equipment repairs, assembly and sales.103 By 2005, business 
operations had become more sophisticated and included production activities. These business 
activities had moved beyond servicing Lagos to providing businesses services and products to 
                                                     
97 Roemer ‘Resource-Based Industrialisation’ (1979) Ibid at 430. 
98 M Porter The Competitive Advantage of Nations (1990) 562. 
99 M Walker and P Jourdan ‘Resource-based Sustainable Development: An alternative Approach to 
Industrialisation in South Africa’ (2003) 18 Minerals & Energy 25 at 31 hereafter ‘Walker and Jourdan 
“Sustainable Development” (2003)’; M Porter The Competitive Advantage of Nations (1990) 562. 
100 For more on how East Asian countries have relied on labour-intensive industrialisation see Kaoru Sugihara 
‘The Second Noel Butlin Lecture: Labour-Intensive Industrialisation in Global History’ (2007) 47 Australian 
Economic History Review 121 at 124-126; M Walker ‘Resource-based Industrialisation Strategies: A Comparative 
Analysis of the South African and International Experience’ (2001) 83 South African Geographical Journal 93 at 
94. 
101 M Porter The Competitive Advantage of Nations (1990) 562; Walker and Jourdan ‘Sustainable Development’ 
(2003) see note 99 at 31. 
102 M Porter The Competitive Advantage of Nations (1990) 562. 
103 Raphael Kaplinsky and Mike Morris ‘Developing Industrial Clusters and Supply Chains to support 
Diversification and Sustainable Development of Exports in Africa: Composite Report’ (2014) 4. 
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other West African countries and between 15 000 to 20 000 people were employed by 
businesses in OCH Village.104 Other businesses, part of the OCH Village, had established 
knowledge-sharing and technology-sharing relationships with businesses in Malaysia, China 
and Dubai.105  
This example illustrates how a shift away from the initial industry of computer and office 
equipment repairs was possible in OCH Village. With an increased focus on knowledge and 
technology-sharing, there was an increase in the possibility of innovation in the technology 
space.  In the third phase, it is up to government and businesses to ensure the gains achieved 
in the first two phases are maintained.106 For businesses this is achieved by continuing to 
innovate and developing the capacity of their employees while for governments this includes 
ensuring the initial industries are embedded in other sectors of the economy.107 
There are a number of different industrialisation strategies that a country can pursue 
depending on what its factor endowments are.108 An African country with a large reserve of 
natural resources could pursue Resource-based Industrialisation to achieve its objectives of 
socio-economic development. A Resource-based Industrialisation (‘RBI’) strategy, such as the 
one proposed in the African Mining Vision,109 would be rooted firmly within the development 
discourse. This brings to the fore a number of the underlying assumptions of the development 
discourse110 which would be embedded in an RBI strategy and these underlying assumptions 
will be helpful to know when attempting to develop an alternative framework for a way 
forward in Chapter Five. 
An RBI strategy can be defined as the use of a country’s natural resource endowment to build 
industrial structures that can achieve economic growth.111 Although a consideration of how 
the benefits of economic growth will be distributed is inherent in the concept of 
‘industrialisation’, there is nothing inherent in the strategy that dictates how the benefits 
should be distributed. It is tenuous to reason that pursuing an RBI strategy will perpetuate 
                                                     
104 Ibid at 4.  
105 Ibid at 4.  
106 M Porter The Competitive Advantage of Nations (1990) 562; Walker and Jourdan ‘Sustainable Development’ 
(2003) see note 99 at31. 
107 M Porter The Competitive Advantage of Nations (1990) 562. 
108 These strategies include: (i) import substitution, (ii) processing natural resources, (iii) exporting manufactured 
products, (iv) industrialisation based on cheap labour and (v) a basic industry strategy which manufactures goods 
to be consumed domestically  see M Roemer ‘Dependence and Industrialization’ (1981) 9 World Development 
429 at 430. 
109 A discussion of the African Mining Vision’s RBI strategy is contained in Chapter Three section 2.1. 
110 Chapter Two section 2.3. 
111 Roemer ‘Resource-Based Industrialisation’ (1979) see note 96 at at 166 and 167. 
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inequality, as various studies have.112  However, an RBI strategy can be unsuccessful and result 
in the perpetuation of inequality, as can any other industrialisation strategy.113  
To ensure the implementation of a successful RBI strategy, three requirements have been 
identified.114 First, an RBI strategy should be pursued as part of a broader diversification 
programme, to ensure that the success of the economy is not bound to fluctuating commodity 
prices.115 An advantage of diversifying the economy is that the benefits of the RBI strategy will 
spread throughout the economy.116 Other sectors of the economy, such as agriculture and 
manufacturing, should also be developed to support the RBI strategy.117  
The second requirement of a successful RBI strategy is that the industrialisation process 
should be linked early on to exporting in emerging markets.118 An export orientation from the 
outset acts as an incentive for the industry to continuously improve and innovate to remain 
competitive.119 Additionally, the increase in revenues can be reinvested in other industrial 
sectors in that economy.120  
The final requirement aims to mitigate the risks associated with a RBI strategy. A successful 
RBI strategy will gradually expand the capacity of existing plants and increase the level of 
processing that a product goes through within the country before it reaches the market.121  
This requirement mitigates the risks associated with RBI because side-linkages, such as 
                                                     
112 For more on this argument see G Wright ‘Resource-based Growth Then and Now’ in the World Bank Project 
Patterns of Integration in the  Global Economy (2001); and Roemer ‘Resource-Based Industrialisation’ (1979) see 
note 96 at 165. For studies that conclude that mineral resources are a paradox for development see O Östensson, 
and A. Uwizeye-Mapendano. ‘Growth and diversification in mineral economies.’ Regional Workshop for Mineral 
Economies in Africa, Cape Town (2000). 
113 Roemer ‘Resource-Based Industrialisation’ (1979) see note 96 at 165; Walker and Jourdan ‘Sustainable 
Development’ (2003) see note 99 at 30. 
114 Economic Commission for Africa ‘Minerals Cluster Policy Study in Africa: Pilot Studies of South Africa and 
Mozambique’ (2004) at 14 to 15. Hereafter ‘ECA: Minerals Cluster Policy Study’. 
115 R.M Auty ‘Resource-based Industrialisation and Country Size: Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago (1986) 17 
Geoforum 325; ECA: Minerals Cluster Policy Study see note 114 at 14. 
116 ECA: Minerals Cluster Policy Study see note 114 at 15; M Walker ‘Promoting the Growth and Development of 
Economic Linkages Arising from Mineral-based Activities in South Africa’ in Simon Roberts (ed) Sustainable 
Manufacturing?: The Case of South Africa and Ekurhuleni (2006) 27-45 at 37. 
117 ECA: Minerals Cluster Policy Study see note 114 at 15; Richard M Auty ‘State enterprise and resource based 
industry in oil exporting countries’ (1988) 14 Resources Policy 275 at 275.  
118 The issue of a developing country’s natural resource exports perpetuating the colonial structures of 
exploitation is raised by dependency theorists see Section 3.2.1; ECA: Minerals Cluster Policy Study see note 114  
at 15; Roemer ‘Resource-Based Industrialisation’ (1979) see note 96 at 194. 
119 A critique of this point could be that it is based largely on the experiences of ‘First World’ countries such as 
Finland, Norway, Sweden and the United States see ECA: Minerals Cluster Policy Study see note 114  15 to 18; 
Synnöve Vuori and Pekka Ylä-Anttila ‘Industrial Transformation in Finland-From Factor Driven to Technology-
Based Growth’ (1992) No. 413. ETLA Discussion Papers 12 to 32.  
120 ECA: Minerals Cluster Policy Study see note 114 at 15; Roemer ‘Resource-Based Industrialisation’ (1979) see 
note 96 at 194. 
121 ECA: Minerals Cluster Policy Study see note 114 at 15. 
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expertise and innovations, are often transferrable to other industries and aide the move away 
from a dependence on the extractives’ sector.122  
 International-level theory of development 
The analysis at this level considers two influential theories that analyse the state as part of a 
global system, namely: the world/dependency theory and the globalisation theory.123 One of 
the premises at this level of analysis is that the socio-economic development of a state is 
constrained and influenced by what occurs at an international level.  
3.2.1 Dependency theory: how sectoral disarticulation and enclave development impedes 
human development 
The dependency/ world-economy theory (‘dependency theory’) arose as a reaction to the 
modernisation theory that emphasised economic liberalism and global economic 
interdependence because, according to the theory, it benefitted ‘Third World countries’ in the 
long run.124 Central to the dependency theory is the idea that there are asymmetries in the 
distribution of power between countries and these asymmetries influence how countries 
interact.125 Countries with less power and influence will be vulnerable and more susceptible 
to exploitation.126 Additionally, to understand the level of socio-economic development of a 
particular country, this theory posits that it is important to analyse the history of its integration 
and interaction at an international level.127   
 
3.2.1.1 The main tenets of dependency theory 
According to Frank, relying on western models and experiences to formulate a path to socio-
economic development is a fruitless exercise because western countries were undeveloped 
                                                     
122 Ibid at 16; Roemer ‘Resource-Based Industrialisation’ (1979) see note 96 at 194. 
123 This theory has influenced a number of the policies of ‘Third World Countries’ and the literature on 
development. Kwame Nkrumah relied on the arguments of dependency theorists during his campaign against 
British colonial rule see Kwame Nkrumah Towards Colonial Freedom (1962); James C. W. Ahiakpor ‘The Success 
and Failure of Dependency Theory: The Experience of Ghana’ (1985) 39 International Organization 535 at 535 
and 540 hereafter ‘Ahiakpor “The Experience of Ghana” (1985)’; For an overview of the dependency theory see 
Gabriel Palma ‘Dependency: A Formal Theory of Underdevelopment or a Methodology for the Analysis of 
Concrete Situations of Underdevelopment?’ (1978) 6 World Development 881-924; Jaffee Development Theory 
(1998) see note 9 at 151. 
124 Robert Gilpin The Political Economy of International Relations (1987) 266 hereafter ‘Gilpin “Political Economy” 
(1987); Jaffee Development Theory (1998) see note 9 at  152; Andreea Mihalache-O'keef and Quan Li 
‘Modernisation vs. Dependency Revisited: Effects of Foreign Direct Investment on Food Security in Less 
Developed Countries’ (2011) 55 International Studies Quarterly 71 at 74. 
125 Jaffee Development Theory (1998) see note 9 at 152. 
126 Jaffee Development Theory (1998) see note 9 at 152. 
127 André Gunder Frank ‘Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution’ (1969) Monthly Review Press 3 
hereafter ‘Frank “Underdevelopment or Revolution” (1969)’; Ahiakpor ‘The Experience of Ghana’ (1985) see note 
123 at 537 to 538; Theotonio Dos Santos ‘The Structure of Dependence’ (1970) 60 The American Economic Review 
231 at 231 to 232 hereafter ‘Dos Santos “Structure of Dependence” (1970)’ .  
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before industrialisation but never in a state of underdevelopment.128 A component of the term 
‘underdevelopment’ is an exploitative relationship.129 Accordingly, a country in a state of 
underdevelopment is a country in an exploitative relationship, where it is deprived of its 
economic surplus as it is exported.130  
Frank describes the relationship between developed and underdeveloped countries as that of 
‘metropolis’ and ‘satellite’ respectively.131 According to the metropolis-satellite structure, the 
economic surplus of satellite countries is used to develop and enrich the metropolis 
countries.132 Frank argues that this structure is replicated within nations.133 Consequently, 
within a satellite country there also exists a metropolis-satellite structure that maintains the 
exploitative relationship that occurs at an international level.134 Another overarching theme 
is that the same historical processes resulted in the economic, social and political 
underdevelopment of satellite countries and the development of countries in the 
metropolis.135 Consequently, development and underdevelopment are two sides of the same 
coin.136 
In addition to the two overarching themes, i.e. the existence of a satellite-metropolis structure 
and that development and underdevelopment are two sides of the same coin, there are 
hypotheses of how the development process occurs. Three of these hypotheses arising from 
Frank’s work are relevant to this chapter.  
                                                     
128 Frank ‘Underdevelopment or Revolution” (1969) ibid at3. It becomes evident at this point that the dependency 
theory also operates within the development discourse because it makes the methodological assumption that a 
universal standard exists that we can use to compare the development of all countries see Walter Rodney How 
Europe Underdeveloped Africa (1973) 19 hereafter ‘Rodney “Underdevelopment of Africa” (1973)’ who makes 
the point that the term ‘underdevelopment’ is a comparative one cf. Brohman Ideological Bias (1995) see note 
9 at 121 to 122. 
129 Rodney ‘Underdevelopment of Africa’ (1973) Ibid 19; Amiya Kumar Bagchi The Political Economy of 
Underdevelopment (1982) 20-40.  
130 Rodney ‘Underdevelopment of Africa’ (1973) see note 128 at20; Ahiakpor ‘The Experience of Ghana’ (1985) 
see note 123 at 536. 
131 Frank ‘Underdevelopment or Revolution’ (1969) see note 127 at 5. Another term used to describe this 
exploitative relationship is ‘core’, for ‘developed’ countries, and ‘periphery’ to describe ‘developing countries’ 
see Immanuel Wallerstein ‘The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative 
Analysis’ (1974) 16 Comparative Studies in Society and History 387 at 401. Immanuel Wallerstein, who falls under 
a different strand of dependency theory compared to Frank (the ‘World-systems theory’) also inserts the term 
‘semi-periphery’. He uses the term to describe countries who are both exploiters and exploited and whose role 
within the world-economy is to offer political stability as the world-system appears less polarised. 
132 Frank ‘Underdevelopment or Revolution’ (1969) see note 127 at 6; Rodney ‘Underdevelopment of Africa’ 
(1973) see note 128 at 19 to 20; Amiya Kumar Bagchi The Political Economy of Underdevelopment (1982) 20-40. 
133 Frank ‘Underdevelopment or Revolution’ (1969) see note 127 at5; Dos Santos ‘Structure of Dependence’ 
(1970) see note 127 at 234. 
134 Frank ‘Underdevelopment or Revolution’ (1969) see note 127 at 6; Dos Santos ‘Structure of Dependence’ 
(1970) see note 127 at 234. 
135 Frank ‘Underdevelopment or Revolution’ (1969) see note 127 at9; Gilpin ‘Political Economy’ (1987) see note 
124 at 273.   
136 Samir Amin is another author who shares this position see Samir Amin Accumulation on a World Scale: A 
Critique of the Theory of Underdevelopment (1974) 17-18 hereafter ‘Amin “Accumulation on a World Scale” 
(1974)’; Gilpin ‘Political Economy’ (1987) see note 124 at 273.  
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The first hypothesis is that the development of countries is stunted by their position as 
satellite countries.137 This means metropolis countries will take and use the economic benefits 
produced by a satellite country.138 An example is in terms of both monetary and non-monetary 
returns the exploitation of  
The second hypothesis is that, for a satellite country to develop, its ties to the metropolis 
country need to be broken.139 Accordingly, while the bond exists between a satellite and 
metropolis country, that relationship is characterised by exploitation and asymmetry in 
power.140 Once these ties are re-established the satellite country will be absorbed in the 
metropolitan country’s system and the exploitation and asymmetry of power will resume.141  
The third hypothesis is that the most underdeveloped regions are those that had the strongest 
bonds to a metropolis in the past.142 Contrary to the belief that a region’s lack of development 
is because of its isolation from the rest of the world, underdevelopment is evident in countries 
and regions that were the biggest exporters of natural resources to metropolis countries.143   
The history of colonialism in South Africa places it as a country in the ‘periphery’ or 
‘satellite’.144 Similar to other African countries (and countries in South America and South 
Asia), colonisation in South Africa meant, amongst other things, the exploitation of natural 
resources and the labour of indigenous people to benefit the development of its coloniser – 
the British Empire.145 While most African countries gained their independence in the late 50s, 
the 60s and 70s and their governments inherited countries distorted by colonialism,146 South 
                                                     
137 Frank ‘Underdevelopment or Revolution’ (1969) see note 127 at 9; Dos Santos ‘Structure of Dependence’ 
(1970) see note 127 at 232; Samir Amin ‘Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black Africa-Origins and 
Contemporary Forms’ (1972) 10 The Journal of Modern African Studies 503 at 520 hereafter ‘Amin 
“Underdevelopment and Dependence” (1972)’. 
138 Frank ‘Underdevelopment or Revolution’ (1969) see note 127 at 9; Amin ‘Underdevelopment and 
Dependence’ (1972) see note 137 at 516 and 524 
139 Frank ‘Underdevelopment or Revolution’ (1969) see note 127 at 9-10; According to Samir Amin, as opposed 
to focusing solely on the form the economy takes e.g. whether the economy is industrial or not, for a satellite 
country to develop it will have to revise how it allocates resources so its economy benefits the inhabitants of that 
country see Samir Amin ‘Accumulation and Development: A Theoretical Model’ (1974) Review of African Political 
Economy 9 at 16 hereafter ‘Amin “A Theoretical Model” (1974)’ . 
140 Rodney ‘Underdevelopment of Africa’ (1973) see note 128 at 20; Ahiakpor ‘The Experience of Ghana’ (1985) 
see note 123 at 536. 
141 According to Samir Amin, for as long as satellite countries make ‘decisions based on profitability’ their 
integration and location within the world system will be that of marginalisation see Amin ‘A Theoretical Model’ 
(1974) see note 139 at 18 to 19; Frank ‘Underdevelopment or Revolution’ (1969) see note 127 at 11.  
142 Frank ‘Underdevelopment or Revolution’ (1969) see note 127 at 13. 
143 André Gunder Frank Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution (1969) 13. 
144 Samir Amin Unequal Development: An essay on the social formations of peripheral capitalism (1976) 204 
hereafter ‘Amin “Social formations of peripheral capitalism” (1976)’; Ralph Horwitz The Political Economy of 
South Africa (1967); Charles H Feinstein The Economic History of South Africa: Conquest, discrimination and 
development (2005). 
145 Samir Amin ‘Africa: Living on the fringe’ (2002) Monthly Review 41 at 44; Amin ‘A Theoretical Model’ (1974) 
see note 139 at 519; see Ralph Horwitz The Political Economy of South Africa (1967). 
146 Samir Amin ‘Africa: Living on the fringe’ (2002) Monthly Review 41 at 45; Jackson TCB Jack, Ifeoma Better 
Nkwocha and Stanley Ebitari Boroh ‘Dependency and Third World Underdevelopment: Examining Production-
Consumption Disarticulation in Nigeria’ (2016) 10 African Research Review 204. 
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Africa entered a period where policies marginalising and dispossessing the majority black 
indigenous population were implemented as they were sent to live in the homelands.  
Consequently, what began as an exploitative relationship between the ‘satellite’ and 
‘metropolis’ during colonialism evolved and was replicated within the country in the 
relationship between homelands and white-only businesses and suburbs. In 1948 the National 
Party implemented Apartheid meaning this marginalisation became state-sanctioned and 
law,147 this further distorted the internal societal structure of South Africa.  
 
3.2.1.2 How the dependency theory can manifest itself as sectoral disarticulation 
 
The dependency theory raises the important concept of sectoral disarticulation. The term 
‘sectoral disarticulation’148 describes the phenomenon that occurs in a ‘satellite’ country with 
a distorted economic and social structure.149 Sectoral disarticulation is a consequence of the 
exploitative relationship between a ‘satellite’ country and a ‘metropolis’.150 The concept arose 
out of the realisation that economic growth does not necessarily translate into socio-
economic development.151 It attempts to account for the improvement of economic indices 
but the lack of improvement in the social conditions.152  
To say that a satellite country, with a distorted social and economic structure is displaying 
'sectoral disarticulation' there are three features that should be present.153 First, the presence 
of an industry whose growth far outpaces other sectors.154 Although uneven growth amongst 
                                                     
147 South African History Online ‘A history of Apartheid in South Africa’ (6 May 2016) available at 
http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/history-apartheid-south-africa accessed 18 July 2018. 
148 The concept of disarticulation is central to Samir Amin’s theory of underdevelopment and peripheral 
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149 Jie Huang ‘Structural Disarticulation and Third World Human Development’ (1995) 36 International Journal of 
Comparative Sociology 164 at 166 hereafter ‘Huang “Structural Disarticulation” (1995)’; Jackson TCB Jack, Ifeoma 
Better Nkwocha and Stanley Ebitari Boroh ‘Dependency and Third World Underdevelopment: Examining 
Production-Consumption Disarticulation in Nigeria’ (2016) 10 African Research Review 204 at 210. 
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Review 63 at 64 and 72 hereafter ‘Stokes and Anderson “Disarticulation and Human Welfare” (1990)’. 
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Economic Theory 22; Huang ‘Structural Disarticulation’ (1995) see note 149 at 165; Stokes and Anderson 
‘Disarticulation and Human Welfare’ (1990) see note 150.  
152 Stokes and Anderson ‘Disarticulation and Human Welfare’ (1990) see note 150; Huang ‘Structural 
Disarticulation’ (1995) see note 149.  
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economic sectors is common and is also found in developed countries, what makes it a feature 
of sectoral disarticulation is when an economy lacks powerful forces ‘that diffuse the benefits 
of the progress throughout the economy’.155 Where the benefits of this growing industry are 
not diffused throughout the entire economy, the result is a disparity between the number of 
the working population in other sectors and how much those sectors contribute to the GDP.156  
Second, the economic sector, whose growth far outperforms other sectors, will have no 
linkages to other productive sectors157 and so its activity will not stimulate or advance the 
other sectors of that economy.158 What is common in underdeveloped countries is an 
economy that is made up of a number of sectors with a marginal number of transactions 
between them.159 The majority of these transactions occur with developed countries and so 
the ‘linkages’160 are found in metropolitan countries161 and these outperforming sectors 
appear as extensions of these metropolitan countries.162 In South Africa, an added layer of 
nuance is required because of the distortion that occurred during Apartheid which resulted in 
the replication of this metropolis-satellite structure internally.163 This means, in addition to 
the links with developed countries that foreign mining companies have, within the country, 
the mining industry is linked almost exclusively to the ‘metropolis’ which largely benefits the 
city and white-owned businesses resulting in a failure to localise the benefits of mining.164 
Finally, there will be a disparity, in the economy, between what is produced and what is 
consumed.165 The goods that are produced are those that are in demand in overseas, foreign 
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markets as the economy tends to be 'export-orientated',166 which results in ‘external 
dependence’ on trade with foreign countries and ‘commercial dependence’ on finance from 
foreign countries.167 
There are a number of theories on what causes sectoral disarticulation. According to Amin, 
the primary cause is an economy that is export orientated.168 This export orientation results 
in the modernisation of industries that are linked to foreign markets either by trade or 
capital.169 Conversely, those economies that are not linked to foreign markets will become 
comparatively unprofitable.170  
High levels of sectoral disarticulation are viewed as the reason why ‘human development’, 
which falls under the 'broader view of development',171 is impeded. Jie Huang makes this 
observation172 and bases it on three reasons: first, is that sectoral disarticulation contributes 
to high unemployment levels; second, is that it results in the diversion of government 
resources from social services and finally, sectoral disarticulation contributes to income 
inequality.173   
The first reason why sectoral disarticulation impedes ‘human development’ is because it 
exacerbates the problem of massive unemployment174 in ‘Third World’ Countries. This is a 
result of the capital intensive industries175 that are promoted and grow significantly in sectoral 
disarticulated economies, often to the detriment of traditional sectors such as agriculture.176 
Capital intensive industries are unable to absorb a significant proportion of workers resulting 
in high unemployment rates amongst both the urban and rural population.177 In turn, high 
unemployment levels restrict the general welfare of the population as a significant proportion 
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of the labour force is unable to contribute to the economy.178 Thus, the country will remain 
with low levels of economic productivity.179 
Secondly, high levels of sectoral disarticulation divert government spending from social 
services.180 This occurs in one of two ways: either, the government will divert spending from 
social services to redirect the money to support the growth of capital intensive economies; or 
a government will cut spending on social services as part of the conditions of a loan received 
from the IMF.181 These cuts to social services impede human development as they lower the 
living standard of inhabitants of developing countries.182 
Thirdly, economic growth in economies that are structurally disarticulated perpetuates 
income inequality.183 The modern industrial sectors, with growth that far outpaces other 
sectors of the economy, produce goods and services that are expensive.184 The sale of these 
goods and services benefits the elite.185 However, because the sector is unable to absorb a 
significant proportion of the labour force, its growth perpetuates high unemployment 
levels.186 The growth of these modern industrial sectors results in an overall disparity between 
the income of those who profit from them and the inhabitants of the country that are 
unemployed.187 
The concept of sectoral disarticulation goes hand-in-hand with the concept of enclave 
development. This is because an ‘enclave approach’ to development is generally characterised 
by the development of infrastructure that only supports the exporting of natural resources.188 
It is also characterised by the type of extraction of natural resources that is delinked and 
disconnected from the rest of the national economy.189 South Africa’s history means that 
caution needs to be exercised when pursuing a Resource-based Industrialisation strategy as it 
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could potentially perpetuate sectoral disarticulation and enclave development unless there is 
a breakaway from how natural resource extraction occurred in the past.  
The enclave approach to development often manifests itself as multinational corporations 
extracting minerals in areas where the only sign of ‘development’ consists of roads, electricity 
and water available for the mining operations to the exclusion of the surrounding 
community.190 From a supply chain perspective, an example of the narrow definition of 
enclave development would consist of goods and services (such as equipment and spares, 
steel, explosives and protective gear) being imported from outside the country as opposed to 
being sourced locally.191 More broadly, enclave development also includes the provision of 
basic human needs to communities that surround the mining operation through various 
development projects and this is the form of enclave development that will be referred to in 
this dissertation.192 This form of enclave development is only ‘broad’ in the sense that it 
includes the provision of both social and physical infrastructure but these developments only 
target specific areas surrounding their mining operations (enclaves).193  Often these 
development projects will take the form of corporate social responsibility, a ‘social license to 
operate’ or, in South Africa, a Social and Labour Plan (SLP).194 
3.2.1.3 Linkages as an alternative to sectoral disarticulation  
The enclave approach to development can be contrasted to ‘linkages’.195  ‘Linkages’ can be 
defined as the amount of transactions between the extractives industry and other industries 
that occur within an economy.196 Broadly speaking there are three types of linkages: fiscal 
linkages, consumption linkages and production linkages.197 Fiscal linkages consist of corporate 
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taxes and levies that a government imposes to benefit from the income streams of mining 
companies.198 Consumption linkages arise out of the disposable income earned from the 
resource sector by workers that they are able to spend in other industries and production 
linkages are those that arise from further processing and procurements.199  
An example of these linkages in an economy is where a transnational corporation (‘TNC’) 
sources its equipment, spares, steel and explosives locally. It would include processing of the 
commodity and the use of that product in the manufacturing industry in the country where it 
was extracted to produce high-end products and hiring a local auditing firm to audit the books 
of the Transnational Corporation. It is important to enhance both the linkages between a 
country’s extractive industry and the rest of the economy and to increase the value added to 
a commodity before it is exported,200 because this prevents sectoral disarticulation from 
occurring. 
3.2.2 Globalisation as a development strategy: The World Trade Organisation 
 
In the previous section, the dependency theory’s two overarching themes were highlighted. 
These explain how socio-economic development is promoted at an international level. The 
first theme is that there exists a metropolis-satellite structure at the international level that 
informs (lack of) socio-economic development.201 The second theme is that the process 
responsible for the development of ‘metropolis countries’ is the same process responsible for 
the underdevelopment of ‘satellite countries’.202    
Globalisation theory also attempts to explain how countries can promote socio-economic 
development.203  In particular, globalisation theory’s analysis of international trade is relevant 
because of the critical role that international trade plays in the economic, social and cultural 
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at 66 in Albert O Hirschman Essays in Trespassing: Economics, Politics and Beyond (1981); Musawenkosi Nxele 
‘Does mining alleviate or exacerbate poverty: Are local communities really ‘A much Ado about Nothing’? (14 
November 2016) MCom Thesis, University of Cape Town at 39. 
199 Albert O Hirschman ‘A generalized linkage approach to development, with special reference to staples’ 59-97 
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development of a country.204 The discussion below on international trade is also relevant to 
the overall discussion of how the enclave approach to development perpetuates the 
extraction and exporting of natural resources that is delinked and disconnected from the rest 
of the country’s economy. 
An ‘extreme’ version of globalisation theory posits that in the current globalised economy, 
markets are increasingly uncontrollable, national economies are insignificant and true change 
can only be effected by  TNCs.205 Additionally, this view posits that the economic interests of 
TNCs are often emphasised to the detriment of developing countries and their social, cultural 
and environmental interests.206      
There is a more ‘moderate’ view of globalisation that posits that in a system of globalisation, 
manufacturing is diffused around the world,207 which results in a fragmented production 
process across various geographical locations,208 and a breakdown of artificial barriers, so that 
goods, services and knowledge can flow.209 The strict distinction between a satellite country 
that exports raw materials and a metropolitan country that manufactures and produces a 
high-end product, is blurred.210   
Used in both these instances, ‘globalisation’ describes the process of increased integration of 
national economies through international trade and foreign direct investment into one 
borderless global economy and TNCs are seen as playing a leading role in increasing this 
breakdown of borders.211 This can be attributed to a number of factors including: TNCs moving 
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their headquarters outside their home countries (thus becoming ‘stateless’),212 and the focus 
of TNCs on ‘core competencies’ and outsourcing other functions thus creating Global Value 
Chains (GVC).213  
‘Globalisation’ can also be used in a prescriptive sense.214 Proponents who use globalisation 
in this sense see integration as a means to achieve development.215  An example of this usage 
can be found in the United Nations Millennium Declaration.216  The Millennium Declaration 
recognises that for globalisation to benefit all peoples it ‘must include policies and measures, 
at the global level, which correspond to the needs of developing countries’.217   
Although the World Trade Organisation (‘WTO’) has maintained that it is not a development 
agency, international trade plays a critical role in the economic, social and cultural 
development of a country.218 When globalisation is thought of as a development strategy, 
increase in integration is coupled with the idea of harmonisation which means as countries’ 
economies become increasingly interlinked, the more necessary it is that their policies are 
harmonised to increase the flow of capital, goods and people across borders.219 This requires 
the role of the State to be harmonised across developed and developing countries in a bid to 
facilitate this integration (which should ultimately result in the development of ‘Third World’ 
countries).220 The policies of the WTO that prioritise trade liberalisation and little to no 
government interference in the markets have been critiqued, because of their inability to 
address the problems of developing countries.221 This is evident in how East Asian countries 
have adopted completely different policies from those proposed by the WTO, including 
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allowing the State to play a leading role in the markets, and have been successful unlike their 
counterparts that have adopted WTO policies.222 The benefits of globalisation accrue mainly 
to developed countries because of their vast economic power and because of their inequitable 
economic and trade policies.223  
Whether one considers the ‘extreme’ view of globalisation or the ‘moderate’ view of 
globalisation as more compelling, one cannot deny that globalisation is occurring. This means 
that the policies that a country implements need to be cognisant of the effect that 
globalisation has had on TNCs, in particular, the increased outsourcing of ‘non-core’ 
competencies to remain more competitive in a globalised world. A country will also have its 
WTO treaty obligations to consider when implementing legislation and policies and more of 
this will be considered in Chapter Three.224   
4. Conclusion  
The two-fold aims of this chapter were: (i) to highlight a number of frameworks that have been 
relied on to promote socio-economic development; and (ii) to highlight how these frameworks 
inform decisions and actions and promote certain outcomes over others. Supplementary to 
these two aims, this Chapter also contextualises the discussions in Chapters Three and Four 
on legislation and policies related to mining. 
This chapter brings us a step closer to answering the research question225 by grounding the 
strategy proposed by the African Mining Vision (‘AMV’) of Resource-based Industrialisation 
(‘RBI’) within the development discourse. The development discourse is the over-arching and 
prevailing framework and within this discourse is the concept of socio-economic 
development.226 The term socio-economic development is a combination of both the broad 
and narrow definitions of development227 and different theories have attempted to explain 
how socio-economic development occurs at the societal level and international level. At the 
societal level, what was evident from the definition of industrialisation is that the model 
inherently considers how to achieve economic growth and how its benefits can be distributed 
to meet national goals such as the reduction of poverty and inequality.228  RBI is a specific form 
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of industrialisation that uses the natural resource wealth of the country to advance the 
industrialisation process and it can be located firmly within the development discourse.229 
The post-development theory rejects the paradigm of development.230 This means the theory 
rejects the assumption that development is always inherently good, that development is 
always possible and that the yardstick of whether a country has developed or not is 
universal.231 Post-development theorists determine the legitimacy of any social change by 
considering whether the mandate comes from the citizens. Accordingly, if citizens decide that 
they in fact aspire to a Western-form of development then it is legitimate.232 The post-
development school of thought will be useful in Chapter Five to come up with Terms of 
References and a way forward.   
At the international level, the point made by dependency theorists is that there are 
asymmetries of power between the different countries in the world which influences how 
they interact.233 Additionally, sectoral disarticulation is a phenomenon that is a result of this 
power imbalance and it accounts for the improvement of the wealth of a country not 
necessarily translating to socio-economic development because of that country’s distorted 
economic and social structure.234 An enclave approach to development exacerbates this 
distorted social structure as the development that does occur is aimed at facilitating the 
expedient extraction and export of natural resources.235  
Sectoral disarticulation and enclave development was contrasted to the idea of ‘linkages’ 
which aims to counter the disarticulation of the mining sector by increasing the number of 
transactions between the mining sector and other sectors of the economy.236 This is aimed at 
strengthening the other sectors of the economy, eventually enabling a move away from an 
over reliance on the extractives sector.237  
Colonialism meant that South Africa became a ‘satellite country’ and the subsequent 
Apartheid era led to a further fragmentation of South African society such that internally, it 
reflected the satellite-metropolis structure and its natural resource extraction occurred in 
enclaves.238 This means, in addition to the links with developed countries that foreign mining 
companies have, within the country, the mining industry is linked almost exclusively to the 
‘metropolis’ which largely benefits the city and white-owned businesses resulting in a failure 
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234 Chapter Two section 3.2.1.2. 
235 Chapter Two section 3.2.1.2. 
236 Chapter Two section 3.2.1.3. 
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238 Chapter Two section 3.2.1.1. 
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to localise the benefits of mining.239 South Africa’s history means that pursuing a strategy of 
using the exploitation of natural resources, such as a Resource-based Industrialisation 
strategy, to effect development could potentially perpetuate sectoral disarticulation and 
enclave development unless there is a breakaway from how natural resource extraction 
occurred in the past.240  
The international level theories of development also highlight that even after a country 
decides to pursue RBI, the success of that process will be influenced (or hampered) by the 
country’s position in the global economy. The increasing integration of national economies 
poses additional challenges because global institutions, such as the WTO, often impose global 
standards and laws with little to no regard to the development stages of the various 
signatories.241  
The focus of the next chapter is on the AMV and how its beneficiation policy as part of RBI is 
in conflict with WTO rules, as they both impact and influence the ability of South Africa to 
implement a number of national laws and policies. 
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Chapter 3: The African Mining Vision and 
Related Frameworks  
 
1. Introduction 
The term ‘resource curse’ is often used when referring to the many countries that have failed 
to leverage their mineral wealth effectively to avoid poverty and underdevelopment. 1 The 
term ‘resource-curse’ describes the occurrence of abundant natural resources in a country 
that is falling behind in a number of development indices and whose development is impeded 
by those natural resources.2 The reality is that difficult and bold steps are required from 
governments to make the asset of natural resources benefit their countries.3  In some of the 
literature, the starting position is that if a government is unable or unwilling to take bold steps 
to ensure that the resource wealth benefits the country as a whole, the best option is not to 
mine at all, because mineral resources are ultimately a non-renewable resource and a non-
wasting asset.4  
The second hypothesis of the research question is that South Africa is not pursuing a Resource-
based Industrialisation (‘RBI’) strategy and that the African Mining Vision’s (‘AMV’) RBI 
strategy 5 could inform South Africa’s SLP system.6 Thus, the focus of this chapter will be on 
the AMV and how it seeks to advance socio-economic development through Resource-based 
                                                     
1 This thesis was first developed by Richard Auty in Richard Auty Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: 
The Resource Curse Thesis (1993); Economic Commission for Africa ‘Minerals Cluster Policy Study in Africa: Pilot 
Studies of South Africa and Mozambique’ (2004) at 12 hereafter ‘ECA: Minerals Cluster Policy Study’; PP Jourdan 
‘Strategies for the Regional Planning of the Minerals Industry in Southern Africa: The case of the SADCC’ (1990) 
unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Leeds; O Östensson and A Uwizeye-Mapendano ‘Growth and 
Diversification in Mineral Economies’, Draft paper prepared for the regional workshop for mineral economies in 
Africa, Cape Town 7-9 November (2000).       
2 For a broad overview of the thesis see Richard Auty Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource 
Curse Thesis (1993); Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey D Sachs and Joseph E Stilglitz ‘Introduction: what is the 
problem with natural resource wealth’ in Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey D Sachs and Joseph E Stilglitz (eds) 
Escaping the resource curse (2007) at 4; PP Jourdan ‘Strategies for the Regional Planning of the Minerals Industry 
in Southern Africa: The case of the SADCC’ (1990) unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Leeds; O Östensson and 
A Uwizeye-Mapendano ‘Growth and Diversification in Mineral Economies’, Draft paper prepared for the regional 
workshop for mineral economies in Africa, Cape Town 7-9 November (2000).       
3 Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey D Sachs and Joseph E Stilglitz ‘Introduction: what is the problem with natural 
resource wealth’ in Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey D Sachs and Joseph E Stilglitz (eds) Escaping the resource curse 
(2007) at 4; cf. Andrew Rosser ‘The Political Economy of the Resource Curse: A Literature Review’ Institute for 
Development Studies (IDS) Working Paper No. 268 (2006) at 7 who argues that the conventional wisdom that 
natural resources can aide in development is wrong.  
4 Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey D Sachs and Joseph E Stilglitz ‘Introduction: what is the problem with natural 
resource wealth’ in Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey D Sachs and Joseph E Stilglitz (eds) Escaping the resource curse 
(2007) at 15. 
5 African Mining Vision 2009, Addis Ababa. Hereafter ‘AMV’. 
6 Chapter One section 2. 
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Industrialisation (‘RBI’). In addition to the AMV, this chapter will also consider the Country 
Mining Vision (‘CMV’) guidebook which is meant to assist African governments domesticate 
the AMV.7  As South Africa has a number of binding legal obligations that are in tension with 
the AMV, in particular WTO treaty obligations, this chapter will end with a discussion of these 
treaty obligations and what their implications are for the implementation of the AMV.  
Chapter Two highlighted a number of frameworks that have been relied on to promote socio-
economic development.8 From the discussion of dependency and globalisation theorists it is 
evident that whatever policies a government chooses these are not created in a vacuum.9 The 
policies of a ‘satellite’ country are influenced by countries in the ‘metropolis’ and global 
institutions that play a role in promoting the harmonisation of countries’ policies across the 
globe.10 The discussion in Chapter Two, on the different levels on which socio-economic 
development theories operate, will be useful for contextualising the legislation and policies 
discussed in this chapter and Chapter Four.  
According to the AMV, South Africa’s policies and legislation need to ensure an increase in the 
number of transactions between their extractives industry and other industries for 
diversification and industrialisation to occur. To this end, the AMV proposes RBI, linkages and 
beneficiation to counter enclave development. Each will be discussed below. 
2. The African Mining Vision  
Africa’s mineral wealth should be a catalyst for structural transformation, but instead, oil and 
the extractives sector are associated with high levels of illicit financial flows.11 The AMV was 
adopted in 2009 by Heads of State at the African Union Summit.12 It promotes RBI13 and 
provides a framework for the integration of mining activities into local, national and regional 
development policies.14 The AMV also needs to be implemented at a national, sub-regional 
                                                     
7 African Minerals Development Centre ‘Country Mining Vision Guidebook: Domesticating the African Mining 
Vision’ (2014) available at https://www.uneca.org/publications/country-mining-vision-cmv-guidebook accessed 
on 28 May 2017.  Hereafter ‘CMV (2014)’. 
8 Chapter Two section 2. 
9 Chapter Two section 3.2. 
10 Chapter Two section 3.2. 
11 African Union and United Nations Economic Commission in Africa (2015) Report of the High-level Panel on Illicit 
Financial Flows from Africa at 56; Philippe Le Billon ‘Extractive sectors and illicit financial flows: What role for 
revenue governance initiatives’ (2011) at 2 available at 
https://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/2474929/Extractive%20sectors%20and%20illicit%20fin
ancial%20flows%3a%20What%20role%20for%20revenue%20governance%20initiatives%3f?sequence=1&isAllo
wed=y accessed 29 May 2018.   
12 ‘About AMV’ available at http://www.africaminingvision.org/about.html accessed 28 May 2017.  
13 RBI was defined in Chapter Two as the use of a country’s natural resource endowment to build industrial 
structures that can achieve economic growth. See Chapter Two section Error! Reference source not found. for a 
discussion of the concept of RBI; M Roemer ‘Resource-Based Industrialisation in the developing countries: a 
survey’ (1979) 6 Journal of Development Economics 163 at 166 and 167;   
14 ‘About AMV’ available at http://www.africaminingvision.org/about.html accessed 28 May 2017. 
39 
 
and continental level.15 The significance of the AMV is twofold: first, it represents a common 
voice from African governments relating to exploiting the mineral wealth found on the 
continent.16 Second, the AMV represents a departure from the idea that governments should 
act as mere regulators, the AMV recognises that governments should promote a 
developmental state.17   
 Industrialisation, linkages and beneficiation 
Historically, African countries have failed to link their mining industries with the rest of the 
industries in their economy.18  This is because of the colonial history of African countries as 
‘satellite countries’ in exploitative relationships with countries in the ‘metropolis’.19 At most, 
the linkages that have existed are those between the transport, energy and mining industry 
to facilitate the export of minerals to overseas markets.20  
One of the objectives of the AMV is the cultivation of linkages which stems from the realisation 
by African leaders that enhancing mineral beneficiation and linkages forms part of ensuring 
the country receives maximum economic and social returns from its natural resources.21 
According to the AMV, there are five opportunities for integrating a country’s extractives 
sector with the rest of the local economy. These are: resource rents,22 physical 
infrastructure,23 downstream and upstream value-addition24 and technology or product 
development.25  
                                                     
15 AMV see note 5 at 30. 
16 Hany Besada and Phillip Martin ‘Mining Codes in Africa: emergence of a ‘fourth’ generation?’ (2015) 28 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs 263 at 273; ECA: Minerals Cluster Policy Study see note 1 at 22. 
17 Antonio M.A Pedro ‘The African Mining Vision: Towards Shared Benefits and Economic Transformation’ (2012) 
1 Great Insight 4 at 5 as cited in Hany Besada and Phillip Martin ‘Mining Codes in Africa: emergence of a ‘fourth’ 
generation?’ (2015) 28 Cambridge Review of International Affairs 263 at 273. 
18 AU Conference of Ministers Responsible for Mineral Resources Development ‘Draft Action Plan for 
Implementing the AMV.’ Second Ordinary Session (12-16 December, 2011) at 31.    
19 See Chapter Two section 3.2.1 for more on the dependency theory and the metropolis-satellite structure that 
exists at an international level. 
20 AU Conference of Ministers Responsible for Mineral Resources Development ‘Draft Action Plan for 
Implementing the AMV.’ Second Ordinary Session (12-16 December, 2011) at 31.    
21 ECA: Minerals Cluster Policy Study see note 1 at 22. 
22 AMV see note 5 at 13.  
23 Resource rents would be used to build physical (roads, dams etc.) and social infrastructure (hospitals and 
schools). This physical infrastructure would then be used by other industries that cannot afford their own 
infrastructure (e.g. agriculture); AMV see note 5 at 13. 
24 Downstream value addition would require the development of industries that could process the commodities 
(beneficiation). The South African government is attempting to incorporate beneficiation into the MPRDA, this is 
reflected in item 21 of the MPRDA Amendment Bill B15D-2013; African Mining Vision 2009, Addis Ababa at 13. 
25 Requires the development of new products and technologies to exploit resources effectively within the country 
context. AMV see note 5 at 13. 
40 
 
As stated in Chapter Two, broadly speaking there are three types of linkages: fiscal linkages, 
consumption linkages and production linkages26 and the AMV deals with only two types of 
linkages – fiscal and production.  We can thus categorise the five opportunities for integrating 
a country’s extractives sector, as proposed by the AMV, into these two broad types of linkages. 
Fiscal linkages would include: resource rents27 and indirectly physical infrastructure because 
the AMV proposes that resource rents be used to build physical (roads, dams etc.) and social 
infrastructure (hospitals and schools).28 Production linkages would include: downstream and 
upstream value-addition29 and indirectly technology or product development.30  
According to the AMV, developing these fiscal and production linkages will lead to an increase 
in the number of transactions between the extractives industry and other industries which 
will result in the industrialisation and diversification of the economy.31 However these 
opportunities do not materialise merely as a result of the presence of mineral resources and 
will require the appropriate policies.32 Government policies need to be implemented to 
ensure these linkages are enhanced and these policies should, first, link access to mineral 
rights with linkage conditions, second, incentivise mining companies to implement integrated 
projects33 and third, prioritise beneficiation and the empowerment of citizens.34   
This means for African countries to move away from their extractives industry perpetuating 
enclave development, their policies and legislation need to ensure an increase in the number 
of transactions between their extractives industry and other industries for diversification and 
industrialisation to occur.35  This would result in the eventual socio-economic development of 
the entire country.36  In addition to this broader objective, the AMV also proposes methods of 
localising the benefits of enclave development without perpetuating enclave development.37  
                                                     
26 Chapter Two section 3.2.1.3; for a broad overview see Albert O Hirschman ‘A generalized linkage approach to 
development, with special reference to staples’ 59-97 in Albert O Hirschman Essays in Trespassing: Economics, 
Politics and Beyond (1981).  
27 AMV see note 5 at 13. 
28 AMV see note 5 at 13. 
29 Downstream value addition would require the development of industries that could process the commodities 
(beneficiation). The South African government is attempting to incorporate beneficiation into the MPRDA, this is 
reflected in item 21 of the MPRDA Amendment Bill B15D-2013; African Mining Vision 2009, Addis Ababa at 13. 
30 Requires the development of new products and technologies to exploit resources effectively within the country 
context. AMV see note 5 at 13. 
31 AMV see note 5 at 13. 
32 AMV see note 5 at 13. 
33 These projects should be integrated with the national and (or) regional economy.   
34 AU Conference of Ministers Responsible for Mineral Resources Development ‘Draft Action Plan for 
Implementing the AMV.’ Second Ordinary Session (12-16 December, 2011) at 31.    
35 AMV see note 5 at 5. This hypothesis, as contained in the AMV, is based on the experiences of countries such 
as Finland, Sweden, Germany and the US and to a lesser extent, Malaysia, Brazil and South Africa. Chapter 5 will 
highlight why assumptions about the validity of this strategy, based on ‘First World’ countries’ experiences should 
be accepted with caution.      
36 AMV see note 5 at 5. 
37 AMV see note 5 at 5, 12, 23 and 24. 
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What follows is a discussion of how the AMV proposes to localise the benefits of mining 
without perpetuating enclave development. 
 Localising the benefits of mining without perpetuating enclave development 
Most mining affected communities expect to benefit positively from mining because of their 
close proximity to the environmental and social costs.38 Thus, it is important to take into 
account both the social and environmental costs of mining to determine whether there is an 
overall benefit.39 More pertinent to this research question is determining how the benefits of 
mining should be localised without perpetuating the enclave approach development. 
As stated in Chapter Two,40 this dissertation is more concerned with the perpetuation of 
enclave development that comprises of multinational corporations making developments that 
support their extraction and export of minerals.41 This form of enclave development includes 
the provision of basic human needs, however this is limited to communities that surround the 
mining operation. 42  This form of enclave development fails to focus on the wider distribution 
of the benefits of mining. In the context of South Africa, this means labour-sending 
communities43 are largely neglected and migrant labourers return to communities that have 
not experienced any socio-economic development.44 It also results in poor communities not 
experiencing socio-economic development, because they happen to be far from mineral 
reserves. This is problematic, because the State is the custodian of mineral resources and is 
meant to exploit these resources for the benefit of all South Africans. 
According to the Country Mining Vision (‘CMV’), most African countries do not have legislation 
or policies that aim to regulate the social and environmental impacts of mining.45 Where 
                                                     
38 These environmental and social costs include: increase in informal settlements, the contamination of 
groundwater, air pollution, sinkholes from decommissioned mines and increase in alcohol abuse see Bench 
Marks Foundation ‘Policy Gap 9: South African Coal Mining, Corporate Grievance Mechanisms, Community 
Engagement Concerns and Mining Impacts’ (2014) available http://bench-
marks.org.za/research/policy_gap_9.pdf accessed 21 December 2018; Musawenkosi Nxele ‘Does mining 
alleviate or exacerbate poverty: Are local communities really ‘A much Ado about Nothing’? (14 November 2016) 
MCom Thesis, University of Cape Town at 48.  
39 CMV (2014) see note 7 at 179. 
40 Chapter Two section 3.2.1.2. 
41 Jenik Radon ‘How to Negotiate an Oil Agreement’ 89-113 at 110 in Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey D Sachs & 
Joseph E. Stiglitz (eds) Escaping the Resource Curse (2007). 
42 Jenik Radon ‘How to Negotiate an Oil Agreement’ 89-113 at 110 in Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey D Sachs & 
Joseph E. Stiglitz (eds) Escaping the Resource Curse (2007). 
43 ‘Labour-sending areas’ are characterised by: (i) being far from where the mining takes place; (ii) they are often 
in dire need of socio-economic development which results in (iii) a significant number of their population 
(migrant labourers) travelling to those communities where mining takes place in search of jobs at the mines.  
44 Musawenkosi Nxele ‘Does mining alleviate or exacerbate poverty: Are local communities really ‘A much Ado 
about Nothing’? (14 November 2016) MCom Thesis, University of Cape Town at 21. 
45 CMV (2014) see note 7 at 182. 
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legislation and policies are enacted, there is a lack of capacity, on the part of African 
governments, to monitor and evaluate the level of compliance.46  
The CMV partly deals with how the benefits of mining can be localised in the chapter dealing 
with ‘Fiscal Regime & Revenue Capture’.47 According to the CMV, an African government 
needs to develop a clear revenue distribution system to local authorities that will eventually 
feed into communities.48  Then revenue can be distributed by governments to more than one 
community, to ensure that the revenue of mining activities are linked to the development of 
both mining affected communities and labour-sending areas. 
Another proposal from the CMV is the establishment of a Sovereign Wealth Fund.49 A 
Sovereign Wealth Fund is owned and managed by a sovereign.50 A ‘sovereign’ can comprise 
of government, national or federal authorities.51 If a fund contains assets that are prudential 
monetary reserves or pension funds then it is not a Sovereign Wealth Fund.52 It aids in 
distributing the benefits of mining across generations.53 This is achieved by investing a portion 
of the revenue from the exploitation of the country’s natural resources into a diversified 
portfolio of assets that are able to provide returns for future generations.54 
Both of the proposals above, a clear mineral revenue distribution system and a Sovereign 
Wealth Fund, ensure that the benefits of mining meet both the short-term and long-term 
needs of communities and the country. Furthermore, developing fiscal linkages aides in 
ensuring the mining industry is as sustainable as possible.55 
Additionally, both of the above proposals from the CMV operationalise the AMV’s proposal 
for the development of fiscal linkages with the mining industry.56  This is aimed at ensuring 
that revenue that accrues from mining is invested into both physical and social 
                                                     
46 CMV (2014) see note 7 at 182. 
47 CMV (2014) see note 7 at 49. 
48 CMV (2014) see note 7 at 69. 
49 CMV (2014) see note 7 at 68. 
50 Andrew Rozanov ‘Definitional Challenges of Dealing with Sovereign Wealth Funds’ (2011) 2 Asian Journal of 
International Law 249 at 252. The first use of the term ‘Sovereign Wealth Fund’ can be found in Andrew Rozanov 
‘Who holds the wealth of nations?’ (2005) 15 Central Banking Journal 52-57. 
51 Benjamin J Cohen ‘Sovereign Wealth Funds and National Security: The Great Trade off’ (2009) 85 International 
Affairs 713 at 715; Andrew Rozanov ‘Definitional Challenges of Dealing with Sovereign Wealth Funds’ (2011) 2 
Asian Journal of International Law 249 at 252. 
52 Andrew Rozanov ‘Who holds the wealth of nations?’ (2005) 15 Central Banking Journal 52-57; Andrew Rozanov 
‘Definitional Challenges of Dealing with Sovereign Wealth Funds’ (2011) 2 Asian Journal of International Law 249 
at 252. 
53 CMV (2014) see note 7 at 68. 
54 Benjamin J Cohen ‘Sovereign Wealth Funds and National Security: The Great Trade off’ (2009) 85 International 
Affairs 713 at 715; Bader Alhashel ‘Sovereign Wealth Funds: A literature review’ (2015) 78 Journal of Economics 
and Business 1 at 2; Rolando Avendaño and Javier Santiso ‘Are Sovereign Wealth Funds’ Investments politically 
biased? A comparison with mutual funds’ OECD Development Centre, Working Paper No. 283 (2009) at 8. 
55 CMV (2014) see note 7 at 151. 
56 AMV see note 5 at 13; CMV (2014) see note 7 at 151. 
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infrastructure.57 This re-investment of mining revenue is one way that mining affected 
communities and labour-sending areas can benefit from mining.  
The ability of African governments to implement the AMV effectively could be constrained by 
a number of factors. What follows is a discussion of factors that may constrain a country in 
implementing the AMV. Additionally, the following section discusses a number of the critiques 
levelled against AMV.  
2.3 Constraints to implementing the African Mining Vision 
The first factor that may constrain a country in implementing the AMV, relates to the 
institutional capacity of most African governments. State regulatory bodies that are 
ineffective and uncoordinated would struggle to implement the AMV.58 There is a lack of 
industrialisation policies that link the extractives sectors to other sectors, and this policy gap 
limits the implementation of the AMV.59 
The second constraint is that in the global political economy, the options available to African 
policy makers are limited by detrimental trade agreements already entered into that would 
prohibit implementing the AMV in one way or another.60 Historically, ‘first world’ countries 
relied on a number of policies to intervene in their markets that enabled their economic 
development and these policies are no longer available to developing countries.61 This 
constraint can be linked to dependency theorists’ argument.62 Commitments to the treaties 
of the WTO and other multilateral and bilateral treaties curtail the ability of African 
governments to realise the objectives of the AMV, because of the tension that exists between 
the WTO treaty obligations and the objectives of the AMV.63 An example of this can be found 
in Article III of the 1994 GATT which states that imported products may not be discriminated 
against in relation to domestic products.64 It is evident that beneficiation falls foul of Article III 
                                                     
57 AMV see note 5 at 13; CMV (2014) see note 7 at 151. 
58 CMV (2014) see note 7 at 95; Oxfam ‘From Aspiration to Reality: Unpacking the African Mining Vision’ (March, 
2017) at 12 available at https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/aspiration-reality-unpacking-africa-mining-vision 
accessed 21 February 2018. 
59 Oxfam ‘From Aspiration to Reality: Unpacking the African Mining Vision’ (March, 2017) at 12 
60 Oxfam ‘From Aspiration to Reality: Unpacking the African Mining Vision’ (March, 2017) at 12; For a historical 
analysis of the policies relied on by ‘First World’ countries versus those available for ‘Third World’ countries see 
Ha-Joon Chang Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective (2002). The WTO has 
164 members of which the majority are classified as either ‘developing countries’ or ‘least developed countries’ 
see ‘Who are the developing countries of in the WTO?’ available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/d1who_e.htm accessed 23 July 2018. 
61 Faizel Ismail ‘Mainstreaming Development in the World Trade Organisation’ (2005) 39 Journal of World Trade 
11 at 19. For a broad overview of this thesis see Ha-Joon Chang Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy 
in Historical Perspective (2002). 
62 See Chapter Two section 3.2.1. 
63 Oxfam ‘From Aspiration to Reality: Unpacking the African Mining Vision’ (March, 2017) at 12. The tension 
between the AMV’s beneficiation strategy and South Africa’s WTO treaty obligations is discussed below at 
section 3.1.  
64 Article III para 1 of GATT 1994: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994). 
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when applying the three-pronged test developed in Korea – Various Measures on Beef65by the 
Appellate Body of the WTO.   This third constraint, regarding the tension between WTO treaty 
obligations and the objective of the AMV will be further elaborated on below.66  
A third constraint towards the realisation of the AMV lies in Africa’s political elites also being 
implicated in revenue mismanagement, tax evasion and corruption.67 An example of this is a 
South African member of parliament (who was also Chairperson of the ruling political party at 
the time) who allegedly received R25 million in shares from Gold Fields, a South African mining 
company.68  A New York law firm found that this allocation of shares constituted a bribery.69 
In Nigeria, because the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (‘NNPC’), a state-owned oil 
company, does not sell directly to end-users but instead, to traders,70 this has resulted in the 
proliferation of middlemen, who are either politicians or well-connected elites. These 
middlemen take advantage of this buyer-seller relationship and benefit for doing little to 
nothing.71 In the Democratic Republic of Congo, US$ 750 million in revenue for the 2011 to 
2014 period was unaccounted for.72 Although the DRC’s state-owned mining company, 
Générale des Carrières et des Mines (‘Gécamines’), has no records indicating that the money 
was received or how it was disbursed,73 there is a history of Gécamines’s funds being allocated 
to the ruling political party.74 
There has been an attempt to address some of the above constraints in the CMV.75  In terms 
of enhancing the institutional capacity of countries, the CMV proposes that an initial 
                                                     
65 Korea – Various Measures on Beef Appellate Body Report, WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R (11 December 
2000). 
66 See section 3 below. 
67 Oxfam ‘From Aspiration to Reality: Unpacking the African Mining Vision’ (March, 2017) at 12; see Aaron Sayne, 
Alexandra Gillies and Christina Katsouris ‘Inside the NNPC Oil Sales: A Case for Reform in Nigeria’ (2015) available 
at https://resourcegovernance.org/analysis-tools/publications/inside-nnpc-oil-sales-case-reform-nigeria 
accessed 1 December 2018 hereafter ‘Report on Nigeria’s NNPC’; The Carter Center ‘A State Affair: Privatizing 
Congo’s Copper Sector’ (2017) available at 
https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace_publications/democracy/congo-report-carter-
center-nov-2017.pdf  accessed 1 December 2018 hereafter ‘Carter Center Report’;   
68 Craig McKune and Stefaans Brümmer ‘Investigators: Gold Fields bribed Mbete’ (6 September 2013) Mail & 
Guardian https://mg.co.za/article/2013-09-06-00-investigators-gold-fields-bribed-mbete accessed 1 December 
2018; Marianne Merten ‘MPs’ ‘interests’: Nothing much to disclose, sort of’’ (24 February 2017) Daily Maverick  
https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-02-24-mps-interests-nothing-much-to-disclose-sort-of/ accessed 
1 December 2018. 
69 Craig McKune and Stefaans Brümmer ‘Investigators: Gold Fields bribed Mbete’ (6 September 2013) Mail & 
Guardian https://mg.co.za/article/2013-09-06-00-investigators-gold-fields-bribed-mbete accessed 1 December 
2018; Marianne Merten ‘MPs’ ‘interests’: Nothing much to disclose, sort of’’ (24 February 2017) Daily Maverick  
https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-02-24-mps-interests-nothing-much-to-disclose-sort-of/ accessed 
1 December 2018. 
70 Report on Nigeria’s NNPC see note 64 at 46. 
71 Report on Nigeria’s NNPC see note 64 at 46. 
72 Carter Center Report see note 64 at 49. 
73 Carter Center Report see note 64 at 50. 
74 Carter Center Report see note 64 at 49 
75 CMV (2014) see note 7. 
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assessment is conducted of institutions it has identified as ‘key’ to formulating the CMV.76 The 
aim of this assessment is to ascertain whether these institutions are able to implement what 
is currently required of them, what will be required of them once the economy is industrialised 
in future and their ability to prosecute and investigate misconduct in the industry.77 
Furthermore, governments need to examine whether these institutions are sufficiently able 
to coordinate their policies so that they are coherent.78  
When formulating a fiscal regime, a government needs to balance its objectives (as it acts on 
behalf of its citizens) and those of investors.79 Although governments may focus on maximising 
revenues, the issue of revenue mismanagement should also be addressed in their fiscal 
regime.80 In this regard the CMV proposes a number of questions that aim to assess a country’s 
revenue use and management. These questions include: (i) whether the country has a well-
established resource revenue management system; (ii) whether the country’s revenue use 
and management system provides for the sharing of the benefits of resource revenues with 
future generations and (iii) whether a reasonable proportion of the resource revenues will be 
invested in assets to support sustainable development.81              
2.4 Critiques levelled against the African Mining Vision 
Implementing the above suggestions of the CMV presupposes that mining in a country that 
adopts the AMV framework will eventually result in positive benefits for all the inhabitants of 
that country.82  One of the critiques of the AMV framework is that it will not benefit all the 
inhabitants of a country, because it fails to address the negative implications that a minerals-
based industrialisation strategy will have on women, children, rural communities and the 
environment.83  This critique is important, considering that rural communities, women and 
children are adversely affected by the extractives sector.84 This is because most extractive 
                                                     
76 An example of these key institutions include institutions responsible for regulating and administering the 
sector, fiscal and planning agencies, trade and industry, chamber of mines, civil society organisations, 
professional associations, educational and research institutions. CMV (2014) see note 7 at 97 to 99.  
77 CMV (2014) see note 7 at 98. 
78 CMV (2014) see note 7 at 98. 
79 CMV (2014) see note 7 at 53. 
80 CMV (2014) see note 7 at 53. 
81 CMV (2014) see note 7 at 65 to 66.  
82 For the argument that the AMV is part of a set of policies that embody the assumption that a country’s natural 
resource  endowment can easily be translated into development and poverty alleviation see Chris WJ Roberts 
‘The other resource course: extractives as development panacea’ (2015) 28 Cambridge Review of International 
Affairs 283; Cf. Kojo Busia and Charles Akong ‘The African Mining Vision: Perspectives on Mineral Resource 
Development in Africa’ (2017) 8 Journal of Sustainable Development Law & Policy 145 at 157.  
83 Womin ‘The African Mining Vision: A long overdue ecofeminist critique’ (October, 2015) at 5; ActionAid South 
Africa ‘The African Mining Vision: Are we repackaging a colonial paradigm?’ (2017) at 6 to 7 available at 
http://www.actionaid.org/south-africa/news/african-mining-vision-repackaging-colonial-paradigm accessed 1 
December 2018 hereafter ‘Womin “The AMV” (2015)’. 
84 Womin ‘The AMV’ (2015) see note 84 at 5; Emmanuel Adjei ‘The Impact of Mining on Livelihoods of Rural 
Households. A Case Study of Farmers in the Wassa Mining Region, Ghana’ (May, 2007) MPhil Thesis in 
Development Studies, Norwegian University of Science and Technology at 35.  
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activities occur near rural communities thus disproportionally exposing them to pollution and 
a toxic environment.85 This critique of the AMV framework is also important because rural 
communities are heavily dependent on their natural environment for their livelihoods.86 For 
example, women and children will often have to go to water sources to collect water for 
household chores, drinking and feeding certain livestock and this is dangerous when water 
sources are polluted by mining activities.87  
In addition to the adverse effects of mining on rural communities, there is a gendered way in 
which the extractives industry affects women.88 More than 60 per cent of the employed 
women in Africa work in agriculture.89 As the environment is compromised during the 
extractives process, this poses a serious threat to the livelihoods of a significant proportion of 
women in Africa and the families they support.90  
A second critique of the AMV is that its approach perpetuates the colonial model of extracting 
natural resources from ‘Third World countries’ to be used and consumed by ‘First World 
countries’.  This export-orientation is the same model that Dependency theorist argue 
perpetuates sectoral disarticulation and enclave development in ‘satellite’ countries.91  
A potential response to this critique is that, unlike the historical natural resource exploitation 
that was delinked and disconnected from other sectors, the RBI strategy proposed by the AMV 
contains the three requirements necessary for successful implementation.92 Namely, the 
AMV’s RBI strategy is part of a broader diversification programme which would limit total 
reliance on the mining sector. Second, although the RBI strategy is export-orientated, these 
exports could be to emerging markets which would not perpetuate underdevelopment as 
highlighted by Dependency theorists as, historically, there is no satellite-metropolis 
relationship amongst most ‘Third World countries’.93 Finally, the RBI strategy as proposed by 
                                                     
85 Emmanuel Adjei ‘The Impact of Mining on Livelihoods of Rural Households. A Case Study of Farmers in the 
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86 Womin ‘The AMV’ (2015) see note 84 at 5; AGN Kitula ‘The environmental and socio-economic impacts of 
mining on local livelihoods in Tanzania: A case study of the Geita District’ (2006) 14 Journal of Cleaner Production 
405 at 410. 
87 Womin ‘The AMV’ (2015) see note 84 at 5; AGN Kitula ‘The environmental and socio-economic impacts of 
mining on local livelihoods in Tanzania: A case study of the Geita District’ (2006) 14 Journal of Cleaner Production 
405 at 410. 
88For an interview on the impact of mining on women see South African Civil Society Information Service ‘The 
impact of mining on women’ (October, 2013) available at http://sacsis.org.za/site/article/1818 accessed 1 
December 2018. 
89 Inter-Agency Task Force on Rural Women, Rural Development and the Millennium Development goals at 2; 
South African Civil Society Information Service ‘The impact of mining on women’ (October, 2013) available at 
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90 Womin ‘The AMV’ (2015) see note 84 at5; South African Civil Society Information Service ‘The impact of mining 
on women’ (October, 2013) available at http://sacsis.org.za/site/article/1818 accessed 1 December 2018. 
91 Chapter Two section 3.2.1. 
92 These three requirements are dealt with more extensively in Chapter Two section 3.1.  
93 Chapter Two section 3.2.1.1. 
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the AMV is meant to stimulate the capacity of domestic manufacturers as the mineral 
resource will be processed as much as possible before it is exported. 
The strength of the above responses are diminished by the fact that the mineral laws and 
policies of countries such as South Africa, which are closely aligned to the AMV, do not have 
the effect of meeting the basic needs of communities.94 If one considers the definition of 
Resource-based Industrialisation as stated in Chapter Two,95 then South Africa is pursuing a 
Resource-based Industrialisation strategy as its natural resources are meant to act as a catalyst 
for the industrialisation of South Africa and eventually, socio-economic development.96 Yet 
seemingly, pursuing RBI has not alleviated South Africa’s social ills and resulted in socio-
economic development. This critique will be addressed again in Chapter Four.97 
3. International law: a country’s sovereign right to its wealth? 
In the 1950s, newly independent states entered an international order which recognised a 
number of international law doctrines they believed hampered their ability to control and 
exploit their resources.98 This resulted in a number of debates regarding nationalisation, 
economic development and the right to self-determination.99 One of the international law 
doctrines was the doctrine of sovereignty. According to ‘Third World’ countries, sovereignty 
over their natural resources remained intact even during colonialism.100  This in turn meant 
that upon independence, they had a right to review the concessions granted by the colonial 
powers to trading companies that exploited their natural resources.101 
The West, however, argued that the extent of ‘Third World’ countries’ sovereignty during 
colonialism would be dictated by what was recognised by (Eurocentric) International law 
during the colonial period.102 This meant ‘Third World’ countries would have to accept an 
                                                     
94 South Africa’s mineral laws and the supporting policies will be dealt with in more detail in Chapter Four. 
95 Resources-based industrialisation was defined as ‘the use of a country’s natural resource endowment to build 
industrial structures that can achieve economic growth’ see Chapter Two section 3.1. 
96 Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection (MISTRA) ‘Uncommon Wealth: Tracing the Implementation of 
the African Mining Vision’ (2014); ActionAid South Africa ‘The African Mining Vision: Are we repackaging a 
colonial paradigm?’ (2017) at 8 available at http://www.actionaid.org/south-africa/news/african-mining-vision-
repackaging-colonial-paradigm accessed 1 December 2018. 
97 Chapter Four section 2.2. 
98 Georges M Abi-Saab ‘The Newly Independent States and the Rules of International Law: An outline’ (1962) 8 
Howard Law Journal 95 at 99 and 100; JJG Syatauw Some Newly Established Asian States and the Development 
of International Law (1961) 230.   
99 Antony Anghie Imperialism, Sovereignty and the making of International Law (2004) at 212; S Prakash Sinha 
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Determination and the Sovereignty over Natural Resources’ (2017) 30 Ratio Juris 290 at 290 to 292. 
101 Ruth E. Gordon and Jon H. Sylvester ‘Deconstructing Development’ (2004) 22 Wisconsin International Law 
Journal  1 at 53; Antony Anghie Imperialism, Sovereignty and the making of International Law (2004) at 212. 
102 Antony Anghie Imperialism, Sovereignty and the making of International Law (2004) 213; Balakrishnan 
Rajagopal International law from below: Development, social movements and third world resistance (2003) 12. 
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international law which legitimised conquest and dispossession and contained no remedy for 
victims.103 This in turn meant that upon independence, ‘Third World’ countries had to comply 
with the doctrines of state succession and acquired rights which meant they would have to 
respect the obligations undertaken by the predecessor (colonised) state.104 
It is within this historical context that the UN’s General Assembly adopted the resolution on 
the Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources which acknowledged ‘the right of peoples 
and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth (which) must be exercised in 
the interest of…national development and the well-being of the people concerned’.105  
The passing of this resolution was viewed by ‘Third World’ countries as integral to ensuring 
they were able to exploit their resources and develop.106 As mentioned in Chapter Two,107 
there was a subsequent attempt by ‘Third World’ countries to have the right to development 
realised and acknowledged in international law which the UN General Assembly subsequently 
acknowledged.108 However, implementing this right against the backdrop of economic 
institutions such as the World Bank, IMF and WTO, has proved difficult.109 Development 
according to the WTO is often viewed as a ‘nice to have’ or an optional extra.110  This view by 
the WTO is despite the fact that its programmes have distributional consequences that affect 
women, particularly harshly, when they fail.111 As stated in Chapter Two, international trade 
plays a critical role in the economic, social and cultural development of a country, as such, the 
WTO needs to be cognisant of the distributional consequences of its programmes.112  
                                                     
103 Antony Anghie Imperialism, Sovereignty and the making of International Law (2004) 213; Balakrishnan 
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112 See Chapter Two section 3.2.2; Faizel Ismail ‘Mainstreaming Development in the World Trade Organisation’ 
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In terms of international trade, South Africa is a member of the WTO and bound to WTO 
Rules.113 These rules include the 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Investment Measures (TRIMs).114 Although beneficiation is not explicitly prohibited in the 
WTO Rules,115 it does fall foul of a number of provisions which are highlighted below.  
The WTO rules on beneficiation are relevant because increased beneficiation and linkages 
between the mining industry and other sectors of the economy are part of the AMV’s 
Resource-based Industrialisation strategy.116 Furthermore, the WTO rules are relevant as 
South Africa is a member of the WTO117 and this makes the legality of beneficiation under 
international trade law an important consideration.   
One of the constraints to implementing the AMV highlighted above was the tension that exists 
between some of the objectives of the AMV and WTO treaty obligations.118 As was highlighted 
above, the majority of the members of the WTO are from ‘Third World Countries’.119 African 
countries, such as South Africa, that attempt to implement the AMV will have to navigate the 
tension between binding treaty obligations and the AMV, which is not binding.   
Article III of the 1994 GATT states that imported products may not be discriminated against in 
relation to domestic products.120 The article prohibition includes regulations that give 
domestic products an advantage over imported products under their processing, 
transportation, distribution, purchase, sale and use.121 In the Korea – Various Measures on 
Beef 122 case heard by the WTO’s Appellate Body, the court developed a three-prong test for 
analysing an alleged violation of Article III. The first element is that the domestic and imported 
product have to be alike. Second, the challenged measure must be a ‘law, regulation [or] 
                                                     
113 South African has been a member since 1 January 1995 World Trade Organisation ‘Members and Observers’ 
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2000). 
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requirement affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, 
distribution or use’. Third, the imported product should be negatively discriminated against.123   
As regards the first and second prong, beneficiation requirements will always confer an 
advantage to domestic products over imported products and this is usually in the form of 
legislation or rules.124 As for the third prong, the article refers to both de jure and de facto 
discrimination between domestic and imported products.125 The result of this is that 
beneficiation requirements will always fall foul of Article III.  
Additionally, once a beneficiation requirement is enacted as law the measure can be 
attributed to the State.126 This means companies are not excluded from the ambit of Article 
III where a member State requires companies to comply with beneficiation requirements 
under law. Where there is no legislation requiring the beneficiation, establishing a ‘nexus’ 
between the State and a local private company, that decides to implement beneficiation 
measures, is sufficient to make the conduct fall within the ambit of Article III.127  
GATT explicitly excludes government procurement from the ambit of Article III and XVII.128 
Where it is exempt under GATT, government procurement is still regulated by the Agreement 
on Government Procurement (‘GPA’).129 Beneficiation requirements imposed on government 
procurements will not contravene the two provisions of GATT but government procurements 
as a whole still fall within the ambit of GATT and the GPA.130 Where a country has not signed 
the GPA, determining the scope of the exemption in GATT becomes more crucial.  
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To be considered ‘government procurement’ under GATT, three conditions need to be met.131 
First, the measure should be ‘laws, regulations or requirements governing the procurement 
of products purchased’.132 Second, it should involve ‘procurement by governmental agencies’. 
Finally, the procurement has to be ‘for governmental purposes and not with a view to 
commercial resale or with a view to use in the production of goods for commercial sale’.133 
Under the second condition, State Owned Enterprises (‘SOE’) that are not acting on behalf of 
the government and who are acting without government authority will not fall under the 
exemption.134 In Canada – Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector the 
Appellate Body interpreted ‘for governmental purposes and not with a view to commercial 
resale or with a view to use in the production of goods for commercial sale’ narrowly.135 
Accordingly, because ‘governmental agencies by their nature pursue governmental aims’,136 
the term should be interpreted such that the ‘purpose’ should be to fulfil a need within the 
governmental agency and this makes it harder for the beneficiation requirement to fall within 
the exemption.137 
Assessing whether or not beneficiation requirements fall foul of the provisions of GATS is more 
complex. This is because member States are required to write down the sectors they would 
like GATS to regulate – this is in addition to GATS already dealing with four ‘modes of 
supply’.138 GATS separates trade into four classes: cross-border, consumption abroad, 
commercial presence and presence of natural persons.139  Unlike GATS, GATT deals with only 
cross-border trade. 
TRIMS was enacted to prohibit investment measures that restrict or distort trade.140 The effect 
of this is that developing countries are unable to implement certain policies that support 
economic development, despite the same measures having enabled developed countries to 
reach their current state.141 Article II, the Annex to TRIMS and the illustrative list in the 
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Annexure are relevant for assessing beneficiation requirements. Article II read with the Annex 
prohibit investment measures that are contrary to a State’s obligations in paragraph 4 of 
Article III of the 1994 GATT.142 The Annexure to TRIMS also contains an illustrative list. Any 
measure that is on the illustrative list automatically violates both Article III of the 1994 GATT 
and TRIMS.143 Beneficiation requirements are in violation of TRIMS because they are in 
violation of Article III of the 1994 GATT. Ordinarily, a country would have to prove that the 
challenged measure results in trade and investment distortions.144 However in practice, 
countries generally assert that because the challenged measure by definition results in 
distortion, it contravenes TRIMS.145  
The above discussion highlights the tension between South Africa’s WTO treaty obligations 
and pursuing a beneficiation strategy. Although South Africa is also pursuing an RBI strategy, 
as will be evident from the discussion in Chapter Four,146 there have currently been no 
challenges to the legality of these provisions which is not to say one could not arise in future. 
4. Conclusion 
According to the AMV, an increase in the number of transactions between their extractives 
industry and other industries results in diversification and industrialisation.147 Additionally, the 
benefits of mining can be localised by developing the fiscal linkages between the mining sector 
and government and a clear revenue distribution system can be used to ensure the money 
reaches mining affected communities, labour-sending areas and poor communities.148 
Additionally, the AMV proposes a SWF to ensure that the benefits of mining also accrue to 
future generations.149 
However, a number of critiques and constraints have been levelled against the AMV. The first 
constrain was the lack of institutional capacity in most African countries. The second constrain 
is that trade agreements that have already been entered into will curtail the ability of African 
countries to implement the AMV. The discussion above,150 bolsters this point and highlights 
the tension that exists between the treaty obligations under the WTO and beneficiation as 
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proposed in the AMV. The final constrain was the corruption and revenue mismanagement 
often associated with African politicians. Although the debate regarding whether or not 
policy-making should take into account corruption is beyond the scope of this dissertation, 
this constrain is a very real one.151  
Two critiques were also raised against the AMV, namely: it fails to adequately address the 
negative implications of a Resource-based Industrialisation strategy on women, children and 
rural communities and second, it perpetuates the colonial model of natural resource 
extraction.   
The first critique highlights the environmental and social costs that mining affected 
communities, rural communities and in particular women will have to bare as a result of an 
RBI strategy. The importance of this critique cannot be overstated particularly because of the 
extent to which rural communities depend on their natural environment for their 
livelihoods.152    
The second critique, that RBI perpetuates the colonial model of natural resource extraction, 
was countered with the fact that the effects of this historic model would be curtailed if: (a) 
there was diversification into other sectors of the economy, (b) the export-orientation was 
instead linked to emerging markets and (c) the capacity to manufacture was increased so that 
the minerals were further processed before they were exported.  
However, the above argument is weakened by the fact that, applying the definition of RBI, 
countries such as South Africa have mineral laws and policies that are seemingly aligned to an 
RBI strategy yet the mining industry seems ineffective in promoting socio-economic 
development. This final point will be further interrogated in Chapter Four, Chapter Four will 
also consider how the SLP System perpetuates enclave development and it is divided into 
three parts.  
Section 2 contains a discussion of South Africa’s mineral laws and policies, how they aim to 
remedy past inequalities and their alignment with the AMV’s RBI strategy. Section 3 will 
consider the various components of the SLP System and how enclave development is 
perpetuated. The chapter ends with section 4 and a discussion of the systemic lack of 
compliance with SLPs and whether the AMV can provide any insight to curb the perpetuation 
of the enclave approach to development. 
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Chapter 4: South African Mineral Law and 
Policy 
 
1. Introduction 
In August 1946, black mineworkers began a strike spurred on by the demand for higher 
wages.1 Reports on the number of participants are inconsistent. According to police reports 
from the time, over 60 000 mineworkers were involved.2 The Native Affairs Department 
reported that of the more than 60 000 mineworkers involved, over one thousand were injured 
and nine black miners were killed by the police.3 In August 2012, the Marikana Massacre 
occurred.4 Thirty-four mineworkers died during the strike at Lonmin’s Mine in Marikana.5  
The black mineworkers of August 1946 and those of August 2012 were 66 years apart, yet they 
fought for, and died for, identical improvements: better wages and better living conditions.6 
Although, in some ways, the Marikana Massacre parallels the strike that occurred in 1946, a 
significant difference therein is that the Marikana Massacre occurred during a constitutional 
dispensation. The legal and policy frameworks that were implemented between 1994 and 
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20 August 2012 p 15. 
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commonly known as the Marikana Mine in Rustenburg, North West Province. Terms of Reference Gazette No. 
35680 of 12 September 2012. Hereafter ‘Terms of Reference Gazette No. 35680’. 
6 While mobilising for the black mineworkers’ strike in 1946, leaders of The African Mineworkers’ Union (AMWU), 
focused on ‘better wages, better food and better living conditions’ in their speeches according to mine and police 
spy reports from the time see T Dunbar Moodie ‘The Moral Economy of the Black Miners’ Strike of 1946’ (1986) 
13 Journal of South African Studies at 19.  
55 
 
 
2012, in line with this constitutional dispensation, are meant to address the injustices that 
black mineworkers faced during Apartheid.7  
This chapter is divided into three parts and is aimed at assessing how the SLP System 
perpetuates enclave development. Part I details the legislation that governs South African 
mineral law, the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act (‘MPRDA’).8 This 
discussion of the MPRDA will include a survey of a number of policies implemented by the 
Department of Mineral Resources (‘DMR’) and the Department of Trade and Industry (‘DTI’) 
to support South Africa’s industrialisation and beneficiation strategy.   
Section 2 is aimed at further highlighting how South Africa is already implementing a 
Resource-based Industrialisation strategy (‘RBI’) as its industrialisation strategy relies on 
natural resource wealth.9 This raises the issue of whether the African Mining Vision’s (‘AMV’)10  
RBI strategy is capable of providing insights for the SLP System as the South African 
government is already implementing the RBI. 
Section 3 is aimed at addressing the above issues by, first, considering the other components 
of the SLP System in addition to the MPRDA,11 namely: the Broad-Based Black Economic 
Empowerment Charter for the South African Mining and Minerals Industry (‘Mining Charter’)12 
and Social and Labour Plans (‘SLPs’) which are tools to implement the MPRDA.13 The Mining 
Charter has eight elements and these elements will be grouped into three categories: (i) 
increasing industry access and linkages, (ii) labour and, (iii) social development. All three 
categories are implemented by means of an SLP. This is followed by an analysis of all three 
                                                     
7 Elmarie van der Schyff Property in Minerals and Petroleum (2016) at 141. 
8 Act 28 of 2002. Hereafter ‘MPRDA’. 
9 This point was raised in Chapter Three section 2.3 and will be further developed in this chapter. 
10 African Mining Vision 2009, Addis Ababa. 
11 MPRDA see note 8.  
12 The 2004, 2010, 2017 and (final) 2018 Mining Charters will be referred to throughout this chapter. Their full 
references are as follows: Broad-Based Socio-Economic Empowerment Charter for the South African Mining and 
Minerals Industry (GN 1639 GG 26661 of 13 August 2004) hereafter ‘2004 Mining Charter’; Broad-Based Socio-
Economic Empowerment Charter for the South African Mining and Minerals Industry (GN 838 GG 33573 of 20 
September 2010) hereafter ‘2010 Mining Charter’; Broad-Based Black Socio-Economic Empowerment Charter for 
the South African Mining and Minerals Industry, June 2017 available at http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west-
1.amazonaws.com/1/FinalCharter.pdf hereafter ‘2017 Mining Charter’. The 2017 Mining Charter was 
subsequently not passed and the DMR facilitated consultations to revise it due to the litigation challenge against 
it see ‘Statement by Mineral Resources Minister Mr Gwede Mantashe, on policy and regulatory matters’ (17 June 
2018). Available at http://www.dmr.gov.za/news-room/post/1723/statement-by-mineral-resources-minister-
mr-gwede-mantashe-on-policy-and-regulatory-matters accessed 25 June 2018. Broad-Based Socio-Economic 
Empowerment Charter for the Mining and Minerals Industry (GN 1002 GG 41934 of 27 September 2018) 
hereafter ‘2018 Mining Charter’.    
13 MPRDA see note 8. 
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categories of the Mining Charter elements and their impact, according to the DMR’s 2009 
Impact Report14 and 2015 Impact Report.15  
The second way of addressing the above issue, of whether the AMV’s RBI strategy can provide 
insights for South Africa as an RBI strategy is already being pursued, is by distinguishing 
between those elements that are inherently better suited to government implementation 
versus implementation by mining companies. This is to bolster the point made in Part II’s final 
section, section 3.4, that enclave development is perpetuated through the current division of 
responsibility in the SLP System.  
Finally, section 4 considers the issue of systemic non-compliance and the chapter ends with a 
discussion of how the AMV can influence South African policy-makers in light of the fact that 
RBI is already being implemented in South Africa yet the SLP System persists to perpetuate 
enclave development.  
The viewpoint of the dependency theorists explored in Chapter Two16 hold that the legal and 
policy frameworks of satellite countries are influenced by the countries in the metropolis. 
Hence it is important to understand and analyse South African legal and policy frameworks 
related to natural resource extraction while contextualising it within the preceding discussion 
on the AMV17 and related policies, and South Africa’s treaty obligations under the World Trade 
Organisation (‘WTO’).   
2. Remedying past inequalities through Mineral Law 
In 1996 a new constitutional dispensation emerged. South Africa’s new Constitution18 
establishes a link between the right to ecologically sustainable development, the use of 
natural resources, and the promotion of socio-economic development.19 This has been 
characterised as a right to ‘development-in-environment’ as the integrity of the environment 
should be maintained and the government should be responsive to the need for socio-
                                                     
14 DMR ‘Mining Charter Impact Assessment Report’ (Oct, 2009) available at 
https://evaluations.dpme.gov.za/evaluations/60 accessed 18 July 2018. Hereafter ‘DMR 2009 Impact Report’. 
15 DMR ‘Assessment of the Broad Based Socio-Economic Empowerment Charter for the South African Mining 
Industry (Mining Charter)’ (May, 2015) available at 
http://www.dmr.gov.za/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=7wIfrMbHgVc%3d&portalid=0 accessed 2 September 2018. 
Hereafter ‘DMR 2015 Impact Report’. 
16 Chapter Two section 3.2.1. 
17 African Mining Vision 2009, Addis Ababa. 
18 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Hereafter ‘Constitution’. 
19 Section 24 of the Constitution provides that ‘Everyone has the right (a) to an environment that is not harmful 
to their health and well-being; and (b) to have legislative and other measures that: 
(iv) Prevent pollution and ecological degradation; 
(v) Promote conservation; and  
(vi) Secure ecologically sustainable development and the use of natural resources while promoting 
justifiable economic and social development.’ Hereafter ‘s 24 right’ of the Constitution. 
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economic development while drawing on ecological resources.20 In the mining industry, the 
promulgation of the MPRDA21 brought a focus on the sustainable development of the 
country’s natural resources and the state’s obligation to promote socio-economic 
development.22 South Africa’s current mineral and petroleum law rests on three pillars: 
‘equitable access’, ‘sustainable development’ and that South Africa’s natural resources 
belongs to ‘the nation’.23 The Constitutional Court has held that the Constitution provides a 
foundation for passing measures ‘to redress inequalities in respect of access to the natural 
resources of the country’ and to ensure that black South Africans also benefit from the 
exploitation of natural resources.24  
The post-apartheid government envisions the natural resources of South Africa benefitting all 
South Africans – be it miners, mining communities and remote rural areas of South Africa.25  
In this way, the MPRDA can be described as ‘remedial legislation’, because it seeks to reduce 
past economic inequalities caused by Apartheid and to improve the condition of South 
Africans.26 There are three relevant legislative and regulatory enactments. The MPRDA, which 
is the primary legislative enactment, and the Mining Charter and Social and Labour Plans 
(‘SLPs’) which are regulations. The Mining Charter and SLPs give effect to the goals set out in 
the MPRDA, which include promoting employment and advancing the social and economic 
welfare of all South Africans.27  
 The MPRDA: industrialisation, beneficiation and linkages 
To advance South Africa’s socio-economic development, the DMR aims to promote South 
Africa’s development through industrialisation, beneficiation and the promotion of linkages.28 
In Chapter Two,29 industrialisation was defined as the building of industrial structures that can 
achieve economic growth30 and Resource-based Industrialisation (‘RBI’) was defined as the 
                                                     
20 Fuel Retailers Association of Southern Africa v Director-General: Environmental Management, Department of 
Agriculture, Conservation and the Environment, Mpumalanga Province 2007 (6) SA 4 (CC) para 44 to 45; Tracy 
Humby ‘The right to development-in-environment and its ecological and development thresholds’ (2016) 32 
South African Journal of Human Rights 219 at 229 to 230. 
21 Act 28 of 2002. Hereafter ‘MPRDA’.  
22 Preamble of MPRDA. 
23 Elmarie van der Schyff Property in Minerals and Petroleum (2016) at 152. 
24 Bengwenyama Minerals (Pty) Ltd and Others v Genorah Resources (Pty) Ltd and Others 2011 (4) SA 113 (CC) 
para 3; Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC) para 1. 
25 Section 24 of the Constitution; Preamble of the MPRDA see note 21. 
26 Elmarie van der Schyff Property in Minerals and Petroleum (2016) at 141.  
27 Section 100(2)(a) of the MPRDA gives the Minister of Mineral Resources the mandate of developing the Mining 
Charter and SLPs are governed by MPRDA regulations 40 to 46 in GN R527 GG 26275 of 23 April 2004.   
28 Department of Mineral Resources ‘A Beneficiation Strategy for the Minerals Industry of South Africa’ (June, 
2011) at v. Available at http://www.dmr.gov.za/publications/summary/162-beneficiation-strategy-june-
2011/617-beneficiation-strategy-june-2011-.html accessed 18 August 2017 hereafter ‘Beneficiation Strategy for 
the Minerals Industry of South Africa’. 
29 Chapter Two section 3.1. 
30 Chapter Two section 3.1.   
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use of a country’s natural resource endowment to build industrial structures that can achieve 
economic growth.31  
The National Industrial Policy Framework (‘NIPF’),32  sets out the government’s approach to 
industrialisation33 and it identifies the natural resources sector as having the greatest 
potential for sectoral diversification.34 The South African government’s industrialisation 
strategy relies on the development of its resource wealth.35 Consequently, it should be 
classified as an RBI strategy.36  Central to this policy of industrialisation is the beneficiation of 
minerals.37  Although the MPRDA does not define ‘beneficiation’, the term is defined by the 
DMR in its Beneficiation Strategy38  as the process of changing a mineral to a higher value 
product, for consumption either locally or internationally.39  
During stage one of production, ‘beneficiation’ will include activities such as smelting and 
refining.40 In the second stage, beneficiation is the process of converting the concentrate or 
mineral into an intermediary product.41 The tertiary stage is further converting the product 
into a refined product.42 The final stage of beneficiation includes further processing the 
product so it can be considered finally processed according to industry standards.43  
Chapter Two of this dissertation raised the important concept of ‘sectoral disarticulation’.44 
One of the features of sectoral disarticulation is an economic sector, whose growth far 
outperforms other sectors that has no linkages to other productive sectors.45 To promote 
linkages between the minerals sector and other sectors of the economy, the minerals 
                                                     
31 Chapter Two section 3.1. 
32 Department of Trade and Industry ‘A National Industrial Policy Framework’ (2007). Available at 
http://www.dti.gov.za/industrial_development/nipf.jsp accessed on 29 June 2018. Hereafter ‘Industrial Policy 
Framework’. 
33 Industrial Policy Framework see note 30 at 3. 
34 Industrial Policy Framework see note 30 at 33. 
35Beneficiation Strategy for the Minerals Industry of South Africa see note 28  at iii and 20; Department of Trade 
and Industry ‘National Industrialisation Policy Framework’ (2007) 36;  
Available at http://www.dti.gov.za/industrial_development/nipf.jsp accessed 24 June 2018. 
36 For more on the characteristics of an RBI strategy see Chapter Three section 2, Economic Commission for Africa 
‘Minerals Cluster Policy Study in Africa: Pilot Studies of South Africa and Mozambique’ (2004) at 33, 98 to 102. 
Hereafter ‘ECA: Minerals Cluster Policy Study’. 
37 Department of Trade and Industry ‘Industrial Policy Action Plan: 2018/2019 – 2020/2021’ (2018) at 30. 
Available at https://www.tralac.org/documents/resources/by-country/south-africa/1924-industrial-policy-
action-plan-2018-2021/file.html accessed on 29 June 2018; Industrial Policy Framework see note 30 at 36. 
38 Beneficiation Strategy for the Minerals Industry of South Africa see note 28.  
39 Ibid at ii.  
40 MPRDA Amendment Act 49 of 2008. 
41 Beneficiation Strategy for the Minerals Industry of South Africa see note 28 at ii. 
42 MPRDA Amendment Act 49 of 2008. 
43 MPRDA Amendment Act 49 of 2008. 
44 Chapter Two section 3.2.1.  
45 The original phrase used by Samir Amin is ‘disarticulation of the economic system’ in Samir Amin Accumulation 
on a World Scale: A Critique of the Theory of Underdevelopment (1974) 15; Jie Huang ‘Structural Disarticulation 
and Third World Human Development’ (1995) 36 International Journal of Comparative Sociology 164 at 166; 
Philip O. Sijuwade ‘Some reflections on the determinants of sectoral disarticulation’ (2011) 5 Journal of Economic 
Theory 22 at 23.  
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beneficiation industry received R35.6 billion of the IDC’s R91.7 billion budget from 2008 to 
2017.46    
Additionally, the DMR plans to realise its purpose of promoting South Africa’s development 
through industrialisation, beneficiation and the promotion of linkages by focusing on the four 
pillars of implementation that it has identified. These are: policy and frameworks, supporting 
structures, international trade agreements and strategic government intervention.47 Below is 
a figure summarising how the four pillars feed into the implementation of the DMR’s strategy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Beneficiary Implementation Strategy Framework48  
 
Under the first pillar, supporting policy and frameworks, the strategy identifies key legislation 
such as the MPRDA,49 Minerals and Mining Policy for South Africa,50 the Precious Metals Act51 
and the Income Tax Act.52 The MPRDA mandates the drafting of a Mining Charter to aid with 
the transformation of the mining industry.53 In June 2017 the DMR published a revision of the 
                                                     
46 Department of Trade and Industry ‘Industrial Policy Action Plan 2018/19 – 2020/21’ at 48 available at 
http://www.dti.gov.za/industrial_development/industrial_development.jsp accessed 23 July 2018. 
47 Beneficiation Strategy for the Minerals Industry of South Africa see note 28 at 8. 
48Figure redrawn using information from Beneficiation Strategy for the Minerals Industry of South Africa see note 
28 at 12. 
49 Act 28 of 2002. 
50 Department of Minerals and Energy ‘White Paper on Minerals and Mining Policy for South Africa’ (October, 
1998). 
51 Act 37 of 2005. 
52 Act 58 of 1962. 
53 Section 100 of the MPRDA 28 of 2002 and 2017 Mining Charter see note 12. 
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Mining Charter.54 According to this revision of the Charter, increasing the amount of mineral 
beneficiation allows the holder of a mining license to set off some of the other requirements 
in the Charter.55 However, this beneficiation should be above the levels required by the 
Minister, to qualify for the offset.56  
The revised 2017 Charter also includes measures aimed at strengthening linkages outside the 
mining industry and with the goods and services industry.57 Among these measures is the 
requirement that the holder of a mining license should identify the goods and services it will 
require to operate.58 In relation to goods, 70% and above are required to be South African and 
in relation to services, 80% and above must be provided by South African companies.59 Proof 
of compliance with these local content measures should be provided to the DMR by the holder 
when it submits its annual Mining Charter report.60  
The second pillar of the DMR’s beneficiation strategy, support structures, identifies structures 
such as a Beneficiation Strategy Task Team, Steel Task Team and Titanium Task Team.61 These 
teams are meant to investigate specific value chains to inform the interventions taken.62 An 
example is the beneficiation of ferrous metals into iron and steel which would require the 
oversight of the Steel Task Team.63 The Steel Task Team would be required to look into the 
iron and steel value chain to identify and address the value chain’s specific issues. Thus far, 
the DMR has identified the high prices of ferrous metals, which are required to produce steel 
and stainless steel, as one of the reasons why South Africa’s manufacturing industry is not 
growing.64 Furthermore, the DMR has suggested the creation of a more competitive domestic 
market, in terms of the prices of ferrous metals, to prompt the development of steel and 
stainless steel plants.65  
The third pillar, international trade agreements, identifies ways in which the bilateral and 
multi-lateral agreements signed by South Africa can be leveraged to increase the amount of 
Foreign Direct Investment into the country or trade of beneficiated goods.66 As of 1 January 
1995, South Africa became a member of the World Trade Organisation.67 This required the 
acceptance of international trade agreements as discussed in Chapter Three above. 
                                                     
54 2017 Mining Charter see note 12.  
55 These requirements include the percentage of ownership that black persons must have in the mining company 
that is a holder of the mining license. Section 2.1.4 of the 2017 Mining Charter see note 12 at 12. 
56 Section 26 of the MPRDA 28 of 2002. 
57 Section 2.2 of the 2017 Mining Charter see note 12 at 13. 
58 Section 2.2 of the 2017 Mining Charter see note 12 at 13. 
59 Section 2.2 of the 2017 Mining Charter see note 12 at 14. 
60 Section 2.2 of the 2017 Mining Charter see note 12 at 15.   
61 Beneficiation Strategy for the Minerals Industry of South Africa see note 28 at 11 to 12. 
62 Ibid at 11. 
63 Ferrous metals are metals that composed primarily of iron, for example chromium, manganese and iron ore; 
Beneficiation Strategy for the Minerals Industry of South Africa see note 28 at 15.  
64 Ibid at 15.   
65 Ibid at 15. 
66 Ibid at 11. 
67 https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm accessed 28 August 2017. 
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The fourth pillar, strategic government interventions, describes a number of interventions 
identified in the Beneficiation Strategy that can be pursued later by the government. These 
include: ensuring the availability of raw materials, increasing the level of skills and developing 
infrastructure.68  
 The implementation of SA’s beneficiation strategy and the AMV 
According to the AMV’s RBI strategy, linkages between the mining industry and other 
industries need to be cultivated.69 As stated in Chapter Two,70  the linkages in the AMV can be 
categorised into two types: fiscal linkages and production linkages. Fiscal linkages include 
maximising resource rents and re-investing a portion into physical and social infrastructure.71 
Production linkages include downstream, up-stream value addition and indirectly technology 
or product development.72 In the AMV, these linkages will lead to an increase in the number 
of transactions from the extractives industry with other industries.73 
A competitive manufacturing sector is integral to implementing South Africa’s beneficiation 
strategy.74 Over the past years, the manufacturing industry’s competitiveness has eroded.75 A 
number of factors that have contributed to this erosion include the increased cost of raw 
material, inadequate infrastructure and energy shortages.76 South Africa is the second most 
competitive economy in sub-Saharan Africa and is ranked 47th globally.77 Despite this, when 
considering a breakdown of the results, infrastructure development has stalled,78 in particular, 
infrastructure development in the transport and electricity industries.79 Out of 138 countries, 
South Africa ranks 64th in terms of its infrastructure, 79th in terms of the macroeconomic 
environment and 123rd in terms of its health and primary education.80 The quality of 
Institutions and the goods market are ranked at 40th and 28th respectively.81  
                                                     
68 Beneficiation Strategy for the Minerals Industry of South Africa see note 28 at 12. 
69 African Mining Vision, 2009 Addis Ababa at v; Chapter Three section 2.1.  
70 Chapter Three section 2.1. 
71 African Mining Vision 2009, Addis Ababa at 13 see Chapter Three section 2.1. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Chapter Three section 2.1. 
74 Zonwabele Zweli Tom ‘Analysis of the key factors affecting beneficiation in South Africa’ (2015) MSc Thesis, 
University of Witwatersrand at 30. 
75 Pan-African Investment & Research Services (2011) ‘Assessing the Manufacturing Sector and its Multiplier 
Effects on the South African Economy’ as cited in Zonwabele Zweli Tom ‘Analysis of the key factors affecting 
beneficiation in South Africa’ (2015) MSc Thesis, University of Witwatersrand at 30. 
76 Pan-African Investment & Research Services (2011) ‘Assessing the Manufacturing Sector and its Multiplier 
Effects on the South African Economy’ as cited in Zonwabele Zweli Tom ‘Analysis of the key factors affecting 
beneficiation in South Africa’ (2015) MSc Thesis, University of Witwatersrand at 30. 
77 World Economic Forum ‘The Global Competitiveness Report 2016-2017’ (2016). Available at 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GCR2016-2017/05FullReport/TheGlobalCompetitivenessReport2016-
2017_FINAL.pdf accessed 28 August 2017 at 25. 
78 Ibid at 30. 
79 Ibid at 30. 
80 Ibid at 325. 
81 Ibid at 325. 
62 
 
 
To have an effective beneficiation strategy, the competitiveness of South Africa’s 
infrastructure and labour market is important because the production of raw materials does 
not necessarily result in an advantage when beneficiating.82 There are a number of factors 
that need to be addressed before a beneficiation strategy can be successful. These include 
increasing the access of raw materials for local beneficiation, developing critical infrastructure 
and trade barriers to international markets.83   
South Africa produces a number of critical commodities.84 However, the mining industry is 
export-orientated.85 This means a number of long-term contracts have been entered into 
between international clients and South African producers.86 South Africa’s power suppliers 
are unable to produce the large uninterrupted supply of energy required for beneficiation 
which is a further constraint to realising the beneficiation strategy.87  
The above discussion detailing how South Africa is not fully implementing its beneficiation 
strategy, and the critique raised in Chapter Three that the AMV perpetuates the colonial 
model of resource extraction,88 results in an impasse. At this stage, it is clear that South Africa 
is pursuing an RBI strategy and that the second hypothesis of the research question has been 
disproved.89 What is not clear, and the basis of the impasse, is whether South Africa’s SLP 
System continues to be ineffective because the AMV’s RBI strategy has not been implemented 
fully or, whether the critique of the AMV’s model of resource extraction is valid, hence the 
inability of  an RBI strategy to result in South Africa’s socio-economic development. 
The argument that South Africa has not implemented the AMV’s strategy fully and has been 
unable  to maximise  all the benefits of an RBI strategy is supported by the preceding 
discussion that highlights how there is still room for increased beneficiation and deeper 
linkages with the manufacturing sector. The need for the establishment of deeper linkages 
between the mining industry and other industries is further supported by the factors listed 
above that highlight the areas where improvement is necessary. Namely, these factors are: (i) 
an eroded manufacturing sector in terms of competitiveness and stalling transport and 
electricity infrastructure, (ii) the long-term supply contracts that have been entered into with 
international clients and (iii) an inconsistent power supply. One could also argue that should 
South Africa implement the AMV’s approach to localising the benefits of mining then the 
results of the RBI strategy would be more evident.90 
                                                     
82 Zonwabele Zweli Tom ‘Analysis of the key factors affecting beneficiation in South Africa’ (2015) MSc Thesis, 
University of Witwatersrand 34. 
83 Beneficiation Strategy for the Minerals Industry of South Africa see note 28 at 5 to 6. 
84 Ibid at iii. 
85 Ibid at iii. 
86 Ibid at 5. 
87 Ibid at 6. 
88 Chapter Three section 2.3. 
89 The research question was based on two hypotheses:  first that the SLP System is failing (as evidenced by the 
Marikana Massacre and subsequent quantitative reports on the SLP System) and, second, that South Africa is not 
pursuing a Resource-based Industralisation Strategy see Chapter One section 2. 
90 For more on the AMV’s strategy on how to localise the benefits of mining see Chapter Three section 2.2. 
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What follows is a consideration of South Africa’s laws and policies. This analysis will address 
the argument that the AMV’s model perpetuates the colonial model of resource extraction.  
Section 3 will also bolster the point that the current divisions of responsibility in the SLP 
System perpetuate enclave development.  
3. The SLP System and the implementation of the MPRDA  
In keeping with the obligation in the Constitution to promote socio-economic development, 
the MPRDA requires the Minister of the DMR to develop a ‘broad-based socio-economic 
Charter’.91 Pursuant to this imperative, the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment 
Charter for the South African Mining and Minerals Industry92 (‘Mining Charter’) was 
implemented. The Mining Charter is the instrument for achieving the goals set out in the 
MPRDA.93 Since 2002, the government has passed two Mining Charters in 2004 and 2010, 
there was a final 2017 Mining Charter but it was subsequently not passed94 and the 2018 
Mining Charter was eventually finalised.95 The replacement of one Mining Charter with 
another is meant to bring significant progress in realising the goals set out in the MPRDA and 
these changes can be organised around eight objectives. These objectives are: ownership, 
procurement, beneficiation, employment equity, Human Resources Development, Mine 
Community Development, Migrant Labour and Housing and Living Conditions.  
In addition to the obligations that mining right holders have to realise these eight objectives, 
they are also obligated to submit an SLP with their application for a mining right.96 An SLP 
contains the comprehensive development programs that a mining right holder will create and 
implement to benefit a ‘mining affected community’.97 
What follows is a description and an assessment of the differences between the 2004, 2010, 
2017 and 2018 Mining Charters regarding these eight elements and how they have been 
implemented. The Mining Charter elements will be analysed under three headings: (i) 
Increasing industry access and linkages; (ii) Labour and (iii) Social development.  
In the category ‘increasing industry access and linkages’ are the ownership, procurement and 
beneficiation elements. Under ‘labour’ is the employment equity element, the human 
                                                     
91 S 100(2)(a) of the MPRDA.   
92 2017 Mining Charter see note 12. 
93The objectives of the MPRDA are set out in s 2 of the MPRDA, these include 2(d) and (f): ‘substantially and 
meaningfully expand[ing] opportunities for historically disadvantaged persons, including women and 
communities, to enter into and actively participate in the mineral and petroleum industries and to benefit from 
the exploitation of the nation’s mineral and petroleum resources’ and ‘promot[ing] employment and 
advance[ing] social and economic welfare of all South Africans’. 
94 See the media statement by the Minister of Minerals as cited in note 12. 
95 2018 Mining Charter see note 12. 
96 Regulation 42(1)(a) of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Regulations GG No. 26275 of 23 
April 2004. 
97 Department of Mineral Resources Revised Social and Labour Plan Guidelines (October, 2010) p 4. Available at 
http://www.Department of Mineral Resources.gov.za/guidelines-revised-social-and-labour-
plans/summary/119-how-to/221-guidelines-revised-social-and-labour-plans-.html accessed 4 May 2017. 
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resources development element and the migrant labour element and under ‘social 
development’ is the mining community development element, the housing and living 
conditions element. This discussion will be followed by a discussion of how these elements 
perpetuate enclave development, the systemic lack of compliance in the SLP System and 
finally, how the AMV should influence South Africa’s laws and policies. 
 Increasing industry access and linkages 
This category comprises of the following elements in the Mining Charter: ownership, 
procurement and beneficiation. These elements are aimed at increasing access to the industry 
for Historically Disadvantaged South Africans (‘HDSAs’)98 and increasing linkages between the 
mining industry and other sectors of the economy. What follows is an assessment of how 
these elements have been dealt with in the 2004, 2010, the draft 2017 and the final 2018 
Mining Charter. The impact of these elements, according to the DMR’s 2009 Impact Report99 
and 2015 Impact Report,100 are also discussed.  
3.1.1 Ownership 
Apartheid policies perpetuated the marginalisation of black South Africans who became 
relegated to providing cheap labour and the effect of these policies is still evident in the mining 
industry today.101  The ownership element seeks to rectify the current patterns of ownership 
in the mining industry.102  
The 2004 Mining Charter mandated 26% ownership by Historically Disadvantaged South 
Africans (HDSAs) of mining assets within 10 years of implementing the Charter.103 Mining 
companies that exceed this requirement, could offset this excess from any of their other 
Mining Charter obligations.104  The 2010 Mining Charter amended this ownership requirement 
by adding a new time deadline of 2014.105 The result was that this change had to be 
implemented within 4 years after the implementation of the 2010 Mining Charter. The 
                                                     
98 These elements give effect to the objects of the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003 
see generally Wouter Scholtz and Chris van Wyk ‘BEE Service Empowermentor’ September 2018 - Issue 15 Ch 1 
at para 1.1. 
99 DMR ‘Mining Charter Impact Assessment Report’ (Oct, 2009) available at 
https://evaluations.dpme.gov.za/evaluations/60 accessed 18 July 2018. Hereafter ‘DMR 2009 Impact Report’. 
100 DMR ‘Assessment of the Broad Based Socio-Economic Empowerment Charter for the South African Mining 
Industry (Mining Charter)’ (May, 2015) available at 
http://www.dmr.gov.za/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=7wIfrMbHgVc%3d&portalid=0 accessed 2 September 2018. 
Hereafter ‘DMR 2015 Impact Report’. 
101 See generally T S Phakathi ‘Worker agency in colonial, apartheid and post-apartheid gold mining’ (2012) 39 
Review of African Political Economy 279; Dan O'Meara ‘The 1946 African mine workers’ strike and the political 
economy of South Africa.’ (1975) 13 Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 146-173.  
102 Section 2(c) and (d) of the MPRDA; Preamble and Items 1(b), 1(c) and 2 of the 2018 Mining Charter see note 
12. 
103 Item 4.7 of the 2004 Mining Charter see note 12 at 13. 
104 These obligations are the 8 themes from 2.1 to 2.8 of this chapter. Item 4.7 of the 2004 Mining Charter see 
note 12 at 13. 
105 Item 2.1 of the 2010 Mining Charter see note 12 at 1. 
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definition of ‘ownership’ also changed in the 2010 Mining Charter such that the ownership by 
HDSAs had to be ‘effective’.106 Unlike the 2004 Mining Charter that allowed any other 
obligation in the Mining Charter to be offset by exceeding the ownership requirement, the 
2010 Mining Charter limited the offset to the beneficiation obligation.107  
The 2017 Mining Charter increases the 26% required to 50%+1 for companies applying for a 
new prospecting  right and 30% shareholding and voting rights for new mining right holders.108 
Furthermore, only 11% of the requirement for black ownership may be offset against the 
beneficiation requirement.109  The Black Economic Empowerment (‘BEE’) ownership targets in 
the 2018 Mining Charter for existing mining rights holders remains at a minimum of 26% and 
a mining right holder will be deemed as compliant for the duration of the mining right even if 
the percentages are to change.110 Applications for new mining rights must have a minimum of 
30% BEE shareholding and the 2018 Mining Charter prescribes how this 30% should be 
distributed between employees, host communities, BEE entrepreneurs and BEE 
entrepreneurs who are women.111       
Across the three Mining Charters,112 it is evident that the obligations imposed on prospecting 
and mining rights holders has become more stringent. Additionally, the time required to meet 
the obligation has decreased: from 10 years after implementation of a mining charter, to 4 
years after the implementation, to being compliant at the stage of applying for the prospecting 
right.113 The Mining Charter has also changed terminology: from ‘Historically Disadvantaged 
South Africans’ to ‘Black Persons’. This change in terminology has allowed the DMR to include 
juristic persons owned by black persons that fall within the definition.114   
The difference in what was drafted in the 2017 Mining Charter and what was gazetted in the 
2018 Mining Charter can be explained by the outcry from the mining industry that eventuated 
in the DMR being taken to court. The mining industry, represented by the Chamber of 
Mines,115 argued against the increase in HDSA shareholders requirement contained in the 
                                                     
106 ‘Effective ownership’ is defined in the 2010 Mining Charter as ‘meaningful participation of the HDSAs in the 
ownership, voting rights, economic interests and management control of the mining entities.’ ‘Black person’ is 
defined in the 2017 Mining Charter as ‘Africans, Coloureds and Indians who are South African by birth, descent 
or naturalisation before 27 April 1994.’ Noticeably the definition also includes a juristic person controlled and 
managed by such persons.    
107 Item 2.1 of the 2010 Mining Charter see note 12 at 1. 
108 2017 Mining Charter see note 12 at 7. 
109 Item 2.1 of the 2017 Mining Charter see note 12 at 7. 
110 Item 2.1 of the 2018 Mining Charter see note 12 at 13. 
111 Item 2.1.3 of the 2018 Mining Charter see note 12 at 14.  
112 See Anri Heyns and Hanri Mostert ‘Three Mining Charters and a Draft: How the politics and rhetoric of 
development in the South African mining sector are keeping communities are in poverty’ (2018) 11 Law and 
Development Review 801. 
113 The 2017 Mining Charter requires compliance at the time that the prospecting right is being applied for see 
2017 Mining Charter see note 12 at 7. 
114 ‘HDSA’ is defined in the 2004 and 2010 Mining Charters as referring to persons or categories of persons who 
are South African citizens and were ‘disadvantaged by unfair discrimination before the Constitution’.   
115 The Chamber of Mines was loosely established by mining employers on 7 December 1887 in Johannesburg 
and formalised in 1889. It acts as a forum to facilitate mining employers’ engagement on policies and their earlier 
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2017 Mining Charter. This culminated in an application for an urgent interdict, brought by the 
Chamber of Mines, to interdict the implementation of the 2017 Mining Charter.116 The 
Minister of Mineral Resources subsequently issued a moratorium on the granting or 
processing of all new prospecting and mining rights under the 2017 Mining Charter until 
judgment had been handed down on the application for an interdict (and the subsequent 
application for judicial review).117  
Additionally, the Minerals Council South Africa has expressed its support of the 2018 Mining 
Charter and ‘the removal of the requirement on existing rights to top up from 26% to 30%’.118  
The Minerals Council of South Africa rejected the increase in HDSA shareholding because, they 
argue, the increase violates the transactions that had been concluded in good faith on the 
basis of the old Mining Charter requirements.119 This argument fails to take into account the 
fact that government regulations need to be responsive to a changing mining industry and 
because of the high levels of non-compliance regulations need to close the gaps that are used 
to evade complying.   
When considering how well the mining industry has done in meeting the objectives set out in 
the Mining Charter, the DMR’s 2009 Impact Report120 and 2015 Impact Report121 will be 
considered. The levels of BEE ownership in the mining industry, according to the 2009 Impact 
Report, were approximately 9% and this was concentrated in either a special purpose vehicle 
or with a few partners (who are referred to as ‘the usual suspects’) which ultimately translated 
to a limited number of black beneficiaries.122   
This brings to the fore one of the barriers to transforming the mining industry, namely, the 
fact that empowerment vehicles123 have been plagued with issues such as benefits not being 
equitably distributed or benefits extending to non-HDSA beneficiaries.124  An example of this, 
                                                     
research was targeted at ‘the role of [the] supervisor in dealing with problematic conditions before they became 
causes of generalised complaint’ see Chamber of Mines ‘Research Organisation’ (1988) at 33 as cited in Nicoli 
Nattrass ‘The Crisis in South African Gold Mining’ (1995) 23 World Development 857 at 864. In May, 2018 the 
Chamber of Mines changed its name to the Minerals Council of South Africa. 
https://www.mineralscouncil.org.za/about/history accessed 1 December 2018. 
116 The Founding Affidavit can be accessed here https://www.mineralscouncil.org.za/images/court-
documents/founding-affidavit.PDF.  
117 Department of Mineral Resources ‘Statement by Minister Zwane on intention to issue moratorium’ (20 July 
2017) available at http://www.dmr.gov.za/news-room/post/1418/statement-by-minister-zwane-on-intention-
to-issue-moratorium accessed 15 November 2018. 
118 Minerals Council South Africa Media Statement ‘Minerals Council South Africa response to the publication of 
the Mining Charter: Welcomes the publication of the Mining Charter and broadly supports its intentions and 
content.’ (3 October 2018) available at https://www.mineralscouncil.org.za/industry-news/media-
releases/2018/send/35-2018/640-minerals-council-south-africa-s-response-to-the-publication-of-the-mining-
charter accessed 15 November 2018.  
119 Minerals Council of South Africa Media Statement (3 October 2018) see note 107.  
120 DMR 2009 Impact Report see note 95. 
121 DMR 2015 Impact Report see note 96. 
122 DMR 2009 Impact Report see note 95 at 17. 
123 Examples of empowerment vehicles include community trusts or employee share ownership schemes. 
124 DMR 2009 Impact Report see note 95 at 18. 
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is the joint venture between the South African government,125 a number of private mining 
companies,126 Ridgewood Investments and the Bakgatla Ba Kgafela (‘BBK’).  This joint venture 
was established under the SLP System to ensure BBK, the mining affected community, would 
benefit from the exploitation of mineral resources in the surrounding area.127 Unfortunately, 
this joint venture has made headlines because the mining affected community of 
approximately 350 000 members have not benefitted from the venture as of early 2018 
despite the fact that they own a 25, 74% stake in a mine valued between R20 to R25 million.128 
This failed venture between government, mining companies and a mining affected community 
highlights a challenge faced by national policy makers to improve governance and develop 
policies that address corruption while not compromising environmental, social and cultural 
considerations.129 
A second barrier to transforming the mining industry includes South Africa’s corporate culture 
of viewing regulatory compliance as a box-ticking exercise as opposed to working towards the 
realisation of the objectives of the Mining Charter.130  A third barrier identified in the 2009 
Impact Report was the lack of HDSA participation at Board level.131 This leaves HDSAs unable 
to influence key decisions that affect the performance of the overall deal and leaves HDSA 
companies bound to the decisions taken by the empowering company.132  
The fourth barrier to the transformation of the mining industry was the prevalence of 
‘fronting’,133 described in the 2009 Impact Report as a ‘scourge to South Africa’s 
transformation Agenda’.134  The practice of ‘fronting’ is described by the Department of Trade 
and Industry (‘DTI’) as a misrepresentation of facts or data in an attempt to appear as if fully 
compliant with the B-BBEE Act and Codes.135  Whether the circumvention of the B-BBEE Act 
                                                     
125 The SA government is part of the joint venture through the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC). The 
IDC was established in 1940 by the South African government as a national development finance institution see 
https://www.idc.co.za/about-the-idc.html accessed 18 July 2018. 
126 One of the notable mining companies is Anglo Platinum through its subsidiary Rustenburg Platinum Mines. 
127 Kevin Bloom and Sasha Wales-Smith ‘Stealing the Crust: How the Bakgatla Ba Kgafela were robbed of their 
inheritance’ (1 February 2018) Daily Maverick accessed 11 February 2018. Available at: 
https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-02-01-stealing-the-crust-how-the-baktatla-ba-kgafela-were-
robbed-of-their-inheritance/#.Wn-L7K6WbIX  
128 Kevin Bloom and Sasha Wales-Smith ‘Stealing the Crust: How the Bakgatla Ba Kgafela were robbed of their 
inheritance’ (1 February 2018) Daily Maverick accessed 11 February 2018. Available at: 
https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-02-01-stealing-the-crust-how-the-baktatla-ba-kgafela-were-
robbed-of-their-inheritance/#.Wn-L7K6WbIX  
129 African Mining Vision 2009, Addis Ababa at 24. 
130 DMR 2009 Impact Report see note 95 at 18. 
131 DMR 2009 Impact Report see note 95 at 19. 
132 DMR 2009 Impact Report see note 95 at 19. 
133 The use of ‘fronting’ in contractual arrangements is dealt with in Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa v 
Swifambo Rail Agency (Pty) Ltd [2017] 3 All SA 971 (GJ) paras 91, 95 to 100; see generally Wouter Scholtz and 
Chris van Wyk ‘BEE Service Empowermentor’ September 2018 - Issue 15 Ch 11 at 11.7;    
134 DMR 2009 Impact Report see note 95 at 19. 
135 DTI ‘B-BBEE Guidelines on “Complex Structures and Transactions and Fronting”’ at 6 available at 
http://www.dti.gov.za/economic_empowerment/guidelines.jsp accessed on 23 October 2018. Hereafter ‘DTI B-
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and Codes is deliberate or attempted, it will constitute ‘fronting’.136 Fronting can manifest 
itself in three forms; first, it can occur as window-dressing.137 This is when black people138 are 
hired or appointed solely for the purpose of ensuring compliance with the B-BBEE Act and 
Codes, however, they do not substantially participate in the core activities of the enterprise.139  
The second way fronting occurs is in the form of benefit diversion.140 This is defined as the 
diversion of benefits, accrued as a result of a B-BBEE status, that are meant to flow to black 
people.141 The final manifestation is when an opportunistic intermediary, with a favourable B-
BBEE status, enters an agreement with another company to assist that company by leveraging 
the B-BBEE status of the opportunistic intermediary.142  
Although the four barriers to transforming the mining industry highlight how there is either 
non-compliance with the ownership element or it is either narrowly construed,143 mining 
companies are still best placed to bearing the bulk of the responsibility when it comes to 
transforming the mining industry. This is because mining in South Africa is conducted, 
primarily, by mining companies who apply to be mining rights holders and if the demographics 
are to change and reflect South African society, then the ownership composition of mining 
companies will also have to change.144    
3.1.2 Procurement 
Non-HDSA companies are the dominant suppliers of capital goods in the mining industry.145  
This element of the Mining Charter aims to increase the number of HDSA suppliers. The 2004 
Mining Charter mandates the progressive use of HDSA suppliers.146 Whereas the following 
objectives were set to ensure this occurs in the 2004 Mining Charter: mining companies should 
give HDSAs preferred status; mining companies should identify their current level of 
procurement from HDSAs of capital goods, consumables and services and commit to increase 
it over a 3 to 5 year period.147  
The 2010 Mining Charter sets more targets by requiring 0.5% of annual income made suppliers 
that are Multi-National Corporations to go to a social development fund to help develop local 
                                                     
BBEE Guidelines on Fronting’; Wouter Scholtz and Chris van Wyk ‘BEE Service Empowermentor’ September 2018 
- Issue 15 Ch 11 at 11.7. 
136 DTI B-BBEE Guidelines on Fronting see note 128 at 6. 
137 DTI B-BBEE Guidelines on Fronting see note 128 at 6. 
138 The term ‘Black people’ is a generic term that encompasses ‘Africans, Coloureds and Indian South African 
citizens’ according to the B-BBEE Amendment Act 53 of 2004.   
139 DTI B-BBEE Guidelines on Fronting see note 128 at 6. 
140 DTI B-BBEE Guidelines on Fronting see note 128 at 6. 
141 DTI B-BBEE Guidelines on Fronting see note 128 at 6. 
142 DTI B-BBEE Guidelines on Fronting see note 128 at 6. 
143 PWC ‘South African Mine 2018’ 10 ed (2018) 21 available at https://www.pwc.co.za/en/publications/sa-
mine.html accessed 22 May 2019; PWC ‘SA Mine’ 9 ed (2017) 25 to 26 available at 
https://www.pwc.co.za/en/publications/sa-mine.html accessed 22 May 2019. 
144 DMR Impact Report 2015 see note xx at 11. 
145 DMR Impact Report 2009 see note 95 at 13. 
146 Item 4.6 of the 2004 Mining Charter see note 12 at 13. 
147 DMR Impact Report 2009 see note 95 at 13. 
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communities.148 The 2010 Mining Charter also mandates mining rights holders to increase the 
number of BEE entities that provide services by 70% and goods by 50% by 2014.149 The 2017 
Mining Charter requires a minimum of 70% of the goods acquired to be manufactured in South 
Africa.150 In terms of the services, a minimum of 80% should be sourced from South African 
companies of which 10% of the 80% should be black.151 The 2018 Mining Charter prescribes 
that a minimum of 70% of the total expenditure on mining goods should be on goods that are 
manufactured in South Africa152 and a minimum of 80% of the total expenditure on services 
must be on a South African based company.153 The 2018 Mining Charter further prescribes 
how this 70% expenditure on mining goods and 80% expenditure on services should be 
allocated.154 Additionally, the procurement expenditure reported must be the actual 
expenditure incurred by a mining right holder.155  
In recognition of the fact that there might be a shortage of BEE owned and controlled 
companies that provide mining goods and mining services, the 2018 Mining Charter allows a 
mining right holder to contribute to enterprise and supplier development and then offset this 
contribution against its procurement obligations.156  
The 2009 Impact Report indicates that 89% of mining companies did not give HDSA companies 
preferred supplier status and 80% did not indicate a commitment to increase procurement 
from HDSA companies.157 On average, 37% of the procurement from mining companies was 
from HDSA companies however, the bulk of those contracts were for non-core services such 
as cleaning or providing toilet paper.158 Additionally, mining companies did not identify their 
procurement levels from HDSA companies nor did they commit to increasing the levels of 
procurement.159 The 2009 Impact Report described these results as reflecting a ‘pervasive 
resistance’ to transform the mining industry.160 
The results of the 2015 Impact Report revealed that only 39.1% of mining companies met the 
target of procuring 40% of their capital goods from HDSA companies and 32% of mining 
companies met the target of procuring 70% of their services from HDSA companies.161 Under 
                                                     
148 Item 2.2 of the 2010 Mining Charter see note 12 at 2. 
149 Item 2.2 of the 2010 Mining Charter see note 12 at 2. 
150 5% of which should be from black owned companies were black women own 50%+1 of the shares and black 
youth own 50%+1 of the shares). Item 2.2 of the 2017 Mining Charter see note 12 at 14. 
151 These black companies should have black women own a minimum of 50%+1 of the shares and 5% owned by 
black youth (with a majority stake of 50%+1). Item 2.2 of the 2017 Mining Charter see note 12 at 14. 
152 Item 2.2.1 of the 2018 Mining Charter see note 12 at 18. 
153 Item 2.2.2 of the 2018 Mining Charter see note 12 at 18. 
154 Item 2.2.1 to 2.2.2 of the 2018 Mining Charter see note 12 at 18. 
155 2018 Mining Charter see note 12 at 19. 
156  2018 Mining Charter see note 12 at 19. 
157 DMR Impact Report 2009 see note 95 at 14. 
158 DMR Impact Report 2009 see note 95 at 14. 
159 DMR Impact Report 2009 see note 95 at 14. 
160 DMR Impact Report 2009 see note 95 at 14. 
161 DMR Impact Report 2015 see note 96 at 20 and 22. 
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multinational companies contributing 0.5% of their income into the social development fund, 
only 3.4% of mining companies complied with this requirement.162  
Although the results of the 2009 Impact Report were unclear as to whether the 37% 
procurement by mining companies was of capital goods or services,163 the 2015 Impact Report 
clearly divides the results into the two categories. This division into ‘capital goods’ and 
‘services’ and increased specificity is another indication that policymakers realised the need 
to remove all ambiguity to combat the ‘pervasive resistance’ to transform the mining 
industry.164 However, the results of the 2015 Impact Report indicate that despite clearly 
identified objectives, mining companies were still largely uncompliant.165  
The above highlights how past non-compliance by mining companies was exacerbated by not 
having clear objectives, there is a more insidious culture that resists transformation of the 
mining industry that needs to be addressed.   
Another concern is that the procurement element is integral to the diversification away from 
the mining industry to promote other economic sectors. If the levels of non-compliance are 
already this high, how will working towards the full implementation of the RBI strategy 
improve this? If anything, this element indicates that at a practical level, the AMV’s strategy 
will be difficult if not impossible to successfully implement. As such, increased implementation 
of the AMV is unattainable.  
3.1.3 Beneficiation 
This element is meant to facilitate a shift from a resource-based economy to a knowledge 
economy and it is based on the idea that mineral resource wealth should translate to 
meaningful economic growth.166 The following measures were adopted by the Mining Charter: 
a mining company should identify its current levels of beneficiation and indicate the extent to 
which these levels will have to be increased to qualify for an offset.167   
Unlike the 2004 Mining Charter that allows companies to determine the levels of beneficiation 
they should achieve with regard to their current levels,168 the 2010 Mining Charter mandates 
companies to look to the Minister of Mineral Resources for a target.169 The 2010 Mining 
                                                     
162 DMR Impact Report 2015 see note 96 at 25. 
163 DMR Impact Report 2009 see note 95 at 14. 
164 DMR Impact Report 2009 see note 95 at 14. 
165 PricewaterhouseCoopers ‘SA Mine: Highlighting trends in the South African Mining Industry’ 4 ed (2012) at 11 
available at https://www.pwc.co.za/en/assets/pdf/sa-mine-nov-2012.pdf accessed 21 December 2018. 
166 DMR Impact Report 2009 see note 95 at 14. 
167 DMR Impact Report 2009 see note 95 at 15. 
168 Item 4.8 of the 2004 Mining Charter at 15. 
169 The 2010 Mining Charter see note 12 read with s 26 of the MPRDA. Section 26 of the MPRDA states: ‘The 
Minister may initiate or prescribe incentives to promote the beneficiation of minerals in the Republic. If the 
Minister, acting on advice of the Board and after consultation with the Minister of Trade and Industry, finds that 
a particular mineral can be beneficiated economically in the Republic, the Minister may promote such 
beneficiation subject to such terms and conditions as the Minister may determine. In promoting beneficiation, 
the Minister may prescribe the levels required for beneficiation. Any person who intends to beneficiate any 
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Charter then allows a company to offset any excess against the ownership requirement.170 
Similarly, the 2017 Mining Charter allows 11% of the requirement of black ownership to be 
offset where beneficiation levels exceed the stipulated amount.171 
The 2009 Impact Report states that neither of the above objectives was achieved.172 In 
instances where local beneficiation did occur, it occurred in pockets and was largely 
uncoordinated.173 Unlike the 2009 Impact Report, the 2015 Impact Report is silent on the 
levels of compliance with this element of the Mining Charter. 
The 2018 Mining Charter does not deal with the element of beneficiation separately. Instead, 
the beneficiation obligations are dealt with under the ownership and procurement elements. 
Under the ownership element, the 2018 Mining Charter allows a mining right holder to offset 
meeting their beneficiation requirements against the ownership targets under a beneficiation 
equity equivalent plan.174 A beneficiation equity equivalent plan is a plan that contains all the 
beneficiation related activities that a mining right holder would like to offset a specific 
obligation under the Mining Charter (these would be either ownership or procurement). The 
DMR allows a maximum of 5% percentage points of the BEE shareholding to offset by 
completing a number of beneficiation-related activities.175  The beneficiation-related activities 
recognised by the DMR include: (a) supplying mineral ore or mineral products to South African 
based beneficiation entities at a discount; or (b) supplying mineral ore to BEE owned 
beneficiation entities at a discount or investing money into South African based mineral 
beneficiation.176 Under the Procurement element of the 2018 Mining Charter, mining right 
holders are required to provide verification of the local content of their goods.177 
Increasing the levels of beneficiation allows African countries to maximise their economic and 
social returns from the mining industry,178 this makes the low-levels of compliance with this 
element worrying. Of all the elements in the Mining Charter, beneficiation is central in 
ensuring a move away from a dependence on mineral wealth to a more diversified economy 
which is why the AMV proposes the cultivation of downstream linkages into mineral 
beneficiation.179 However, based on the reports conducted by the DMR, this is easier said than 
done.  
                                                     
mineral mined in the Republic outside the Republic may only do so after written notice and in consultation with 
the Minister.’ 
170 The amount offset cannot exceed 11% of the ownership requirement. Item 2.3 of the 2010 Mining Charter 
see note 12 at 2. 
171 Item 2.1 of the 2017 Mining Charter see note 12 at 7. 
172 DMR Impact Report 2009 see note 95 at 15. 
173 DMR Impact Report 2009 see note 95 at 15. 
174 Item 2.1.7 of the 2018 Mining Charter see note 12 at 16. 
175 Item 2.1.7.1.1 of the 2018 Mining Charter see note 12 at 16. 
176 Item 2.1.7.1.5 of the 2018 Mining Charter see note 12 at 17. 
177 Item 2.2.3 of the 2018 Mining Charter see note 12 at 19. 
178 ECA: Minerals Cluster Policy Study see note 36 at 22. 
179 African Mining Vision 2009, Addis Ababa.   
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 Labour  
At the time the first Mining Charter was implemented in 2004, the mining industry’s workforce 
was not reflective of the demographics of South Africa, particularly at executive level and 
senior management level.180 Under this category the following elements of the Mining Charter 
will be addressed: employment equity, human resources development and migrant labour. 
Although the discussion below will highlight the lack of compliance with these Mining Charter 
elements, mining right holders still are best placed at ensuring these targets get met.    
 
3.2.1 Employment Equity 
 
This element seeks to ensure equity in the workplace by eliminating unfair discrimination and 
implementing affirmative action measures. 
Both the 2004 and 2010 Mining Charters require companies to achieve 40% HDSA 
management.181 The 2010 Mining Charter takes this requirement a step further by mandating 
the representation be at ‘Board, senior management, core and critical skills, middle and junior 
management level’.182  Both the 2017 Mining Charter183 and the 2018 Mining Charter184 state 
the specific guidelines of the percentages of the black persons that should occupy certain 
levels of management. These requirements can be broken down as follows: 
 
Level Minimum percentage (%) of black persons that should 
occupy that level. 
 2017 2018 
Board (with voting rights) 50 (25 of which should be 
with black women) 
 
50  
Executive 50 (20 of which should be 
black women) 
Senior Management  60 (30 of which should be 
black women)  
60  
Middle management 75 (38 of which should be 
black women) 
60  
                                                     
180 DMR Impact Report 2009 see note 95 at 6. 
181 The 2004 Mining Charter requires this by 2009 and the 2010 Mining Charter by 2014. Item 4.2 of the 2004 
Mining Charter see note 12 at 11; Item 2.4 of the 2010 Mining Charter see note 12 at 3.  
182 Item 2.4 of the 2010 Mining Charter see note 12 at 3.  
183 Item 2.3 of the 2017 Mining Charter see note 12 at 15. 
184 Item 2.4 of the 2018 Mining Charter see note 12 at 22. 
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Junior management 88 (44 of which should be 
black women) 
70  
Core and critical skills* 60 60 
Table 1: 2017 and 2018 Mining Charter Employment Equity guidelines 
*‘Core and critical skills’ are defined by the 2017 Mining Charter as ‘high level technical skills across all 
organisational levels within both the production and operational parts of the Holders’ value-chain’ and in the 
2018 Mining Charter as including: science, technology engineering and maths.  
 
The 2018 Mining Charter also requires a minimum 1.5% of the employees must be employees 
with disabilities. 
Although this element of the Mining Charter is not directly addressed by the AMV’s RBI 
strategy, the Apartheid era in South Africa’s meant that the majority black population 
provided cheap labour to the mining industry and were unable to form part of management. 
Inherently, this element has narrow impact (in that there are generally few management 
positions) however, mining companies appropriately bear the responsibility of ensuring their 
human resource practices are aligned to the ideals of remedying past inequalities and ensuring 
that their company management is reflective of the demographics of the country. 
3.2.2 Human Resources Development 
The mining industry is knowledge-based and South Africa’s labour market is unable to meet 
the needs of the mining industry, this has caused the current skills deficit.185 Therefore, this 
element is aimed at ensuring the mining industry’s workforce is skilled, trained and diverse.186 
Stakeholders agreed that to realise this element of the Mining Charter they need to work 
together to address the skills deficit in the mining industry.187 As a result, the Mining 
Qualifications Authority (MQA) was established in 1996.188The primary objective of the MQA 
is to develop programmes for the mining industry that equip employees to better meet the 
skills shortages in the mining industry thereby supporting transformation in the mining 
industry.189 
The MQA is made up of four components, namely:  skills planning and research, the 
implementation of learning programmes and quality assurance and support services.190 The 
skills planning and research component focuses on identifying skills gaps in the mining 
industry and compiles a plan to address these shortfalls.191 The implementation of the learning 
                                                     
185 DMR Impact Report 2009 see note 95 at 4. 
186 2018 Mining Charter see note 12 at 21. 
187 DMR Impact Report 2009 see note 95 at 4. 
188MQA ‘About Us’ http://www.mqa.org.za/ accessed 14 May 2018. 
189 MQA ‘Strategic objectives’ http://www.mqa.org.za/strategic-objectives accessed 14 May 2018; 
PricewaterhouseCoopers ‘SA Mine: Highlighting trends in the South African Mining Industry’ 4 ed (2012) at 11 
available at https://www.pwc.co.za/en/assets/pdf/sa-mine-nov-2012.pdf accessed 21 December 2018. 
190 DMR Impact Report 2009 see note 95 at 25. 
191 DMR Impact Report 2009 see note 95 at 25. 
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programmes component ensures that either strategic programmes192 or operational projects 
are implemented to ensure workers that are already within the mining industry develop their 
skills.193 The quality assurance component of the MQA is responsible for accrediting training 
providers, registering qualifications and approving assessment centres.194  Support services 
include: corporate governance and legal services, human resources and supply chain 
management functions that assist the MQA and its partners in executing the MQAs legislative 
mandate.195  
Stakeholders are required to address the mining industry skills gaps in various ways. The 2004 
Mining Charter requires scholarships in certain disciplines, increase in the number of 
learnerships and the provision of skills training to mineworkers so they can have alternative 
skills to use once the mine closes.196   The 2010 Mining Charter mandates a certain percentage 
of the company’s annual payroll must be dedicated to skills development197 while the 2017 
Mining Charter requires 5% of the leviable amount to be set aside for developing essential 
skills.198  
The following components were measured by the DMR to establish the progress made in the 
mining industry in relation to this element. First, whether the company annually published its 
employment equity plan and reported on its progress; second, whether there was a plan 
established by the company to achieve at least 40% HDSA participation at the management 
level within 5 years.199  
Only 37% of mining right holders developed employment equity plans and 26% of mining 
companies achieved the target of 40% HDSA participation in management.200 A closer break-
down of the HDSA participation average revealed that the majority of HDSA participation was 
at middle-management level and very few had strategic decision-making capabilities.201 
Additionally, only 26% of mining companies achieved the objective of 10% participation of 
women (inclusive of white women). However, the majority of these women participated in 
ancillary roles as only 1% of the women were reported as holding positions in core 
management.202  
                                                     
192 Strategic programmes are programmes that increase the number of students passing maths, sciences or 
increasing the number of bursaries in the sector). 
193 For example, employees may enrol in Adult Education and Training (AET) colleges or Occupational Health & 
Safety Representative Development programmes. DMR Impact Report 2009 see note 95 at 25. 
194 DMR Impact Report 2009 see note 95 at 25. 
195 DMR Impact Report 2009 see note 95 at 25 and 51. 
196 Item 4.1 of the 2004 Mining Charter see note 12 at 10. 
197 The percentage of the annual payroll used per year is as follows: 3% in 2010, 3.5% in 2011, 4% in 2012, 2013 
in 4.5% and 5% in 2014. Item 2.5 of the 2010 Mining Charter see note 12 at 4. 
198 Item 2.4 of the 2017 Mining Charter see note 12 at 17. 
199 DMR Impact Report 2009 see note 95 at 7. 
200 DMR Impact Report 2009 see note 95 at 7. 
201 DMR Impact Report 2009 see note 95 at 7. 
202 DMR Impact Report 2009 see note 95 at 8. 
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At the time the 2009 Impact Report was released it revealed that South Africa’s mining 
industry reflected the participation of HDSAs primarily within the lower levels of the 
industry.203 White males and females were still privileged within the industry.204 One way this 
privilege manifested itself was in the salaries earned by white men and women. White men 
and women earned more than their HDSA counterparts in general and that this even extended 
to instances where they were less skilled or had less experience.205  
The 2010 amended Mining Charter was more in depth as regards what the 40% target of HDSA 
representation in the mining company should mean within company structures. Accordingly, 
40% HDSA representation was required at executive management (board), senior 
management, core and critical skills, middle management and junior management level by 
2014.206    
The results of the 2015 Impact Report revealed that the mining industry exceeded the target 
of 40% HDSA representation at the various levels. However, on closer inspection of the results 
black African females were under-represented at all levels and black African males were 
under-represented at the top, senior and middle management levels.207 Similarly, coloured 
males and females were significantly under-represented in all categories.208 Additionally, 
white males were still over-represented at all functional categories except at core skills.209 
After the 2009 Impact Report revealed that there was only 6% representation of women in 
mining when the target was 10%, according to the 2015 Impact Report by 2014 the 
representation of women in the mining industry was 10.5%.210  
Unlike the results of the 2009 Impact Report which relied mainly on two components to assess 
the progress made in employment equity, the results of the 2015 Impact Report were more 
detailed because more, clear and quantifiable objectives were set.  From the time of the 2009 
Impact Report to the time the 2015 Impact Report was compiled, the levels of employment 
equity improved significantly. Although the breakdown provided in the 2015 Impact Report 
reveals that more work still needs to be done, the benefit of the increase in specificity means 
more targeted intervention can be developed.  
The DMR measured the progress made in this element by considering the following three 
components:211 whether the company trains their employees and offers every employee the 
opportunity to be functionally literate and numerate; the implementation of career paths and 
skills development plans for HDSAs and the mentoring of HDSAs. 
                                                     
203 DMR Impact Report 2009 see note 95 at 8. 
204 DMR Impact Report 2009 see note 95 at 8. 
205 DMR Impact Report 2009 see note 95 at 8. 
206 DMR Impact Report 2015 see note 96 at 26. 
207 DMR Impact Report 2015 see note 96 at 27. 
208 DMR Impact Report 2015 see note 96 at 27. 
209 DMR Impact Report 2015 see note 96 at 27. 
210 DMR Impact Report 2015 see note 96 at 28. 
211 DMR Impact Report 2009 see note 95 at 5. 
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According to the results of the 2009 Impact Report, there was an average of 17.1% in 
functional literacy.212 The report attributes these inadequate levels of skills development to 
the lack of support from management.213An example of how staff were not supported by their 
employers is how they would be called out of their Adult Basic Education and Training (ABET) 
classes to work or how staff were penalised for attending their ABET classes.214    
The 2009 Impact Report also revealed that the compliance average for the implementation of 
career paths and skills development was set at an average of 17.1%. This was attributed to 
career path plans focusing primarily on senior staff and not lower level employees.215 The 
mentorship of HDSAs was reported at an average of 11.4%.216  
The 2010 amended Mining Charter set a requirement that mining companies spend 5% of 
their total payroll on human resources development.217 The results reveal that although there 
a number of mining companies that have attempted to meet this target there is still a 
significant number of mining companies that fall below this target.218 The 2018 Mining Charter 
requires mining right holders to invest a minimum of 5% on essential skills including: science, 
technology, engineering, maths and artisans.219   
The implication of these results is that little to no skills development is taking place within the 
mining industry and there is a lack of commitment from mining companies to close the skills 
gap. This perpetuates the gap between the skills development needed by South Africa’s 
mining industry and the inability of the South African labour market to close it. This raises the 
question of why mining companies behave, as evidenced in the compliance levels, as if they 
have no vested interest in ensuring that the South African labour market is able to provide 
them with the skills they require to operate. 
One of the components of a successful RBI strategy is increasing side-stream linkages such as 
innovations and research that can be transferred to other industries.220 The current skills gap 
in South Africa’s mining industry means we are lagging behind in critical skills and not enough 
research and innovation is occurring. It also means that we cannot take it for granted that fully 
implementing the AMV will result in side-stream linkages and innovations for other industries 
because of the high levels of non-compliance with this element. 
3.2.3 Migrant Labour 
In this element the Mining Charter assesses whether a mining company subscribes to 
government and industry agreements to ensure non-discrimination against foreign migrant 
                                                     
212 DMR Impact Report 2009 see note 95 at 5. 
213 DMR Impact Report 2009 see note 95 at 5. 
214 DMR Impact Report 2009 see note 95 at 5. 
215 DMR Impact Report 2009 see note 95 at 5. 
216 DMR Impact Report 2009 see note 95 at 5. 
217 This amount excludes skills development levies. DMR Impact Report 2015 see note 96 at 28.  
218 35.3% of the right holders did not meet the target. DMR Impact Report 2015 see note 96 at 28. 
219 Item 2.3.1 of the 2018 Mining Charter see note 12 at 21.  
220 Chapter Two section 3.1. 
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labour. The 2010 and 2017 Mining Charter are silent on the issue of labour migrants. The 2004 
Mining Charter deals with the issue of mining labour. Even then, it only mandates companies 
to ensure non-discrimination.221 This silence is startling, since, historically, South Africa’s 
mining industry was built on the migrant labour system with most gold mines in Johannesburg 
relying on miners from the Eastern Cape and this system is still perpetuated.222 Additionally, 
the commencement of mining operations generally results in an influx of people from 
different provinces seeking job opportunities at the mines.223   
According to the 2009 Impact Report this objective was successfully complied with however, 
no further details are provided in the report.224 The 2015 Impact Report is silent on the levels 
of compliance with this element of the Mining Charter which is unsurprising considering the 
silence in the 2010 Mining Charter on this element. 
The 2004 and the 2010 Amended Mining Charters lacked detail on the issue of migrant labour. 
Consequently, it should come as no surprise that both the 2009 and 2015 Impact Reports had 
little to report on under the progress in realising this element. 
The above discussion highlights various levels of compliance and the fact that more work 
needs to be done by the mining industry. However, the above elements of the Mining Charter 
are still best placed within the ambit of mining companies’ responsibilities. From section 2,225 
it became evident that South Africa is pursuing an RBI strategy. The fact that compliance levels 
are not ideal thus raise the question of whether intensifying the implementation of the AMV 
is the solution.        
 Social Development  
Under this element is the mine community development element of the Mining Charter and 
the housing and living conditions element. This section highlights the complexity of localising 
the benefits of mining without perpetuating enclave development. Although the levels of non-
compliance are high, in this discussion what becomes evident is that government, and not 
mining rights holders, is best placed at bearing the responsibility of ensuring there is social 
development.  
                                                     
221 Item 4.3 of the 2004 Mining Charter see note 12 at 12. 
222 Alan H Jeeves Migrant Labour In South Africa’s Economy: The Struggle for the Gold Mines’ Labour Supply 1890 
– 1920 (1985) 90. 
223 PricewaterhouseCoopers ‘SA Mine: Highlighting trends in the South African Mining Industry’ 4 ed (2012) at 12 
available at https://www.pwc.co.za/en/assets/pdf/sa-mine-nov-2012.pdf accessed 21 December 2018. 
224 DMR Impact Report 2009 see note 95 at 9. 
225 Chapter Three section 2. 
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3.3.1 Mine Community Development and SLPs 
Stakeholders are mandated to assist in formulating the Integrated Development Plan (‘IDP’)226 
in the 2004 Mining Charter.227 The 2010 and 2017 Mining Charter requires companies to meet 
community needs in line with the IDP and either a social license to operate, in 2010, or a Social 
and Labour Plan, in 2017.228 However, more often than not companies implement SLPs that 
are not aligned to IDPs.229 According to the 2018 Mining Charter, a mining right holder must 
consult with the relevant municipalities, mine communities, traditional authorities to identify 
developmental priorities.230   
SLPs must contain development programs that address human resources and local economic 
development.231 Mining companies are the main duty bearers in the SLP System. They are 
charged with designing and implementing development programs.232  
The DMR administers the SLP System by managing all the prospecting and mining rights, 
granting or refusing other permissions such as reconnaissance, retention and co-operation 
permits.233 Additionally, the Minister of the DMR must assist all historically disadvantaged 
persons to conduct prospecting or mining operations,234 and develop a Charter aimed at 
advancing the government’s objectives of redressing historical, social and economic 
inequalities as stated in the Constitution.235  
The ideal SLP will be designed such that it is aligned to the various plans of the mining company 
as illustrated in the diagram below.  This is because SLPs will touch on issues that a mining 
company would have already addressed in previous documents. The figure below illustrates 
some of the various sources that should inform a mining company as they design an SLP.236 
 
 
                                                     
226 An IDP allows communities to highlight their development priorities to local government officials. Local 
government is tasked with facilitating the involvement of local communities in the budgeting and performance 
management of the IDP see JT Thobatsi ‘The alignment of Social Labour Plans (SLPs) commitments with municipal 
Integrated Development Plans (IDPs)’ (2014) Masters Thesis, North West University at 13.  
227 Item 4.4 of the 2004 Mining Charter see note 12 at 12. 
228 Item 2.6 of the 2010 Mining Charter see note 12 at 4; Item 2.5 of the 2017 Mining Charter see note 12 at 18. 
229 For more on the problems caused by the misalignment of SLPs and IDPs see JT Thobatsi ‘The alignment of 
Social Labour Plans (SLPs) commitments with municipal Integrated Development Plans (IDPs)’ (2014) Masters 
Thesis, North West University at 26 to 31. 
230 Item 2.5 2018 Mining Charter see note 12 at 24. 
231 Regulation 46(b) and (c) of the MPRDA Regulations see note 8. 
232 CALS ‘The Social and Labour Plan Series. Phase 1: System Design Trends Analysis Report’ (March, 2016) at 34. 
233 Section 3(2)(a) of the MPRDA. 
234 Section 12(1) of the MPRDA 28 of 2002. 
235 Section 100(2)(a) of the MPRDA 49 of 2008. 
236 Managing Transformation Solution (Pty) Ltd: Affidavit to the Marikana Commission of Inquiry ‘The problems 
of the Social and Labour Plan (SLP) “System” within the Mining sector in South Africa’ (August 2014) 54 available 
at 
http://www.sahrc.org.za/home/21/files/Marikana%20Commission%20of%20Inquiry_SLP%20Affidavit_Final_20
140819%5B3%5D.pdf accessed 27 February 2017. Hereafter ‘MTS Affidavit’. 
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Figure 4: Mining operation plans that should inform the design of SLPs.237  
 
SLPs typically target the specific areas surrounding their mining operations (enclaves) to 
contribute to those areas’ socio-economic development.238 This enclave approach to socio-
economic development is prone to critique. From this critique, a premise of this dissertation 
arises, namely that not even absolute compliance with the SLP System239 can result in large-
scale and far-reaching socio-economic development of South Africa.240 As such, the SLP 
System misses one of its central aims. 
The SLP submitted by Lonmin, as part of its mining right application, undertook to build 5500 
houses for their employees by 2011.241 However, by September 2012, only three of the 5500 
                                                     
237 MTS Affidavit see note 228 at 5. 
238 Regulation 41(c) of the MPRDA see note 11. 
239 ‘SLP System’ refers to the MPRDA Regulations governing SLPs and the Mining Charter. 
240 S 24(b)(iii) of the Constitution of Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter the ‘Constitution’) read with section 
3(1) of the MPRDA states the State is the custodian of mineral and petroleum resources for the benefit of all 
South Africans and their exploitation should promote socio-economic development. 
241 Marikana Commission of Inquiry Report para 17 at 526; Lonmin Social and Labour Plan Analysis – Quantitative 
Assessment Annexure ‘A’ at 2. Available at 
http://www.sahrc.org.za/home/21/files/Lonmin%20Social%20and%20Labour%20Plan%20Analysis%20Qualitati
ve%20and%20Quantitative%20Assessment_ANNEXURE%20A%5B1%5D.pdf accessed 4 May 2017. 
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houses were built.242 This is despite the legally binding nature of SLPs that could result in the 
DMR withdrawing Lonmin’s mining license for non-compliance.243   
Non-compliance with the obligations of SLPs is widespread and by March 2015, a total of 240 
mining rights holders had not complied with their SLPs.244 Various reasons have been 
identified for the gross lack of compliance by mining right holders.245 One reason is that mining 
companies prioritise profits over complying with the SLP as opposed to regarding both as 
important.246 Where mining companies do attempt to comply with SLPs, they have been 
described by the DMR as elevating form over substance.247 SLPs are not prioritised as much as 
other legal obligations such as the Environmental Impact Assessment.248 Most mining 
companies are not structured in a way that enables them to plan and implement local 
economic development projects,249 and so the priority becomes merely ‘building 
structures’.250  Rather, the aim should be sustainable systemic change that can only occur 
where companies partner effectively with the relevant government departments to meet 
community needs.251  
An affidavit submitted to the Marikana Commission of Inquiry252 indicated that the 
inconsistencies253 of the legal framework underpinning the SLPs impacted the ability of key 
role-players to fulfil their roles.254 These inconsistencies often exacerbate the general non-
compliance with SLPs as legislation is poorly drafted and unclear.255 Additionally, the 
perception is that various government departments and organs fail to coordinate and 
communicate effectively.256   
                                                     
242 Marikana Commission of Inquiry Report para 19 at 527. 
243 Marikana Commission of Inquiry Report para 28 at 533. Under point 3 of the Mining Charter, non-compliance 
renders the mining company in breach of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 
(MPRDA) and subject to section 47 read with sections 98 and 99 of the MPRDA. 
244 National Council of Provinces Question for oral reply No. 178 Advance Notice No: CO582E. Date of Publication 
in Internal Question Paper: 19 October 2015. Internal Question Paper Number: 37. As cited in CALS SLP Phase I 
Report see note 17 at 14.  
245 CALS SLP Phase II Report at 45 to 48.  
246 CALS SLP Phase II Report see note 18 at 47. 
247 This was stated in a presentation to the National Assembly’s Portfolio Committee on Mineral Resources. 
Parliamentary Monitoring Group: Mineral Resources Committee Meeting ‘Social and Labour Plans: Centre for 
Applied Legal Studies briefing’ 30 November 2016 available at https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/23775/  
accessed 27 February 2017. 
248 CALS SLP Phase II Report see note 18 at 47. 
249 Ibid.  
250 Ibid.  
251 Ibid.  
252 MTS Affidavit see note 236. 
253 An example is the uncertainty in the mining industry regarding how the provisions in the Codes of Good 
Practice should be managed. Adding to that is the lack of prioritisation of the DMR’s Codes. Managing 
Transformation Solution (Pty) Ltd Affidavit to the Marikana Commission of Inquiry ‘The problems of the Social 
and Labour Plan (SLP) “System” within the Mining sector in South Africa’ Annexure E (August 2014). 
254 MTS Affidavit see note 236 at 51. 
255 CALS SLP Phase II Report see note 18 at 48. 
256 CALS SLP Phase II Report see note 18 at 48. 
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The DMR’s lack of capacity and resources257 means that they are unable to process the large 
amounts of SLPs that are submitted within the required time frames.258 Other issues faced by 
the DMR include the inability to monitor compliance with SLPs and enforce regulations259 and 
inconsistency with their approach to the various mining companies.260 
The 2009 Impact Report assessed the following: whether the mining company consulted with 
the relevant stakeholders including mining communities and communities from labour-
sending areas when they designed their development plan and whether there was 
cooperation with government to implement the plan.261   
The report revealed that 63% of mining companies consulted with mining communities 
however, only 14% consulted with communities in labour-sending areas.262 Additionally, no 
link was found between the projects that were proposed and implemented and community 
needs.263 This disjuncture was also evident in the poor correlation between SLP commitments 
and the expenditure of mining companies.264 
What is also noteworthy from the 2009 Impact Report is that mining companies expressed a 
desire for the DMR to implement a uniform approach to SLP modes across the country. 
However, the DMR refused this request as different mining communities have differing 
development requirements.265 
Similarly, the 2010 Amended Mining Charter required mining companies to use SLPs to 
develop programmes to contribute to the development of these communities.266  The 2015 
Impact Report revealed that nationally, only 36% of mining companies met their targets under 
mining community development.267 With the 2018 Mining Charter it is evident that the DMR 
is attempting to expand the impact of development beyond the enclave as it explicitly requires 
mining rights holders to consult with more stakeholders.268   
As the main duty bearers in the SLP System, mining companies lie at the centre of 
government’s aims of promoting the socio-economic welfare of all South Africans, 
transforming the mining industry and the developing mining affected communities.269 
However, both Impact Reports reveal a lack of compliance from mining companies. The 2009 
Impact Report revealed that mining companies had requested a uniform approach to 
                                                     
257 MTS Affidavit see note 236 at 74; CALS SLP Phase II Report see note 18 at 52. 
258 MTS Affidavit see note 236 at 77. 
259 CALS SLP Phase II Report see note 18 at 52. 
260 CALS SLP Phase II Report see note 18 at 52; MTS Affidavit see note 236 at 76. 
261 DMR Impact Report 2009 see note 95 at 10. 
262 DMR Impact Report 2009 see note 95 at 10. 
263 DMR Impact Report 2009 see note 95 at 10. 
264 DMR Impact Report 2009 see note 95 at 11. 
265 DMR Impact Report 2009 see note 95 at 11. 
266 DMR Impact Report 2015 see note 96 at 30. 
267 DMR Impact Report 2015 see note 96 at 30. 
268 Item 2.5 of the 2018 Mining Charter see note 12 at 24. 
269 Regulation 41 of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Regulations in GN R527 GG 26275 of 
23 April 2004.  
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developing and implementing SLPs could be an indication of the complexity facing mining 
companies in developing and implementing SLPs. It could also be an indication of how mining 
companies want to cut down on the resources required to deal with the complexity of 
developing and implementing SLPs – or both.  
3.3.2 Housing and Living conditions  
This element is meant to address the historically inhumane living conditions that black 
mineworkers were subjected to.270 The 2004 Mining Charter set the following objectives: that 
mining companies improve the standard of housing271 that they provided and report on their 
achievements and that address the nutrition of mine employees and report on what they have 
achieved and how they plan to improve.272  
All three Mining Charters prioritise the upgrading of hostels to family units and the promotion 
of home ownership.273 The 2017 Mining Charter takes, ostensibly, a step back by requiring a 
housing and conditions plan to be approved by the DMR who will consult with the Department 
of Human Settlements.274 According to the 2018 Mining Charter, mining right holders are 
required to submit a Housing and Living Conditions Plan to the DMR for approval.275 Housing 
and Living Conditions Plan should be developed in consultation with trade unions and the 
Department of Human Settlements.276 
According to the 2009 Impact Report, 26% of mining companies provided houses for their 
employees while 29% improved the standards of existing housing.277 Employees’ access to 
home ownership was facilitated by 34% of the mining companies and 29% of the mining 
companies offered nutrition to their employees.278 
Following the results of the 2009 Impact Report, the 2015 report set two objectives under this 
element. First, the upgrade of hostels to family units by 2014 and, second, an occupancy rate 
of one person per room.279  Overall, 55% of the mining companies met both objectives.280 
What is unclear from this percentage, is the number of mineworkers whose housing and living 
conditions have improved as compliance by more than half of the mining companies with 
mining rights does not necessarily translate to the improvement of the housing and living 
conditions of more than half of mineworkers in the industry. More clarity is thus required. 
                                                     
270 DMR Impact Report 2009 see note 96 at 11. 
271 An example of how this could be done is by either upgrading hostels or converting hostels into family units. 
272 DMR Impact Report 2009 see note 96 at 11. 
273 Item 4.5 of the 2004 Mining Charter see note 12 at 12; Item 2.7 of the 2010 Mining Charter see note 12 at 4; 
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277 DMR Impact Report 2009 see note 96 at 12. 
278 DMR Impact Report 2009 see note 96 at 12. 
279 DMR Impact Report 2015 see note 96 at 19. 
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Both of the above elements, mine community development and housing and living conditions, 
highlight the complexity required to ‘advance the social and economic welfare of all South 
Africans’.281 An added layer of complexity comes from the responsibility that mining 
companies have to localise the benefits of mining, to mining affected communities and labour-
sending areas,282 without perpetuating enclave development.283   
 ‘Enclave Development’ and the SLP System    
In Chapter Two284  enclave development was defined as ‘resource extraction that is 
disconnected from the rest of a country’s economy attached to development projects that is 
limited to the provision of basic human needs only to communities that surround the mining 
operation.285 This was contrasted to the phenomenon of linkages which was defined as the 
amount of transactions between the extractives industry and other industries that occur 
within an economy.286 Chapter Three considered the AMV and how it encourages linkages, as 
linkages are considered a means of ensuring the country receives maximum economic and 
social returns from its natural resources.287 
As stated above, the elements of the Mining Charter can be classified   according to three 
headings: (i) Increasing industry access and linkages which includes the ownership, 
procurement and beneficiation elements; (ii) Labour which includes the employment equity 
element, the human resources development element and the migrant labour element and (iii) 
social development which comprises the mining community development element and the 
housing and living conditions element. 
The elements that form part of increasing industry access and linkages work towards broader 
forms of distributing mineral wealth and inclusivity. These elements link other sectors of the 
South African economy with the mining industry which aligns them more closely to the idea 
of linkages as espoused in the AMV.288 The elements that form part of labour are aimed at 
ensuring workers at every level of the mining industry are representative of the demographics 
of South Africa, that their skills are developed and relevant to the needs of mining industry. 
The social development category is comprised of elements that are aimed at ensuring the 
development priorities of mining affected communities are met by mining rights holders 
                                                     
281 Regulation 41(a) of the MPRDA Regulations in GN R527 GG 26275 of 23 April 2004. 
282 Section 24 of the Constitution, s 2 of the MPRDA see note 8, regulation 41 MPRDA Regulations in GN R527 
GG 26275 of 23 April 2004.   
283 See Chapter Two section 3.2.1.2 and 3.2.1.3. 
284 Chapter Two section 3.2.1. 
285 Chapter Two section 3.2.1. 
286 Chapter Three section 2.1; A. O. Hirschman Strategy of Economic Development (1958) as cited in Richard 
Weisskoff and Edward Wolff ‘Linkages and Leakages: Industrial Tracking in an Enclave Economy’ (1977) Economic 
Development and Cultural Change 607 at 609. 
287 Chapter Three section 2.1; ECA: Minerals Cluster Policy Study see note 36 at 22. 
288 Chapter Three section 2.1.  
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through their SLPs. Arguably, this category of the SLP System is an example of enclave 
development as the development projects are aimed at and limited to the enclave.289  
It is this category, social development, which lies at the core of the SLP System’s flaw.  The 
social development category tasks mining rights holders with ensuring social development 
despite the fact that government is best suited to this task. The elements under social 
development also support the premise of this dissertation that even absolute compliance with 
the SLP System290 cannot result in large-scale and far-reaching socio-economic development 
of South African communities.291  
This inherent inability of the SLP System to distribute widely the benefits of mining translates 
to both labour-sending areas and poor communities that happen to be far from mineral 
reserves not experiencing socio-economic development.292 This is either because a mining 
company is not designed with the ability to implement far-reaching social development 
programmes or, as in the second case, because the SLP System does not task mining rights 
holders with developing poor communities that are far from mineral reserves and are not 
labour-sending areas.293 
4. Systemic lack of compliance and the influence of the African Mining 
Vision  
The 2009 and 2015 Impact Reports highlight the extent to which the lack of compliance by 
mining companies is systemic and how in instances where there is compliance, mining 
companies often take the narrowest approach.  
 Non-compliance and enclave development 
An example of mining companies adopting the narrowest approach possible where there is 
ambiguity is found in the 2009 Impact Report.294 The ambiguity on what the term ‘ownership’ 
in the 2004 Mining Charter entailed, allowed the industry to interpret ‘ownership’ narrowly 
by limiting it to an economic interest by HDSAs whereas the DMR relies on a broader 
interpretation that includes voting rights, an economic interest and net value.295 Additionally, 
mining companies relied on HDSAs in supporting roles as opposed to as part of their core 
business services which left core business positions in mining companies untransformed and 
                                                     
289 Chapter Two sections 3.2.1.2 and 3.2.1.3. 
290 ‘SLP System’ refers to the MPRDA Regulations governing SLPs and the Mining Charter. 
291 Chapter One section 2; section 24(b)(iii) of the Constitution of Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter the 
‘Constitution’) read with section 3(1) of the MPRDA states the State is the custodian of mineral and petroleum 
resources for the benefit of all South Africans and their exploitation should promote socio-economic 
development. 
292 See above at section 3.3. 
293 See above at section 3.3 
294 DMR Impact Report 2009 see note 95 at 23 to 24.  
295 See above at 60. 
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occupied by white men and women.296 Finally, mining companies emphasised ensuring their 
employees were literate and numerate as opposed to also ensuring research and 
development was funded to ensure South Africa’s human resources development was able to 
produce the requisite skills for the sustainable growth of the mining industry.297 According to 
the 2015 Impact Report, only 36% of the mining companies within the industry met the targets 
they had set in terms of the mining community development.298 In terms of employment 
equity, a target that relates to the level that a mining companies’ employees are 
representative of the demographics of South Africa, the 2015 Impact Report reveals that 
although companies met the target of 40% of HDSA representation, a break-down of the 
various rungs of the corporate ladder reveal the persistent lack of compliance in ensuring true 
representation.299     
Although the lack of compliance by mining companies permeates even to those elements that 
fit more comfortably with the traditional roles of companies, such as employment equity and 
human resources development, underlying the discussion below is how this lack of compliance 
can be addressed by moving away from the enclave approach to development.  
The 2009 and 2015 Impact Report point to the limitations inherent in tasking mining 
companies with a role best suited to government. The role of the State in promoting socio-
economic development was discussed in Chapter Two,300 and this discussion was based on 
the widely held idea that developing countries need ‘to create and regulate the economic and 
political relationship that can support sustained industrialisation’.301 Although the role of a 
‘developmental state’ is context specific and changes depending on the stage of development 
a country finds itself in,302 a number of suggestions have been posited regarding what this 
would look like for the South African government in relation to the mining industry. 
The first is that mining community development should be the responsibility of a state 
agency.303 The second recommendation is that mining companies contribute to a government 
fund that would ensure socio-economic development at the local level.304 The rationale for 
both recommendations is that a state agency would be better suited at implementing the 
development needs of a mining community because of its connection with the three levels of 
                                                     
296 See above at 63.  
297 See above at 66. 
298 DMR Impact Report 2015 see note 96 at 30. 
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government and other government departments.305 This is supported by mining companies’ 
past requests to the DMR for a uniform approach to designing and implementing SLPs, 306 
which is a sign of acknowledgement that they are unable to address multifaceted socio-
economic issues.   
 The influence of the African Mining Vision on South African policy makers 
The significance of the above two recommendations, that implementing the elements relating 
to social development be the responsibility of the government and not mining companies and 
that, instead, mining companies contribute to a government fund, lies in the fact that they 
curb the perpetuation of enclave development which occurs when mining companies are 
tasked with implementing the social development elements of the SLP System.  
Additionally, the form that these two recommendations will take can be fleshed out with 
reference to the AMV’s proposals for localising the benefits of mining, as discussed in Chapter 
Three.307 The South African government, in addition to the tax and royalties that mining 
companies contribute, could require an additional contribution for social development as 
opposed to imposing the implementation of this onto mining companies. A portion of these 
funds could be distributed through a clear revenue distribution system308 that would feed into 
local government. Local government would then ensure that mining affected communities, 
labour-sending areas and poor communities that happen to be far from mines share in the 
benefits of mining.309 The other portion of the revenue contributed by mining companies 
would be put into a Sovereign Wealth Fund (‘SWF’)310  and this would enable future 
generations to share in the benefits of mining. Section 24 of the Constitution can be relied on 
to support the assertion that it is important that the SLP System ensures both present and 
future generations share in the benefits of mining as the section sites both as beneficiaries.311 
According to the principle of intergenerational equity, present generations are accountable 
for how they steward natural resources and the state of the natural resources when they are 
                                                     
305 CALS SLP Phase III Report see note 303 at 41. 
306 DMR Impact Report 2009 see note 95 at 11. 
307 Chapter Three section 2.2. 
308 Chapter Three section 2.2; African Minerals Development Centre ‘Country Mining Vision Guidebook: 
Domesticating the African Mining Vision’ (2014) at 69 available at https://www.uneca.org/publications/country-
mining-vision-cmv-guidebook accessed on 28 May 2017.  Hereafter ‘CMV (2014)’. 
309 See Chapter Three section 2.2. It has been argued that a prevailing feature of neo-liberal thought within the 
development discourse is the fear associated to giving primary responsibility for development to African 
governments and, instead, tasking  either the markets or the private sector with transformation see Gumede 
“Social policy” (2018) see note 19 at 131. 
310 Chapter Three section 2.2 for the discussion on the SWF as proposed by the AMV. 
311 This is provided for expressly in section 24(b) of the Constitution; Tracy Humby ‘The right to development-in-
environment and its ecological and development thresholds’ (2016) 32 South African Journal of Human Rights 
219 at 234; For more on who bears the responsibility for ensuring the inter-generational protection of natural 
resources see Anél Du Plessis ‘Climate Change, Public Trusteeship and the Tomorrows of the Unborn’ (2015) 31 
South African Journal of Human Rights 269 at 276 to 280. 
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handed-over.312   This principle has been used to interpret s 24 of the Constitution as requiring 
the stewardship and handing over of ‘both natural resources and development gains’ as the 
fruits of development would have been derived from the exploitation of natural resources.313  
5. Conclusion 
The legislation governing mineral law in South Africa can be described as ‘remedial legislation’ 
because of its focus on remedying the effects of Apartheid on the mining sector. The 
constitutional basis of South Africa’s mineral law is found in section 24 of the Constitution and 
the Constitution establishes a link between the right to an ecologically sustainable 
development, the use of natural resources, and the promotion of socio-economic 
development.  
By considering the AMV, in Chapter Three and based on the discussion in this chapter, it 
becomes evident that South Africa is pursuing an RBI strategy. The question then arises why 
there seems to be apparent consensus regarding the failure of the current system to realise 
socio-economic development?  One of the critiques levelled against the AMV is that it will not 
benefit all the inhabitants of a country because it fails to address the negative implications 
that a minerals-based industrialisation strategy will have on women, children, rural 
communities and the environment. However, the SLP System deals extensively with mine 
community development, improving the living and housing conditions and increasing the 
participation of women and youth as part of employment equity yet, seemingly, to no avail. 
Instead the SLP System perpetuates enclave development by placing the responsibility for the 
Mining Charter elements that can be categorised as ‘social development’ with mining 
companies. 
Even more concerning are the high levels of non-compliance with the Mining Charter elements 
that fall appropriately within the domain and that are integral to an RBI strategy such as 
beneficiation and procurement. These high levels of non-compliance subvert the idea that to 
full benefit from RBI, South Africa needs to maximise its implementation of the AMV’s RBI 
strategy. The critiques of surrounding the AMV model and the analysis in this chapter open 
the door to more questions than answers and the final chapter will seek to clarify what has 
been established in the previous chapters and what questions have been left unanswered. 
                                                     
312 UN General Assembly ‘Report on International Solidarity and the Needs of Future Generations’ (2013) at 274 
available at https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/2006future.pdf accessed 23 December 
2018; Tracy Humby ‘The right to development-in-environment and its ecological and development thresholds’ 
(2016) 32 South African Journal of Human Rights 219 at 235. 
313 The emphasis on both natural resources and the fruits of development is the interpretation proposed by Tracy 
Humby in Tracy Humby ‘The right to development-in-environment and its ecological and development 
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of the interpretation proposed by Anél Du Plessis in Anél Du Plessis ‘Climate Change, Public Trusteeship and the 
Tomorrows of the Unborn’ (2015) 31 South African Journal of Human Rights 269 at 282 to 291which focuses 
solely on natural resources. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion and a way forward 
 
1. Overview 
How can the African Mining Vision (‘AMV’) influence the content of the Social and Labour Plan 
(‘SLP’) System as found in the MPRDA, its regulations governing SLPs and the Mining Charter? 
This question, and the focus of this dissertation, was stirred by the tragedy of the Marikana 
Massacre which brought to the fore a failing SLP System. 
As argued in this dissertation, the failures of the SLP System are rooted in the fact that the 
SLP System inherently perpetuates enclave development.1 The form of enclave development 
that is referred to in this dissertation includes the provision of both social and physical 
infrastructure but these developments only target specific areas surrounding their mining 
operations (enclaves).2 In the context of South Africa, this enclave approach to development 
is problematic because it means the SLP System is unable to distribute widely the benefits of 
mining to both labour-sending areas and poor communities that happen to be far from 
mineral reserves.3As such, the SLP System misses its central aims which are: (i) to promote 
employment and advance socio-economic development for all South Africans; and (ii) to 
ensure that mining right holders contribute to the socio-economic development of the areas 
where they operate.4 
2. Insights gained 
By analysing a number of socio-economic theories relevant to natural resource extraction,5 it 
became evident that the AMV’s proposal of Resource-based Industrialisation (‘RBI’) has its 
foundations firmly within the development discourse.6 Within the development discourse, 
RBI follows the broad approach to defining development as it inherently includes 
considerations of how to achieve economic growth and how the benefits of economic growth 
can be distributed to meet the national goals of the policy-makers who implement it.7  
The exploitation of natural resources has a long history of entrenching the exploitative 
relationship between ‘satellite countries’ and ‘metropolis countries’.8 Added to this history, 
is the effect that Apartheid had of entrenching sectoral disarticulation and enclave 
development in South Africa such that the internal structure of South Africa is now distorted. 
                                                     
1 Chapter Four section 3.4. 
2 Chapter Two section 3.2.1.2. 
3 Chapter Two section 3.2.1.2. 
4 Regulation 41(a) and (c) of the MPRDA see note 11. 
5 Chapter Two section 3. 
6 Chapter Two section 3.1. 
7 Chapter Two section 3.1. 
8 Chapter Two section 3.2.1. 
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The danger then, in wanting to fully implement an RBI strategy is that in an attempt to use 
natural resources to achieve socio-economic development, it could perpetuate sectoral 
disarticulation.9  
According to the AMV, to mitigate sectoral disarticulation from occurring, the natural 
resource extraction needs to be linked to other sectors of that country’s economy.10 If these 
links are, instead, with the economic sectors of other countries then the benefits of the 
resource extraction will no longer benefit the country where the resource extraction took 
place. Furthermore, if within a country, the metropolis-satellite structure is replicated and the 
mining industry is linked almost exclusively to the ‘metropolis’ within the country, that 
country will fail to localise the benefits of mining and ensure that the mining benefits the 
country as a whole.11 The type of relationship between the country where the resource 
extraction takes place, in most cases a ‘satellite country’, and a country that benefits from 
this resource extraction, ‘a metropolis country’, is what leads to the underdevelopment of 
the ‘satellite country’ while contributing to the development of the ‘metropolis country’.12     
Another implication of pursuing the AMV’s proposal of RBI at the international level, is that 
by promoting beneficiation tension arises with the treaty obligations of a country that is a 
member state of the World Trade Organisation, such as in the case of South Africa.13 As 
discussed in Chapter Two, international trade has distributional consequences and impacts 
the development of a country.14  
3. Contextual relevance 
When considering South Africa’s mineral laws and policies, it becomes evident that elements 
of the RBI strategy are already being pursued.15  This disproves the first hypothesis in the 
research question. Namely, in as much as the AMV proposes an RBI strategy as a means to 
achieving socio-economic development, what insights does it provide to localise the benefits 
of natural resource extraction that do not perpetuate enclave development? Additionally, is 
South Africa’s inability to realise the benefits of an RBI strategy because the government has 
not maximised its implementation or are the critiques levelled against the AMV’s model 
valid?16  
If one where to follow the line of reasoning that South Africa should work towards the full 
implementation of an RBI strategy then the AMV’s proposal of localising the benefits of 
mining are appealing. The AMV proposes the development of fiscal linkages, a clear mineral 
                                                     
9 Chapter Two section 3.2.1.2. 
10 Chapter Two section 3.2.1.2. 
11 Chapter Two section 3.2.1.2. 
12 Chapter Two section 3.2.1.1. 
13 Chapter Three section 3.1. 
14 Chapter Two section 3.2.2. 
15 Chapter Four section 2.1. 
16 Chapter Three section 2.3. 
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revenue distribution system and the establishment of a Sovereign Wealth Fund (‘SWF’).17 The 
fiscal linkages from the mining industry to the government enable the government to re-
invest the revenue from exploiting the minerals into both physical and social infrastructure.18 
These re-investments can be distributed more widely by the government and local 
government to mining-affected communities, labour-sending areas and other poor 
communities to ensure the basic needs of those communities are met.19 Additionally, a SWF 
ensures that future generations can also benefit from mining.20  
4. Challenges and weaknesses of current model 
However the difficulty of implementing the AMV’s RBI strategy was evident in Chapter Four. 
In Chapter Four the continual revision of the eight elements within the Mining Charter was 
discussed.21 The eight elements can be classed into three categories: (i) Increasing industry 
access and linkages; (ii) Labour and (iii) Social development.22 Within the ‘Increasing industry 
access and linkages’ are the following elements: ownership, procurement and beneficiation 
elements. In ‘Labour’ is the employment equity element, the human resources development 
element and the migrant labour element and under ‘Social development’ is the mining 
community development element, the housing and living conditions element.23 
The perpetuation of enclave development occurs within the third category ‘Social 
development’. This is because the social development category is comprised of elements that 
are aimed at ensuring the development priorities of mining affected communities are met by 
mining rights holders through their SLPs and these development projects are aimed at and 
limited to the enclave.24  
Government is best suited to the development and implementation of far-reaching social 
development. This inherent limitation of mining rights holders, which are generally mining 
companies, to distribute widely the benefits of mining translates to both labour-sending areas 
and poor communities that happen to be far from mineral reserves not experiencing socio-
economic development.25 This is because a mining company is not designed with the ability 
to implement far-reaching social development programmes and, in the second case, because 
the SLP System does not task mining rights holders with developing poor communities that 
are far from mineral reserves and are not labour-sending areas.26 
                                                     
17 Chapter Three section 2.2. 
18 Chapter Three section 2.2. 
19 Chapter Three section 2.2. 
20 Chapter Three section 2.2. 
21 These eight elements are: ownership, procurement, beneficiation, employment equity, human resources 
development, migrant labour, mining community development and housing and living conditions.  
22 Chapter Four section 3.4. 
23 Chapter Four section 3.4. 
24 Chapter Four section 3.4.  
25 Chapter Four section 3.4.  
26 Chapter Four section 3.4.  
91 
 
 
From the first Mining Charter to the latest Mining Charter, the DMR has continued to revise 
the Mining Charters in an attempt to realise the objectives of ‘(i) promoting employment and 
advance socio-economic development; and (ii) ensuring that mining companies contribute to 
the socio-economic development of the areas where they operate.’27 This is all based on the 
premise that the SLP System can, in fact, reach its objectives. What Chapter Four highlights, 
however, is that so long as mining companies are charged with social development, a number 
of communities will not benefit from mining. 
The fact that the exploitation of natural resources fails to result in socio-economic 
development means a crises is brewing. It also gives credence to the two critiques levelled 
against the AMV that (a) it fails to adequately address the negative implications of a Resource-
based Industrialisation strategy on women, children and rural communities and (b) it 
perpetuates the colonial model of natural resource extraction.  At the heart of this crises is 
an interrogation of what it means to exploit natural resources when the social and 
environmental costs outweigh the benefits of mining.    
Government and mining companies will find it increasingly difficult to justify mining, with its 
harmful impact on the environment, its disruptive effects on the use of land and its impact 
on communities’ and societies’ way of life, when communities see no evidence that the 
mining will result in socio-economic development. It also wouldn’t make sense to want to 
justify mining if it was not working for all South Africans and this is aligned to the sentiment 
that where mining cannot benefit the whole country, the best option is not to mine as natural 
resources are a non-renewable resource.28  
5. Terms of reference for RBI 
If natural resource exploitation is to truly result in socio-economic development a completely 
different paradigm will be required. This is where some of the insights from the school of 
post-development scholars can be used to offer (tentative) terms of reference.  
The first term of reference is that no African country has successfully relied on RBI. This term 
of reference seeks to remove the methodological assumptions present in the AMV and South 
Africa’s mineral laws and policies which look to RBI because, supposedly, European countries 
relied on RBI to reach their present level of development. Thus far, we have no evidence that 
an RBI strategy in South Africa will lead to socio-economic development.  
The second term of reference is that there is no guarantee that the implementation of a 
successful RBI will lead to socio-economic development. This term of reference is aimed at 
removing the normative assumption. What is certain is that a successful RBI strategy will 
necessitate the destruction of the environment, it will have disruptive effects on the use of 
                                                     
27 Regulation 41(a) and (c) of  the MPRDA Regulations see note 11 
28 Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey D Sachs and Joseph E Stilglitz ‘Introduction: what is the problem with natural 
resource wealth’ in Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey D Sachs and Joseph E Stilglitz (eds) Escaping the resource curse 
(2007) at 15. 
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land and communities’ and societies’ way of life. This is not to say that a RBI strategy cannot 
result in socio-economic development merely that we have no evidence either way and 
should implement legislation and policies with this in mind. 
A third term of reference, which goes to the foundation of the development discourse, is that 
we do not know whether socio-economic development can be achieved and, even more 
critically, what does it mean to set ‘socio-economic development’ as the goal?  As stated in 
Chapter Two,29 post-development theorists reject the three assumptions present in both the 
narrow and broad approaches to defining ‘development’, and the term ‘socio-economic 
development’ is firmly rooted within the broad approach.   
6.   Final word 
On 28 February 2019 the North West High Court handed down a judgment30 dismissing the 
application to declare the Minister of Mineral Resources in breach of his statutory obligations 
for not holding Lonmin accountable for failing to comply with their SLP. This application was 
brought by the Mining Forum of South Africa, an NGO that represents the interests of 
communities – communities that are in Marikana. The case highlights the ongoing difficulty 
that mining affected communities face in ensuring SLPs are complied with. It further 
highlights the need for government to not only ‘think outside the box’ but to possibly get rid 
of the box in a way that is community led. This reimagining would need to include mining 
affected communities, communities in labour-sending areas and poor communities. This 
approach is necessary given that these are the communities that pay the highest price for the 
social and environmental costs of mining.  
In addition to the above Terms of Reference, sustained monitoring and evaluation is required 
to ensure that flaws and shortcomings in our mineral laws and policies can be detected early 
on and addressed. We can no longer assume that certain strategies will, in time, begin to yield 
results. Instead, ongoing research is required into whether the insights provided by the AMV 
are worth implementing, and whether they can be implemented by the South African 
government.  
 
                                                     
29 Chapter Two section 2.3. 
30 Mining Forum of South Africa and Another v Minister of Mineral Resources and Others [2019] 2 All SA 485 
(NWM) (28 February 2019). 
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